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1. Introduction
This volume was prepared as a dissertation in the broad ﬁeld of the economics of inter-
national trade. One could easily classify this thesis altogether to belong to the broadly
deﬁned F code of the classiﬁcation provided by the Journal of Economic Literature. How-
ever, the four chapters I present here ask four diﬀerent research questions which could be
seen as detached from each other within this ﬁeld.
With Chapter 2, I provide a rigor ﬁrst time empirical quantiﬁcation of a theoretical model
that predicts the multilateral pattern of international migration ﬂows in the world. Specif-
ically, I structurally estimate a micro-founded gravity equation for migration ﬂows. The
model allows me to conduct comparative static analyses which include general equilib-
rium changes in migration costs. With this framework, ex ante counterfactual analysis
and the quantiﬁcation of migration redirection eﬀects are possible. For a sample of 33
European Union (EU) and OECD countries, I quantify eﬀects on immigration from two
scenarios. First, I provide direct and indirect immigration eﬀects of Turkey becoming a
member of the European Union. Second, I evaluate a deeper integration of the European
Union single market from lowered language and correlated cultural barriers to migration.
The results show that inference from consistent regression coeﬃcients does not ensure a
correct quantiﬁcation of migration ﬂows. Comparative static results diﬀer quantitatively
and qualitatively from predictions of consistently estimated coeﬃcients. First, compar-
ative static eﬀects on immigration are substantially lower and second, immigration in
third countries is aﬀected negatively by bilaterally decreased migration frictions.
In Chapter 3 we ask how the welfare quantiﬁcation of trade liberalization changes if
we allow workers to be mobile within established frameworks. Precisely, so-called new
quantitative trade models which are prominently used to evaluate welfare eﬀects from
trade liberalization so far assume labor to be immobile. This chapter therefore provides
a ﬁrst structurally estimable model of international trade with endogenous international
migration choices of workers. We use the model for an ex ante comparative static welfare
quantiﬁcation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. We use dyadic
trade and migration data for 36 OECD countries and ﬁnd that quantitative welfare pre-
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dictions change if workers are allowed to migrate. The results are informative about the
complex welfare changes of international economic integration agreements with respect
to the interaction of trade and migration frictions.
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature that tries to explain why the observation of reduced
frictions with respect to international trade due to globalization does not show up if we
infer elasticities of these frictions with established tools. More detailed, to solve this
distance puzzle, we use a newly developed gravity equation estimator derived from a
heterogeneous ﬁrm micro-structure. We use three diﬀerent data sets and ﬁnd that the
distance coeﬃcient increases over time when standard estimators are use, while a non-
linear estimation of the newly developed estimation leads to a decline in the distance
coeﬃcient over time. We show that distance puzzle, thus, arises from a growing bias
of standard estimates. We explain the latter by an increase of the importance of the
bias from omitting the number of heterogeneous exporting ﬁrms relative to the bias from
omitting zero trade ﬂows. Furthermore, we show that simply including zero trade ﬂows
cannot solve the distance puzzle.
And Chapter 5 tries to clarify why domestic labor market eﬀects of ﬁrm's internation-
alization strategies might diﬀer across empirical investigations. This chapter precisely
investigates the eﬀects of oﬀshoring and FDI on German establishment employment. We
compare diﬀerent modes and measures of oﬀshoring and FDI, diﬀerent estimation meth-
ods, diﬀerent sets of control or selection variables, and two diﬀerent micro-data sets in a
uniﬁed methodical framework. We can conﬁrm positive employment eﬀects from general
FDI, market seeking FDI, and even from cost saving FDI which we ﬁnd in the literature,
but ﬁnd negative employment eﬀects from international sourcing which includes domes-
tic closures. We show that the results are sensitive to the mode of internationalization
rather than to the estimation method, the choice of control or selection variables, or the
employed data set. We argue that this can also explain diverse results in the literature.
However, we document a robust negative employment eﬀect of international sourcing
whenever a domestic restructuring is causally aligned and can conﬁrm this result also
with a quasi natural control group which is unique to one of our data sets.
While it is true that all chapters could generally be seen as stand-alone contributions to
more narrowly deﬁned strands of literature within international trade, I want to high-
light that the four chapters are additionally centered around and linked by two recently
dominating topics within the international trade literature.
The ﬁrst recurring topic is the gravity model of economic ﬂow variables. Augmenting
the pure empirical observation of gravity forces driving international goods ﬂows with
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a general equilibrium economic theory, turned the gravity equation to a gravity model.
By now this model is seen as the workhorse model to analyze international trade and
speciﬁcally to quantify the welfare consequences of trade liberalization within so-called
new quantitative trade models and elsewhere.
Clearly, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 source from recent developments in the economic gravity
literature and can therefore be seen closely related to each other. All three chapters
contain some version of a gravity model and estimate a gravity equation, although with
diﬀerent objectives. Chapter 2 employs a theoretical gravity model for migration derived
from an individual discrete choice over potential locations. I use the gravity model here
to infer international migration costs and to predict equilibrium changes of international
migration ﬂows with respect to changes in migration policy.
Chapter 3 actually includes two micro-founded gravity equations, one for trade ﬂows and
one for migration ﬂows. Here we propose a full general equilibrium model of international
trade where workers are mobile in the vein of new quantitative trade models. The twofold
gravity structure guides on the one hand the structural estimation of trade and migration
frictions and on the other hand the equilibrium welfare calculation with respect to changes
in international trade and/or migration frictions.
One common property of (most) existing gravity models is that they cannot explain the
stylized fact that some countries do not trade with all other countries in the world, but
for inﬁnite trade costs. In Chapter 4 we employ a gravity estimator which is derived
from a heterogeneous ﬁrms model. Within this model, zero trade ﬂow observations for
some country-pairs are explained by insuﬃcient productivity levels of ﬁrms to serve every
foreign market due to ﬁxed costs from exporting.
One other core result of the heterogeneous ﬁrms literature is that not all ﬁrms engage in
international activity. This fact inspires the the general research design and the identiﬁ-
cation strategy of Chapter 5 using micro-data and methods from the treatment evaluation
literature. At the same time the empirical speciﬁcation in this chapter is guided by the
general insights from the heterogeneous ﬁrms literature.
So, Chapters 4 and 5 share a close relationship to the heterogeneous ﬁrms literature. For
a much broader overview on both, the gravity and new quantitative trade literature and
the heterogeneous ﬁrms literature I refer to speciﬁc chapters of the most recent volume of
the Handbook of International Economics. Head and Mayer (2014) summarize the status
of gravity in international trade while Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) do this for
new quantitative trade models. Melitz and Redding (2014) and Antràs and Yeaple (2014)
review the importance of heterogeneous ﬁrms in international trade over the last decade.
3
All chapters of this thesis are self-contained and can be read autonomously. They provide
own introductions, conclusions, and appendices.
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2. Comparative Statics
Quantiﬁcation of Structural
Migration Gravity Models
2.1. Introduction
International migration is subject to various frictions. Changes of these frictions result
in complex changes of migration ﬂows which are highly relevant for policy makers. In
a world of more than two countries barriers to migration between two countries con-
tain a multilateral component. If two countries bilaterally lower their migration barriers,
migration from one of these two countries to a third country becomes relatively less at-
tractive in terms of relative costs. The literature calls this property of a multi-country
migration model multilateral resistance. Theoretical concepts of multilateral resistance
to migration involve potential migration redirection eﬀects from bilateral changes in mi-
gration frictions and thus potential immigration eﬀects on third countries. In this paper
I quantify the complex changes of migration ﬂows in a structural gravity model of in-
ternational migration. I apply the Anderson (2011) model to a data set of 33 European
Union and OECD countries, estimate the model's migration cost parameters implied by
the model's migration gravity structure and illustrate how this framework can be used
for comparative statics. I demonstrate that comparative statics are quantitatively and
qualitatively diﬀerent from merely interpreted gravity regression coeﬃcients. Speciﬁcally,
I explore neglected properties of a Random Utility Model (RUM) based general equilib-
rium migration gravity model.1 I focus on the multilateral resistance equilibrium nature
of the model by Anderson (2011) which enables a quantiﬁcation of migration ﬂows in a
comparative static analysis. Since multilateral resistance terms of this model depend on
all bilateral migration barriers, their change must be accounted for in a quantiﬁcation of
1The general idea of RUMs is to derive a discrete choice model under the assumption of utility maxi-
mization following to Marschak (1959). See Section 2.3.
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the equilibrium impact of changes in bilateral migration barriers on migration ﬂows. The
structural model allows me to account for these changes, additional to a consistent struc-
tural eﬀects estimation. The eﬀects resulting from the comparative static quantiﬁcation
are called conditional general equilibrium (conditional GE) eﬀects.2 However, interpreting
theory-consistent regression coeﬃcients, given that they might already control for mul-
tilateral resistance to migration, does not deliver correct predictions of migration ﬂows,
since this does not account for equilibrium changes due to multilateral resistance. The
comprehensive application of multilateral resistance to migration in a comparative static
analysis is therefore crucial for a quantiﬁcation of immigration eﬀects. Another advantage
of the conditional GE approach is that it sheds light on the heterogeneity of immigration
changes across countries. Therefore, we gain a much more diﬀerentiated picture from this
exercise.
The conditional GE eﬀects of a change in bilateral migration barriers on immigration
can be obtained as follows. First, I consistently estimate the structural parameters of
the theoretical model. This gives theory-consistent parameters. Then, I use parameters
and observed values of the model and calculate multilateral resistance terms for every
country. Third, I recalculate multilateral resistance terms for counterfactual scenarios.
These new values can then be used to calculate changes in bilateral migration ﬂows for
every country-pair. This delivers migration redirection and third country eﬀects and a
detailed picture of the heterogeneity of eﬀects on immigration. In contrast to conditional
GE eﬀects, I refer to predictions of migration ﬂows from consistently estimated coeﬃcients
from the empirical gravity equation as partial eﬀects.
I demonstrate and compare the diﬀerences between partial eﬀects and conditional GE
eﬀects of bilateral changes in migration barriers on migration ﬂows for two counterfactual
scenarios. The ﬁrst example is an evaluation of Turkey becoming a full member of
the European Union and the eﬀects on multilateral migration ﬂows. As one of the so-
called four freedoms of the single market project, becoming a member of the European
Union includes the free movement of workers within all member countries. Therefore
this exercise serves as a prototypical example for a policy induced change of migration
barriers.
2Multilateral resistance is a general equilibrium concept in the model by Anderson (2011) which means
that it involves all bilateral changes of migration frictions in the world. The term conditional stems
from the fact that multilateral resistance eﬀects are conditional on the supplied labor force to a
country. In the trade literature this term was coined by Anderson and Yotov (2010). See Section 2.2
for a discussion on the relation to the trade gravity literature of this approach and Section 2.3 for
details on the model. Chapter 3 of this thesis shows how the supplied labor force to a country can
be endogenized in a gravity model of migration and trade.
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In the second scenario I hypothetically lower migration frictions between all European
Union member countries in terms of language barriers. The literature on the determi-
nants of migration costs documents the economic importance of language barriers for
aggregate migration ﬂows (Chiswick, 2015; Adserà and Pytlikova, 2015). The European
Commission proposes the promotion of the integration process via the framework strat-
egy for multilingualism. Eﬀectively, language is seen as a long term policy variable for
deepening integration, especially via increased job opportunities of migrants within the
European Union. Thus, both scenarios lower existing migration barriers for a subset of
countries.
The results can be summarized as follows. Lowering migration frictions increases mi-
gration. Partial and conditional GE eﬀects on immigration deliver expected qualitative
results for the countries which are directly involved in the bilateral reduction of frictions.
This is in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature and our general intuition with re-
spect to migration barriers. While the results do not diﬀer with respect to the sign of the
change in migration ﬂows for directly aﬀected countries, I document substantial quantita-
tive and qualitative diﬀerences between interpreting consistent regression coeﬃcients and
comparative static results on immigration. For example, partial eﬀects predict a bilateral
relative increase in immigration of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union
of around 113% for Turkey-EU country-pairs, whereas the comparative static analysis
only predicts an increase of around 75% for bilateral immigration for the same country-
pairs. Partial eﬀects for bilateral immigration are constant, while conditional GE eﬀects
are heterogeneous with values ranging from 7% to 98% for the Turkey-EU country-pairs.
Total immigration changes for the two counterfactuals are heterogeneous at the country-
level, although due to very diﬀerent reasons.3 For the partial eﬀects prediction of total
immigration changes at the country-level, I must multiply the uniform estimate from the
regression with the observed migration ﬂows for every country-pair where a change in
the migration cost vector is induced in the counterfactual scenario, i.e. EU-Turkey or
EU-EU country-pairs respectively. Immigration from all other countries does not change
for this exercise. Since the share of immigration from these countries in total immigration
again diﬀers at the country-level, I do observe some heterogeneity for total immigration
changes across destination countries. In contrast to this, heterogeneity of the conditional
GE eﬀects on total immigration results from changes in multilateral resistance to migra-
tion which is endogenous in the model. The degree of heterogeneity is substantial for
3To be precise, bilateral immigration is the migration ﬂow from one particular country to one other
particular country. Total immigration is the aggregate migration ﬂow from all countries to one
particular country.
7
conditional GE eﬀects, while it is minor for partial eﬀects. The qualitative diﬀerence of
partial eﬀects and conditional GE eﬀects is also documented for total immigration. On
the one hand, partial eﬀects on total immigration are zero for third countries and positive
for all other countries. On the other hand, total immigration from the comparative static
analysis  which accounts for multilateral resistance and delivers conditional GE eﬀects
on total immigration  are substantially negative for third countries. With this, I quantify
causal migration redirection eﬀects from multilateral resistance which cannot be detected
by simply interpreting estimated coeﬃcients of a gravity equation. To sum up, consistent
estimates from a migration gravity model do not give a correct impact of migration fric-
tions on migration ﬂows. This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, recent
contributions to the literature of international migration propose varieties of migration
gravity equations to analyze international migration matrices and to estimate parameters
of bilateral migration ﬂow determinants. Multilateral resistance to migration is accounted
for at the estimation stage in some works. As a result these studies provide consistently
estimated coeﬃcients. I brieﬂy review this literature in Section 2.2. Beine et al. (2015)
provide a broader guide through this young strand of literature. I contribute to this
literature with the ﬁrst application of the model by Anderson (2011) which includes a
comparative static analysis to account for multilateral resistance comprehensively. I will
refer in the following to the international trade literature. Most importantly, I transfer
the insight from a comparative statics quantiﬁcation of multilateral resistance to trade to
multilateral resistance to migration. Relations to this literature are reviewed in Section
2.2. The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 brieﬂy reviews recent migra-
tion gravity studies and relates to the trade literature. Section 2.3 recaps the migration
gravity model of Anderson (2011) on which I will base the structural estimation and the
comparative static analysis. Section 2.4 presents the estimation stage, after which Section
2.5 provides information on the compiled data set. Section 2.6 discusses the results of
the estimation, while Section 2.7 discusses the comparative static quantiﬁcation for both
counterfactual scenarios. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2. Related Literature
2.2.1. Gravity Equations for Migration
The ﬁrst connection of empirical regularities of migration ﬂows to a law of gravity similar
to Newton's law of gravity dates back to the 19th century. Early works which document
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the idea of gravitational forces à la Newton driving spatial interaction of economic entities
include Carey (1858). Ravenstein (1885) is known for characterizing laws of migration fol-
lowing a gravity intuition. Only recently this idea has regained attention in the economic
literature on international migration. Beine et al. (2015) blame the absence of (dyadic)
migration data for a century without progress on migration gravity. However, recent
contributions employ varieties of migration gravity estimations to establish bilateral de-
terminants of migration ﬂows (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Beine et al., 2011; Ortega and
Peri, 2013; Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013; Oreﬁce, 2015; Figueiredo et al.,
2016; Adserà and Pytlikova, 2015).
The common denominator of micro-foundations for a migration gravity equation which
the literature proposes is a RUM. Generally, the maximized utility by individuals in a
RUM consists of two parts. One which is observed by the researcher and one which
is private information of the individual. The observed part of the utility is given by
the payoﬀs from migration (usually income) reduced by the costs from migrating. To
gain individual probabilities of migration from a discrete choice model, distributional
assumptions about the unobserved part of individual utility are necessary. Migration
gravity approaches in the literature diﬀer by their speciﬁcation of the observed part and
by the distributional assumptions about the unobserved part of utility. Beine et al.
(2015) give an overview on RUMs which are used for international migration gravity
modeling. In the next step, one can derive an aggregate expression for migration from
these probabilities. In Section 2.3, I explore this in more detail for the model proposed
by Anderson (2011).
Specifying the payoﬀs of the observed part of the utility with bilateral variables already
yields a partial equilibrium gravity model for aggregate migration ﬂows. See Beine et al.
(2015) for a general presentation of this approach. Existing studies use this RUM founda-
tion either to establish empirical speciﬁcations of migration barriers or to clarify selection
and sorting issues of migration with respect to payoﬀs and costs. For example Grogger
and Hanson (2011) use such a framework with two skill groups to derive an empirical
migration gravity equation which sheds light on migration costs and the international
sorting of migrants across skill groups. Beine et al. (2011) document the importance
of network eﬀects measured via past stocks of bilateral migrants with a similar design
of the analysis. Ortega and Peri (2013) construct a unique measure of migration policy
tightness to establish that migration costs are considerably aﬀected by policy regulations.
Adserà and Pytlikova (2015) give a detailed picture of the eﬀects of diﬀerent language
barriers on migration ﬂows. Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) derive a con-
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cept of multilateral resistance to migration from a generalization of the distributional
assumptions of the unobserved component of utility. They show that the error term of
an empirical gravity equation of migration shares entails a multilateral component which
generally depends on alternative migration destinations and bilateral migration barriers.
This concept of multilateral resistance can then be controlled for in an estimation on data
with higher frequency using recent advances of panel data estimators.
In contrast to Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013), Anderson (2011) proposes a
theoretical concept of multilateral resistance to migration in a general equilibrium model,
which also builds on the canonical RUM. From this, he can obtain a structural migration
gravity model where multilateral resistance to migration occurs for standard assumptions
on the unobserved part of utility (see Section 2.3 for details on the model). Note that
multilateral resistance to migration is a general equilibrium concept in Anderson (2011)
while it is an assumption about the error term of an empirical gravity equation in Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013). To quantify the eﬀects of multilateral resistance
to migration of Anderson (2011), a comparative static analysis of the model is necessary.
Oreﬁce (2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016) refer to the model of Anderson (2011), al-
though they do not use the model for a comparative static analysis but estimate partial
eﬀects. They estimate the model to establish regional trade agreements as a determinant
of bilateral migration frictions.
I contribute to this literature by using the model of Anderson (2011) for a quantiﬁcation
of multilateral resistance consistent counterfactual migration ﬂows. Some works in the
literature present empirical speciﬁcations which already control for the concept of multi-
lateral resistance to migration of Anderson (2011) at the estimation stage. So do Oreﬁce
(2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016). Therefore, they present consistent estimated coeﬃ-
cients which can be used for a prediction of migration ﬂows in form of partial eﬀects. The
theoretical model allows me to conduct a comparative static analysis which is consistent
with changes of multilateral resistance terms in a new counterfactual equilibrium. The
quantiﬁcation I present here therefore entails for the ﬁrst time endogenous equilibrium
changes of multilateral resistance to migration.
2.2.2. Relations to Structural Trade Gravity
The importance of a comprehensive treatment of multilateral resistance in a general
equilibrium model is well known for trade gravity approaches, although not commonly
implemented. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) introduce the concept of multilateral
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resistance to trade in a micro-founded general equilibrium trade gravity model. Over
the last decade, such structural trade gravity models became fundamental in the trade
literature.4 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show the puzzling high negative eﬀect
of national borders on trade in goods to be driven by missing multilateral resistance to
trade. Speciﬁcally, they show that a comparative static analysis of equilibrium changes of
trade ﬂows, which account for multilateral resistance comprehensively, does not show the
puzzling eﬀect of borders anymore. However, the trade gravity literature elucidates of the
fact that interpreting consistent regression coeﬃcients does not give a correct quantiﬁ-
cation of the impact of bilateral changes in trade costs on trade ﬂows. Head and Mayer
(2014) write that the estimation of empirical trade gravity models became [...] just a
ﬁrst step before a deeper analysis [...]. I transfer this insight to the migration gravity lit-
erature by estimating the model of Anderson (2011) and conducting a comparative static
analysis. My results show qualitatively a similar picture of the importance of multilateral
resistance to migration compared to multilateral resistance to trade. Although structural
gravity models are sometimes reviewed as applying to factor ﬂows as well (Head and
Mayer, 2014; Anderson, 2011), a comparable implementation and quantiﬁcation seems to
be missing in the migration literature.
The formal representation of the theoretical migration gravity model of Anderson (2011)
(see Section 2.3) is analogous to the one in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). This
allows me to draw on recent insights from the trade gravity literature.
As for Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the modularity of the structural migration
gravity model by Anderson (2011) allows one to correct consistent estimates of bilateral
changes in migration barriers to ones which account for the eﬀects via a recalculation
of the multilateral resistance module for a new equilibrium of migration ﬂows. How-
ever, Head and Mayer (2014) call the interpretation of theory consistent estimates at the
estimation stage of a trade gravity the Partial Trade Impact. I call the prediction of mi-
gration ﬂows from this partial eﬀects, as outlined in Section 2.1. For predicted migration
ﬂows which incorporate multilateral resistance term changes from bilateral changes in
migration barriers, I use the term conditional GE eﬀects. For the trade analog, Anderson
and Yotov (2010) coin the term conditional general equilibrium technique. Compared
to a full general equilibrium where GDPs and expenditures are recalculated in the com-
parative static analysis, the multilateral resistance terms can be recalculated separately
4I dare to say that the theoretical underpinnings of trade gravity models by Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Anderson (1979), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) are initially accountable for the so-called
literature of new quantitative trade models. Roughly, these models use micro-founded general equi-
librium trade models to quantify economic impacts from changes in trade determinants on spatially
linked economic entities. See Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) for an overview on this literature.
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in the trade gravity model as well.5 Head and Mayer (2014) therefore call conditional
GE eﬀects in a trade gravity the Modular Trade Impact. Importantly, they note that
the diﬀerence of results for moderate trade cost changes between conditional GE and full
general equilibrium eﬀects are minor.
2.3. Migration Gravity Model
I brieﬂy recap the structural migration gravity system proposed by Anderson (2011).
In a multi-country setting emigration is a discrete choice from the set of countries in
the world from the perspective of a single worker. A worker h migrates from country
o (origin) to d (destination) only if her utility of choosing d is bigger than for all other
possible choices. The utility in country o is given by her wage, wo plus an idiosyncratic
part of utility. Migration to country d involves country-pair speciﬁc costs of migration,
δod > 1 ∀ d 6= o and δoo = 1, which reduce utility in country d in an iceberg type way,
wd/δod. Migration additionally involves a worker and country-pair speciﬁc factor of utility
odh. So a worker decides to migrate from country o to d iﬀ (wd/δod)odh ≥ woooh. In
line with discrete choice theory, utility of a representative migrant is separated into two
parts. One part which is observable and determined by characteristics at the country-
pair-level, Vod = ln(wd) − ln(wo) − ln(δod). The second part of the utility, which is
worker and country-pair speciﬁc, εodh = ln odh, is not observable for the researcher. With
distributional assumptions for εodh, one can derive the probability of a randomly drawn
worker to migrate.6
From multiplying the number of people in country o with the migration probability of
a randomly drawn worker of country o, G(Vod), we gain an aggregate multi-country
migration ﬂow equation,
Mod = G(Vod)No, (2.1)
where No is the number of natives in o and G(Vod) gives the proportion of migrants from
o to d, which is given by
G(Vod) =
eVod∑
k e
Vok
. (2.2)
5Anderson (2011) highlights the general modularity of the gravity equation in more detail and with
respect to a sectoral analysis.
6Adopted to the multi-country discrete choice of a representative worker, a derivation of the
multinomial-logit probabilities is given in Appendix A.1.
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Plugging in the V 's yields a multilateral migration ﬂow equation as
Mod =
wd
δod∑
k(
wk
δok
)
No. (2.3)
The migration ﬂow from country o to d is positively associated with the wage in the
destination country d, bilateral migration barriers to all other potential countries than d,
δok, and the number of natives of the source country o, No.7 Migration is negatively asso-
ciated with bilateral migration barriers, captured by δod, and wages in all other countries
than d, wk. Note that the idiosyncratic or worker speciﬁc part of the utility is captured
implicitly by the functional form of Equation (2.3). So the individual probabilities, which
are derived in Appendix A.1, already capture the unobserved part of the migrant's utility,
εodh.
Using accounting identities and the labor market clearance condition, Anderson (2011)
provides the following migration gravity system:8
Mod =
LdNo
Nw︸ ︷︷ ︸
frictionless migration
1/δod
ΩdWo︸ ︷︷ ︸
migration frictions
, with (2.4)
Ωd =
[∑
o
(
1/δod
Wo
)
No
Nw
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
inward multilateral resistance
, Wo =
[∑
d
(
1/δod
Ωd
)
Ld
Nw
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
outward multilateral resistance
. (2.5)
The masses which drive migration ﬂows in this gravity model are given by No, the pop-
ulation of the origin country, and by Ld, the labor force supplied to country d. Both
increase migration ﬂows between a bilateral pair of countries and their product goes into
the ﬂow equation relatively to the world population Nw. Bilateral migration barriers,
δod, decrease migration ﬂows. Ωd and Wo indicate the multilateral resistance terms to
migration.
Section 2.4 estimates Equation (2.4) structurally to infer δod, and in Section 2.7 I use this
system to conduct the comparative static analysis. This can be done by realizing that
multilateral resistance terms can be solved for observed values of No, Ld, and δod.
Before I go on, several things are worth mentioning about this model. First of all, we
can observe the hypothetical migration pattern of a frictionless world by the ﬁrst part of
Equation (2.4). In a world without any friction to migration, we would observe the mi-
7Beine et al. (2015) call the latter the potential of a country for sending migrants.
8For intermediate steps of the derivation see Appendix A.2.
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grant share from country o of the labor force supplied to d to be equal to country o's share
of the world population. From this we can nicely observe the general two-way migration
nature of the model. The precise two-way migration pattern is additionally shifted by
bilateral migration costs and multilateral resistance terms. The frictionless view already
points to the second important fact, that the model would only imply a zero migration
ﬂow if the frictions between two countries o and d were inﬁnitely large. Migration frictions
are collected in the second part of Equation (2.4). Frictions are a composite of bilateral
migration barriers, δod, and multilateral resistance terms. Bilateral migration costs aﬀect
bilateral migration ﬂows relative to the multilateral resistance terms. We can already
see that multilateral resistance terms depend on bilateral migration barriers. Therefore,
a change in the bilateral migration cost vector for one country-pair aﬀects all countries'
multilateral resistance terms which has to be accounted for when it comes to a predic-
tion of migration ﬂows. Technically multilateral resistance terms are averages of inverse
migration frictions weighted by the relative size of a country. The inward multilateral
resistance term collects all barriers for migrants to a speciﬁc migration destination coun-
try, while the outward multilateral resistance term collects all barriers for migrants from
a speciﬁc migration origin country. Anderson and Yotov (2010) give a nice intuition for
these terms for trade ﬂows. They suggest understanding inward multilateral resistance as
the uniform markup a buyer pays for a bundle of goods from a hypothetical world market.
Outward multilateral resistance is then understood as the average trade cost which an
exporter faces when selling to this world market. Transferring this intuition to migration
means that inward multilateral resistance captures migration barriers for every migrant
to destination country d for migrants from a hypothetical world origin, i.e. irrespective
of her origin country. Then, outward multilateral resistance measures the uniform costs
every migrant faces for migration from country o to the hypothetical migrant's country,
i.e. irrespective of her actual destination country.9 Put diﬀerently, inward multilateral
resistance of a country aggregates unilateral immigration barriers from a hypothetical
world origin country and outward multilateral resistance of a country aggregates emi-
gration barriers to a hypothetical world destination. Multilateral resistance terms are
aggregate concepts. Migration ﬂows at the aggregate (Equation (2.4)) are determined by
bilateral migration barriers relative to multilateral resistance terms. Also, multilateral
resistance terms vary across countries. A change in bilateral migration barriers results
in heterogeneous migration eﬀects. The multilateral resistance terms entail non-trivial,
multilateral changes of the migration pattern from bilateral changes in migration barriers,
9How to transfer the incidence intuition to migration is not obvious since for migration it is not clear
who is the hypothetical entity which is actually charged.
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which can be inferred from the comparative static analysis in Section 2.7.
Also note that there is no term left in Equation (2.4) which explicitly captures wage
diﬀerentials, since they were substituted out via the labor market clearance equation
(see Appendix A.2). This explains the diﬀerence of the empirical speciﬁcation of the
migration gravity to other RUM based migration approaches like Grogger and Hanson
(2011). Furthermore, the theoretical migration gravity model is, in a way, agnostic about
the classical diﬀerentiation between push and pull factors and the importance of speciﬁc
migration barriers. Simply put, δod is not speciﬁed by the model. The speciﬁcation of
migration barriers is an empirical question and oftentimes hinges on the availability of
bilateral measures and data.10 I leave the presentation of the empirical speciﬁcation for
Section 2.4.
2.4. Structural Estimation of the Migration Gravity
System
The formally equal representation of the structural migration gravity model and the
structural trade gravity model allows me to borrow several insights from the trade gravity
literature for a structural estimation of Equation (2.4). With a stochastic error term,
Equation (2.4) can be written as
Mod = exp (lnLd + lnNo − lnNw + ln(1/δod)− ln Ωd − lnWo) + εod. (2.6)
Multilateral resistance to migration terms, ln Ωd and lnWo, are accounted for in the
estimation with origin and destination ﬁxed eﬀects as do Oreﬁce (2015) and Figueiredo
et al. (2016). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004) are usually credited
for the inclusion of importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects to capture multilateral resistance
to trade. I follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who show a bias from estimating
a log-linearized gravity equation via OLS if data are heteroskedastic. Standard het-
eroskedasticity tests reject the Null hypotheses of a constant variance of residuals after
an estimation of a correctly speciﬁed gravity also for migration data. The argument for
the bias from estimating a log-linearized gravity via OLS then holds true. Therefore,
I estimate Equation (2.6) via Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML). I control
for lnLd and lnNo via the inclusion of the correct set of ﬁxed eﬀects to capture the
multilateral resistance terms. Note also that with included origin and destination ﬁxed
10The same is true for any structural trade gravity model.
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eﬀects, all unilaterally varying determinants of migration ﬂows and many classical push
and pull factors of migration are accounted for. World population, lnNw, is captured by
a constant.
PPML allows me to include migration ﬂows in levels instead of logged migration ﬂows in
a log-linearized version of the model for a linear estimation via OLS. Thus, zero migration
ﬂow observations do not drop out during the estimation.11 Also following Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006), PPML estimates Equation (2.6) consistently for a sample which
includes many zero observations. Remember that the theoretical model only predicts
zero migration ﬂows between a pair of countries if their migration barriers are inﬁnite.
Zero observations in the data thus are assumed to occur randomly or due to measurement
errors in form of rounding errors.12
For the purpose of this paper, I stick to a fairly simple speciﬁcation of δod. I specify
bilateral migration barriers as
δ−1od = exp(γ1 lnDISTod+γ2CONTIGod+γ3COLONYod+γ4LANGod+γ5EUod), (2.7)
where lnDISTod is the log of distance between country o and d. CONTIGod and
COLONYod indicate contiguity and a common colonial history of country-pairs. LANGod
is equal to one if a country-pair shares at least one common oﬃcial language and EUod
is one if a country-pair belongs to the European Union.
As usual I have to assume regressors to be exogenous to collect consistent estimates of
the γ coeﬃcients and consistent estimated migration barriers for the comparative static
analysis. This assumption might not be plausibly fulﬁlled for the EUod indicator variable
due to a selection bias. One might argue that the inclusion of distance and origin and
destination ﬁxed eﬀects already captures a lot of the selection process of becoming a
European Union member. However, to overcome a potentially left selection bias, as
Figueiredo et al. (2016), I follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and include directional
bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects in an auxiliary estimation. Augmenting data by the time dimension
allows me to infer γ5 less prone to a bias from selection. I then estimate Equation (2.7)
with the constrained coeﬃcient from the auxiliary estimation to infer δod.
There are further observations one might make with respect to the speciﬁcation. As
11Ortega and Peri (2013) add a small value to all observations to circumvent the problem of zero
observations. In general, this leads to biased estimates. See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
12This is also true for structural trade gravity estimations. Egger et al. (2011) use a two part model to
allow for a diﬀerent data generating process for zero observations of bilateral trade ﬂows. See also
Helpman et al. (2008) and Chapter 4 of this thesis on zero observations in trade gravity estimations.
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previously mentioned, wages are substituted out by the labor market clearance condi-
tion, and therefore bilaterally varying wage diﬀerentials do not show up in the empirical
speciﬁcation. Note also that the classical distinction between push and pull factors of mi-
gration is perfectly in line with a correct speciﬁcation of migration barriers in a structural
gravity estimation. Most of these factors are already captured by the origin and destina-
tion ﬁxed eﬀects. An obviously missing determinant of bilateral migration barriers is the
restrictiveness of migration policies. A bilaterally varying measure for migration policy
is simply not yet available. An already launched data project, the IMPALA database,
might solve this missing data problem for future research.13 With the free movement of
labor within the European Union, the EU-pair dummy variable captures at least a part
of this potential variation.
To sum up, my preferred estimation includes origin and destination ﬁxed eﬀects, speciﬁes
migration costs according to (2.7) with a constrained coeﬃcient for γ5 and employs PPML.
I present the results of the auxiliary regression and the outlined estimation in Section
2.6.
2.5. Data
As a measure for Mod I use the yearly inﬂow of foreign population by nationality. The
meta source for this information here is the International Migration Database (IMD)
compiled and freely provided by the OECD.14 To my knowledge the IMD oﬀers the most
extensive coverage in terms of origin and destination country combinations of aggregate
and dyadic migration ﬂow data. The IMD collects data which are initially gathered at
the national level, mainly by statistical oﬃces and oﬃcial registers who try to maintain
consistent deﬁnitions of immigrants over time. I use the inﬂows of foreign population
by nationality from the IMD. National information are either derived from population
registers and residence and/or work permits or by special surveys for some countries.15
Countries rarely use speciﬁc methods to collect data on migration, especially when it
comes to migrant outﬂows. Even if there might be a legal obligation to report out
migration in a speciﬁc country, there is no obvious incentive for individuals to indicate
emigration. Therefore, I only use migrant inﬂows and follow the literature to construct
13See http://www.impaladatabase.org/.
14See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG.
15The countries which use diﬀerent special survey approaches are Ireland, United Kingdom, Australia
and New Zealand. Detailed Information on methods and sources by country can be found at the
website given in Footnote 14.
17
a dyadic data set on migration ﬂows.16 Standard geographical information stem from
the GeoDist data set provided by CEPII.17 I extracted population data from World
Development Indicators provided by the World Bank.18 For the auxiliary estimation I
compile data over the period from 2000 to 2012. For the main regressions I keep the cross
section of 2010 because coverage in this year is most extensive. Potentially the IMD oﬀers
a set of 210 origin regions and 34 destination countries. For some speciﬁcations in 2.6
I employ the largest possible sample, excluding duplicates due to regional aggregations.
The main sample is deﬁned by the countries which belong to the OECD and/or to the
European Union. Due to missing migration data, I provide the comparative static results
on a subsample of 33 countries of these.19
2.6. Estimation Results
As discussed in Section 2.4, I provide two sets of estimation results. The auxiliary es-
timation from which I gain a consistent coeﬃcient for the EU-pair dummy is given in
Table 2.1. Table 2.2 provides estimation results of Equation (2.6), including my preferred
speciﬁcation, from which I predict migration barriers for the comparative static analysis.
For both tables I provide OLS and the preferred PPML results for diﬀerent samples and
for diﬀerent sets of included ﬁxed eﬀects. I also indicate whether the PPML regressions
include zero observations or whether I use the corresponding sample of the OLS estimates
which does not include zero observations. All depicted standard errors are heteroskedas-
ticity robust. For Table 2.2 I also present regression results which do not constrain the
EU-pair coeﬃcient.
Table 2.1 reads as follows. From the left to right, I reduce the sample size to achieve a set
of countries where PPML estimation converges and where the singularity condition of the
variance matrix for the huge set of dummy variables is fulﬁlled. All regressions include
origin-year and destination-year ﬁxed eﬀects to capture multilateral resistance terms.
Columns (1)-(3) show OLS results, where column (1) does not include directional country-
16Other studies use migration stock data either to construct ﬂow data from these or to directly use stock
data as a long term equivalent to ﬂows (see Figueiredo et al. (2016)).
17See http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6.
18See
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators.
19The 33 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic
of, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
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pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (3)-(5) present results on a reduced sample of 15 destination
countries.20 Column (4) presents PPML results without zero observations and column
(5) presents results of my preferred PPML speciﬁcation including zero observations.
Except for column (1), which does not control for selection, the EU-pair coeﬃcient is
positive as expected and highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. The preferred speciﬁcation
of column (5) reports a coeﬃcient of 0.76 which translates to an average percent eﬀect of
(exp(0.760)− 1) ∗ 100% = 113.83%. This means that, conditional on all other regressors,
becoming a member of the European Union increases immigration between country-pairs
on average by around 113%. For the speciﬁcation of the main estimation, which I use to
predict migration barriers to use in the comparative static analysis, I will constrain the
EU-pair dummy to this estimate.
In Table 2.2 the most right column (8) reports the estimates which I use for the prediction
of migration barriers for the comparative static analysis in Section 2.7. All other columns
report results for variations in the sample and contrast (constrained) OLS to (constrained)
PPML results. The overall picture for this migration gravity is as expected. I estimate
a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of bilateral distance on migration ﬂows, where
coeﬃcients are lower for the EU-OECD sample and for PPML results in general. Conti-
guity of countries is either insigniﬁcant or increases migration signiﬁcantly in column (7)
and (8). A common colonial past of countries leads also to signiﬁcantly higher migration
between countries and seems to be less pronounced, but still very high in economic terms,
for the EU-OECD-sample. This picture is repeated for the common language dummy.
The coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient of 0.578 in the preferred speci-
ﬁcation. This translates to an average partial eﬀect of sharing a common language of
(exp(0.578)− 1) ∗ 100% = 78.24%.
Both estimated coeﬃcients, which are of interest for the comparison to conditional GE
eﬀects to partial eﬀects in Section 2.7, are substantial in driving migration ﬂows. The
European Union formulates four freedoms as a basis for the single market project. One
of these four freedoms is the free movement of workers including working permissions
in all member countries without any disadvantages for migrants. Therefore the EU-
pair dummy is prototypical for a policy change inﬂuencing migration ﬂows. With a
partial eﬀect of around 113% this is already indicated here for partial eﬀects. The same
is true for the common language dummy with around 78%. I conﬁrm the result of the
literature (Chiswick, 2015) that language and correlated cultural barriers are economically
20The 15 destination countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
The same set of destination countries is used in Ortega and Peri (2013).
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Table 2.1.: Auxiliary Migration Gravity Estimation for Years 2000 to 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML
log(Distance) -1.153***
(0.0143)
Contiguity -0.299***
(0.0517)
Colony 1.388***
(0.0460)
European Union -0.201*** 0.426*** 0.723*** 0.742*** 0.760***
(0.0348) (0.0406) (0.0503) (0.0669) (0.0670)
Common Language 1.159***
(0.0263)
Observations 44,464 44,464 7,054 7,054 7,089
Origin-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Including zeros No No No No Yes
Sample Full Full Reduced Reduced Reduced
Notes: Dependent variable for OLS columns is the log of migration ﬂows from country
o to country d, lnMod. Dependent variable for PPML columns is migration ﬂows in
levels, Mod. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For
information on the diﬀerent samples see text.
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important migration ﬂow shifters.
2.7. Counterfactuals
In this section, I present selected results of the counterfactual scenarios with a special
emphasis on speciﬁc gains from the conditional GE approach.21 Therefore I ﬁrst contrast
the estimated partial eﬀects from Section 2.6 to their counterpart from the conditional
GE analysis. Second, I want to shed light on the heterogeneity of eﬀects in contrast to
the average eﬀects from estimation. Third, I show multilateral migration redirection and
its eﬀects on countries which are not directly aﬀected by the induced bilateral changes.
I do this for both scenarios.
To be clear about the counterfactual scenarios, I outline the involved steps to gain the
subsequent results. Once I collect observed values for No, Nd and Nw, and estimated
migration barriers δ−1 (Equation (2.7)), I can solve for the multilateral resistance terms
(Equation (2.5)) and gain migration ﬂows for the baseline b, M bod (Equation (2.4)). The
next step is to change the world to a counterfactual scenario and to resolve the multi-
lateral resistance terms. The resulting migration ﬂows are deﬁned M cod and vary across
counterfactual scenarios, c. The two changes of the world which I induce are the follow-
ing. For the Turkey counterfactual I change the EU-pair dummy variable to one between
Turkey and current European Union member countries. For the language counterfactual
I set the dummy variable of a common oﬃcial language equal to one for all European
Union member countries.
Simply interpreting the consistently estimated coeﬃcients would lead us to a conclusion
like `if Turkey becomes a member of the European Union, we expect an bilateral in-
crease in immigration for Turkey from European Union member countries and vice versa
of 113.83% on average'. The interpretation of the common language dummy variable
would imply an on average higher bilateral immigration between countries which share
a common oﬃcial language of 78.24%. Table 2.3 contrasts these two results with the
conditional GE eﬀects. The counterpart to the estimated partial eﬀects is obviously
given by the average relative change of immigration in Turkey from European Union
member countries and in European Union member countries from Turkey. I calculate
∆M cod% = (
Mcod
Mbod
− 1) ∗ 100% for the respective countries and take the average, indicated
by ∆M cod%. With 74.63% we observe a substantially lower immigration eﬀect from the
21Note that potentially this simulation exercise delivers changes for every bilateral migration ﬂow.
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comparative static analysis. For the language counterfactual I calculated an average
relative change in bilateral immigration between European Union member countries of
25.8%, which is an even bigger drop from partial eﬀects to the conditional GE impact.
Table 2.3.: Partial vs Conditional GE Eﬀects on Immigration
(1) (2)
[exp(γi)− 1] ∗ 100% ∆M cod%
Partial Eﬀects Conditional GE Eﬀects
Turkey Counterfactual 113.83 % 74.63 %
Language Counterfactual 78.24 % 25.8 %
Notes: Values in column (1) use estimates from Table 2.2. Column (2) reports av-
erage bilateral immigration between Turkey and European Union countries from the
comparative static analysis.
Table 2.4 documents the heterogeneity of the bilateral eﬀects, simply by showing bilateral
ﬂows, ∆M cod%, for the Turkey counterfactual.
22 As the estimated coeﬃcient is the same
for all European Union country-pairs, partial eﬀects would be uniform here and are de-
picted in Table 2.3. I can document substantial heterogeneity in the bilateral immigration
eﬀects of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union.23 Immigration changes for
Turkey range from 7.37% from Slovenia to 85.72% from Belgium. Immigration changes
for European Union countries from Turkey are much more homogenous around 98%. Al-
though this indicates that the heterogeneity might be driven mainly by origin country
characteristics, there is no obvious pattern apparent for all other bilateral changes.
In contrast to Table 2.3, Table 2.5 includes all multilateral changes of immigration in and
from all countries, and not only the bilateral immigration changes of directly involved
countries of the respective counterfactual.24 Column (1) depicts the partial eﬀects and
column (2) the results from the comparative static analysis. Remember that I reduce
22For convenience of the presentation, I do not report the corresponding bilateral heterogeneity for the
language counterfactual in a table since it would consist of 23 ∗ 22 = 506 entries. For details on the
heterogeneity of eﬀects from this counterfactual I refer to Table 2.7 where I report average changes
of total immigration at the country-level.
23Since I only observe heterogeneity at the second decimal place if Turkey is the origin country for the
percentage changes, I report the average for immigration from Turkey to European Union countries
in the last row of Table 2.4. This indicates that the heterogeneity seems to be driven by the country
of origin characteristics here.
24Partial eﬀects are given by ∆Mpd% = (
Mpd
Mbd
− 1) ∗ 100%, where M bd =
∑
oM
b
od and M
p
d =
∑
oM
b
od +
(M bod ∗ (exp(γi) − 1) ∗ 1cf ), where γi is either the estimated coeﬃcient of the EU-pair, or of the
common language dummy variable. 1cf is an indicator function which is either one for European
Union country-pairs including Turkey in the Turkey counterfactual scenario, or it is one for European
Union country-pairs in the language counterfactual.
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Table 2.4.: Bilateral Immigration Changes from Turkey Counterfactual for Turkey and
EU Member Countries
Origin Destination ∆M cod%
Austria Turkey 47.19
Belgium Turkey 85.72
Czech Republic Turkey 29.17
Germany Turkey 80.48
Denmark Turkey 25.20
Spain Turkey 82.52
Estonia Turkey 12.92
Finland Turkey 54.11
France Turkey 77.87
United Kingdom Turkey 84.11
Greece Turkey 49.42
Hungary Turkey 42.27
Ireland Turkey 62.47
Italy Turkey 83.92
Lithuania Turkey 22.47
Luxembourg Turkey 61.29
Latvia Turkey 19.61
Netherlands Turkey 51.51
Poland Turkey 63.71
Portugal Turkey 55.65
Slovakia Turkey 19.32
Slovenia Turkey 7.37
Sweden Turkey 58.08
Turkey EU Countries 98.11
Notes: Values in column (1) report bilateral im-
migration changes at the country-pair-level of the
comparative static analysis which includes condi-
tional GE eﬀects.
24
migration barriers in both counterfactuals. On average, we observe a substantial increase
in immigration for both counterfactual scenarios. For both counterfactuals, we observe on
average a much lower immigration eﬀect from the comparative static analysis, compared
to the partial eﬀects calculation. Obviously, simply interpreting the coeﬃcients does not
give the whole picture of immigration changes since immigration changes due to changes
in multilateral resistance terms are not captured.
Table 2.5.: Average Percent Immigration Changes for 33 EU and OECD Countries
(1) (2)
∆Mpd% ∆M
c
d%
Partial Eﬀects Conditional GE Eﬀects
Turkey counterfactual 49.89 6.44
Language counterfactual 31.44 4.55
Notes: Values in column (1) report average immigration changes for and from
all 33 countries from calculations using partial eﬀects. Column (2) reports aver-
age immigration changes for and from all 33 countries of the comparative static
analysis which includes conditional GE eﬀects.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 give a more detailed picture of immigration changes at the country-
level. Again, I contrast partial (column (1)) and conditional GE changes (column (2)) of
total immigration. The picture of Table 2.5 is repeated at the country-level. Partial eﬀects
are much higher than the immigration eﬀects which account for multilateral resistance
equilibrium changes. Naturally, partial eﬀects are zero for countries which are not directly
aﬀected by the counterfactual change of the world. Most important for Tables 2.6 and
2.7 are the non-zero third country eﬀects measured by ∆M cd%. For all countries which
are not directly aﬀected by a decrease in migration frictions, we observe a substantial
decrease in immigration. These negative immigration changes for third countries nicely
show migration redirection eﬀects. For example, in both counterfactual scenarios, Norway
loses the most in terms of immigration with -19% if Turkey becomes a European Union
member, and -17.76% if European Union countries hypothetically were to share at least
one common language. Norway, for example, is geographically closely linked to the
European Union without being a member, which perfectly in line with my expectation.
For the counterfactual concerning Turkey, Turkey would gain most with an immigration
increase of 40.06%, which is also in line with the intuition that Turkey would receives many
migrants from the European Union if it were to join the single market. For the language
counterfactual, we observe the highest increase in immigration of 33.37% for Portugal,
which does not share a common language with any European Union country. Belgium
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has the lowest increase of 0.62% which is consistent with the above results, since it
shares its oﬃcial languages with contiguous neighboring countries France, Germany, and
Netherlands. We also see a substantial degree of heterogeneity for conditional GE eﬀects
at the country-level. Note that this heterogeneity is driven by the model structure and
is therefore endogenous. The minor heterogeneity we see for partial eﬀects is only driven
by the exogenous heterogeneity of baseline migration ﬂows. The quite substantial drop of
immigration changes from partial eﬀects to the comparative static results, the substantial
negative third country eﬀects, and the heterogeneity of eﬀects from this exercise document
the importance of multilateral resistance for migration gravity.
2.8. Conclusion
To my knowledge, I present the ﬁrst comparative static analysis of changes of migration
ﬂows which builds on a general equilibrium migration gravity model. There are multiple
gains from this analysis compared to existing migration gravity works. First, I document
that partial eﬀects estimations cannot recover the full impact of changes in migration
barriers on migration ﬂows. This holds true even if the estimation is consistent with
the theory and controls for multilateral resistance to migration. Second, the analysis
documents a substantial endogenous degree of heterogeneity of immigration eﬀects across
countries in contrast to uniform consistent estimates. Third, the comparative static
analysis accounts for non-trivial conditional general equilibrium changes via multilateral
resistance to migration. These changes uncover indirect third country and migration
redirection eﬀects. I show that a simple interpretation of estimated coeﬃcients of a
migration gravity are qualitatively and quantitatively misleading. Researchers who want
to use the gravity equation in the context of international migration are to be made aware
of these eﬀects.
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Table 2.6.: Percent Immigration Changes from Turkey Counterfactual for 33 EU and
OECD Countries
(1) (2)
Destination ∆Mpd% ∆M
c
d% EU Member
Australia 0.00 -9.07 No
Austria 101.81 14.74 Yes
Belgium 102.67 0.64 Yes
Canada 0.00 -8.60 No
Chile 0.00 -11.40 No
Czech Republic 101.70 31.27 Yes
Denmark 97.56 32.06 Yes
Estonia 98.65 27.65 Yes
Finland 98.44 10.27 Yes
France 92.74 25.87 Yes
Germany 99.34 20.74 Yes
Greece 95.08 38.14 Yes
Hungary 100.40 25.78 Yes
Iceland 0.00 -15.27 No
Ireland 97.98 11.56 Yes
Israel 0.00 -14.64 No
Italy 91.90 27.63 Yes
Japan 0.00 -10.12 No
Korea, Republic of 0.00 -10.37 No
Latvia 97.98 26.76 Yes
Lithuania 98.64 28.65 Yes
Luxembourg 101.49 6.70 Yes
Mexico 0.00 -10.51 No
Netherlands 99.97 26.49 Yes
New Zealand 0.00 -8.48 No
Norway 0.00 -19.00 No
Poland 100.54 29.46 Yes
Portugal 95.22 34.03 Yes
Slovakia 103.38 27.25 Yes
Slovenia 100.78 31.03 Yes
Spain 90.53 28.84 Yes
Sweden 96.02 13.85 Yes
Switzerland 0.00 -17.48 No
Turkey 78.65 40.06 Yes, hypothetically
United Kingdom 89.23 21.24 Yes
United States 0.00 -8.53 No
Notes: Values in column (1) report total immigration changes for and
from all 33 countries from calculations using partial eﬀects. Column
(2) reports average immigration changes for and from all 33 coun-
tries of the comparative static analysis which includes conditional
GE eﬀects.
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Table 2.7.: Percent Immigration Changes from Language Counterfactual for 33 EU and
OECD Countries
(1) (2)
Destination ∆Mpd% ∆M
c
d% EU Member
Australia 0.00 -8.31 No
Austria 68.67 14.82 Yes
Belgium 69.61 0.62 Yes
Canada 0.00 -7.98 No
Chile 0.00 -10.48 No
Czech Republic 68.35 31.14 Yes
Denmark 65.38 31.68 Yes
Estonia 66.02 27.45 Yes
Finland 66.08 9.97 Yes
France 62.40 25.69 Yes
Germany 66.93 20.73 Yes
Greece 53.51 24.58 Yes
Hungary 66.88 25.10 Yes
Iceland 0.00 -14.17 No
Ireland 66.19 11.37 Yes
Israel 0.00 -12.91 No
Italy 60.81 26.64 Yes
Japan 0.00 -9.25 No
Korea, Republic of 0.00 -9.47 No
Latvia 65.34 26.25 Yes
Lithuania 65.67 27.93 Yes
Luxembourg 68.73 6.67 Yes
Mexico 0.00 -9.69 No
Netherlands 67.28 26.29 Yes
New Zealand 0.00 -7.77 No
Norway 0.00 -17.76 No
Poland 67.21 28.96 Yes
Portugal 63.56 33.37 Yes
Slovakia 69.53 27.41 Yes
Slovenia 67.46 30.75 Yes
Spain 60.44 28.31 Yes
Sweden 64.42 13.58 Yes
Switzerland 0.00 -16.42 No
Turkey 0.00 -15.81 No
United Kingdom 59.91 20.97 Yes
United States 0.00 -7.91 No
Notes: Values in column (1) report total immigration
changes for and from all 33 countries from calculations us-
ing partial eﬀects. Column (2) reports average immigration
changes for and from all 33 countries of the comparative
static analysis which includes conditional GE eﬀects.
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3. International Trade and
Migration: A Quantitative
Framework1
3.1. Introduction
Most generally, economists are aware of the fact that frictions commonly prevent an eﬃ-
cient allocation of goods and factors. Most recently, economic evaluations of changes in
frictions to international trade gained a considerable amount of attention. A dominating
topic in international economic policy these days is the potential mega deal of economic
integration between the European Union and the United States, the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The general economic intention of such a deal is
to reduce frictions. As is negotiated for TTIP, most international economic integration
agreements intend to reduce frictions for trade in goods, at least as a ﬁrst step. The
international trade literature proposes various methodical frameworks and methods to
evaluate welfare eﬀects of such agreements with respect to changes in trade frictions.
So-called new quantitative trade models represent a strand of literature which aims at a
rigor empirical quantiﬁcation of welfare eﬀects from globalization in terms of trade fric-
tions (Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014). However, one potentially important aspect
of economic integration is the integration of labor markets in terms of lowered migra-
tion frictions. This seems to be mainly missed by both, the political debate and the
literature of new quantitative trade models. The latter assume workers to be immobile
across countries. Therefore, welfare evaluations from these models are agnostic about
the potential impact of lowered migration frictions and the interdependency of goods and
factor ﬂows. And in the public debate on economic integration agreements like TTIP,
mobility of workers appears to be of minor importance, although for the example of the
European Union as another economic integration mega deal integration is deﬁned by the
1This chapter bases on joint work with Mario Larch. All remaining errors in this volume are mine.
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freedom of movement of workers.2 We formulate the broad research question of this paper
as How does a state-of-the-art welfare evaluation of trade liberalizations change if we
allow workers to be mobile?. In the vein of new quantitative trade models, we therefore
propose a micro-founded general equilibrium trade model where workers endogenously
decide about migration.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst set up a one sector one factor trade model with Armington (1969)
preferences and link it to a recently developed Random Utility Model (RUM) migration
model borrowed from Anderson (2011). Thus, we incorporate in an established trade
model an endogenous individual migration decision. From this we gain a tractable and
quantiﬁable framework of international trade and international migration. An important
property of the framework is that we can derive two structurally estimable gravity equa-
tions for the estimation of core parameters of the model. From a gravity equation for
international trade we can infer trade frictions and from a migration gravity equation
we can infer migration frictions. The structural estimation ensures that we account for
both, multilateral resistance to trade and multilateral resistance to migration. With ob-
served values of the model and consistently estimated frictions of international trade and
migration, we can use the model for a full general equilibrium quantiﬁcation of trade, mi-
gration, and welfare eﬀects from changes in bilateral frictions. The framework generally
allows us to quantify ex post or ex ante changes in trade and/or migration frictions.
Arkolakis et al. (2012) show for diﬀerent existing micro-foundations and resulting ratio-
nales for trade of new quantitative trade models that changes in the import penetration
ratio due to changes in barriers to trade and the trade elasticity are suﬃcient to calcu-
late welfare eﬀects. However, a priori it is not clear whether this result holds true if for
example a fundamental assumption like immobile workers is relaxed. For example Heid
and Larch (2016) show for relaxing another common assumption in this class of models,
namely the assumption of full employment, that the welfare formula of Arkolakis et al.
(2012) changes qualitatively. We show that the suﬃcient statistic of Arkolakis et al.
(2012) for welfare calculation in terms of GDP per labor force does not change for the
consideration of workers being mobile across countries. However, we document that for
an actual welfare quantiﬁcation the precise change in the import penetration ratio due
to changes in frictions is partly driven by the immobile workers assumption. To show the
resulting eﬀects of this, we use our model to ex ante evaluate TTIP. That means for a
2One notable exception in the political debate in Germany is Klaus F. Zimmermann. As the director
of the director of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Zimmermann repeatedly puts the view
of an increasing potential of TTIP if it would additionally include reduced frictions for workers into
the policy debate. See for example Zimmermann (2014).
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counterfactual analysis we change the world to a scenario where the European Union and
the United States have already signed a regional trade agreement. For a sample of 36
European Union and OECD countries we compare the evaluation of TTIP of our model
which allows migration to an evaluation where migration costs are prohibitive. Addi-
tionally we compare welfare eﬀects from TTIP to a TTIP scenario where at the same
time migration frictions between the European Union and United States of America are
reduced by the average eﬀect of a free movement policy between countries. Our results
show subtle changes in welfare eﬀects if we allow for migration.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the structural
gravity model including an individual, explicit and multilateral migration decision. The
following Section 3.3 derives two estimable gravity equations, one for trade and one for
migration from which we extract structural parameters. The bilateral trade and migration
data we use are described in Section 3.4 and Section 3.6 presents the results and the design
of the counterfactual analysis. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. The Model
Our quantiﬁable general equilibrium framework consists of a trade system à la Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003) and a linked migration system following Anderson (2011).
That means we link an established multi-country perfect competition trade model to a
multi-country Random Utility Model of migration. The indirect utility function of a
representative consumer drives the individual probability to migrate and therefore the
aggregate migration ﬂow. From the model we derive two gravity equations, one for trade
and one for migration. A crucial general equilibrium feature for both gravity equations is
multilateral resistance which we have to account for in the empirical analysis. We start
with a one sector one factor multi-country perfect competition trade model.
3.2.1. Aggregate Bilateral Trade Flows
The utility of a representative consumer in country j is denoted Uj. We assume goods
to be diﬀerentiated by country of origin following Armington (1969). The quantity of
purchased goods from country i is given by cij, leading to the following utility function
Uj =
[
n∑
i=1
β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij
] σ
σ−1
, (3.1)
31
where n is the number of countries in the world, σ is the elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption across goods, and βi is a positive preference parameter indicating the product
appeal for goods from country i. With the factory gate price of the good in country i, pi,
and a trade costs factor tij > 1 of goods from i to j following (Samuelson, 1952), proﬁt
maximization implies pij = pitij. The representative consumer maximizes Equation (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint Yj =
∑n
i=1 pijcij. The value of aggregate sales of goods
from country i to country j can then be expressed as
Xij = pitijcij =
(
βipitij
Pj
)1−σ
Yj, (3.2)
where Pj is a standard CES price index given by Pj = [
∑n
i=1(βipitij)
1−σ]1/(1−σ). In general
equilibrium, total sales of a country correspond to its nominal income, i.e., Yi =
∑n
j=1Xij.
Assuming labor to be the only factor of production and full employment, we can express
GDP also by total factor income, i.e., Yi = wiLi, where wi is the uniform wage in country
i and Li is the number of people working in country i, so the labor force. Note already
that Li changes if we allow for migration in the model. As we assume perfect competition
and one unit of labor produces one unit of output, it holds that pi = wi.
The individual decision of a worker to migrate from an origin country j to a destination
i will crucially depend on the net attainable utility in every alternative. We therefore
derive the indirect utility of a representative consumer in country j, U∗j , given by
U∗j =
1
Lj
 n∑
i=1
β
1−σ
σ
i
((
βi
Pj
)1−σ
(pitij)
−σ Yj
)σ−1
σ

σ
σ−1
=
YjP
σ−1
j
Lj
[
n∑
i=1
(βipitij)
1−σ
] σ
σ−1
=
YjP
σ−1
j
Lj
[
P 1−σj
] σ
σ−1
=
Yj
LjPj
=
wj
Pj
. (3.3)
Hence, the decision to migrate will, among other factors, depend on the real wage diﬀer-
ences between country j and potential destinations i.
3.2.2. The Trade Gravity Equation
From the set up so far, we derive a gravity equation for bilateral trade ﬂows following
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We ﬁrst use Yi =
∑n
j=1 Xij which summarizes the
32
general equilibrium nature of our model and implies market clearing, i.e.,
Yi =
n∑
j=1
Xij = (βipi)
1−σ
n∑
j=1
(
tij
Pj
)1−σ
Yj. (3.4)
Solving for scaled prices, βipi, deﬁning world income by Y W ≡
∑
j Yj, and income shares
θj ≡ Yj/Y W , we can write bilateral trade ﬂows as given in Equation (3.2) as
Xij =
YiYj
Y W
(
tij
ΠiPj
)1−σ
, (3.5)
where
Πi ≡
(
n∑
j=1
(
tij
Pj
)1−σ
θj
)1/(1−σ)
, (3.6)
and
Pj ≡
(
n∑
i=1
(
tij
Πi
)1−σ
θi
)1/(1−σ)
. (3.7)
We substituted equilibrium scaled prices into the deﬁnition of the price index to obtain
the multilateral resistance to trade.
Note that this system of equations is anlagous to the system given in Equations (9)-(11)
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Since migration only will change the number of
people working in country i, Li, we take as a ﬁrst result that the estimation of trade costs
does not change when relaxing the assumption of immobile workers. Migration therefore
inﬂuences trade ﬂows, Xij, via changes in prices respectively in total production which
we take as second results from the model so far.
3.2.3. Aggregate Bilateral Migration Flows
Following the presentation of Anderson (2011), a worker h migrates from country j to
i if her utility is bigger in i. Since we assume that migration also involves country-pair
speciﬁc costs modeled as a factor δji > 1, the individual decision of a worker to migrate
is given by
(U∗i /δji)jih ≥ U∗j jjh, (3.8)
where jih indicates a worker speciﬁc, unobserved utility factor. That means, when it
comes to the individual migration decision, we allow workers' preferences about origin-
destination-pairs to be heterogeneous. In our multi-country setting, and with log utility,
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and separating the observed and the unobserved part of Equation (3.8) we can write the
probability of the decision of worker h to migrate from j to i, Pjih, as
Pjih = Prob(Vji + εjih > Vjk + εjkh ∀ k 6= i)
Pjih = Prob(εjkh < εjih + Vji − Vjk ∀ k 6= i),
(3.9)
where Vji = ln(U∗i )− ln(U∗j )− ln(δji) and εjih = ln jih. Assuming εjih to be distributed
independently, identically extreme value, we can derive now (see Appendix B.1) the
multinomial-logit probabilities à la McFadden (1974) given by
Pjih =
eVji∑
k e
Vjk
. (3.10)
This gives the probability of a randomly drawn worker h to migrate from country j
to country i. Obviously, this probability coincides in the aggregate with the share of
migrants from country j to country i. From multiplying this share with the number of
natives in country j, Nj, we get an equation for the aggregate migration ﬂow from j to i
as
Mji = PjihNj. (3.11)
Now, inserting (3.3) in (3.11), we can write the bilateral migration ﬂow equation as
Mji =
wi
wj
Pj
Pi
1
δji∑
k(
wk
wj
Pj
Pk
1
δji
)
Nj (3.12)
=
wi
Pi
1
δji∑
k(
wk
Pk
1
δjk
)
Nj. (3.13)
The migration ﬂow from country j to i is positively associated with the real wage in the
destination country i, bilateral migration barriers to all other potential countries than i,
δjk and the number of natives of the source country j. Migration is negatively associated
with bilateral migration barriers captured by δji and the real wage in all other countries
than i. Importantly note that the idiosyncratic or worker speciﬁc part of the utility is
captured implicitly by the functional form of Equation (3.10). So, the multinomial-logit
probabilities already capture the heterogeneity of workers. In Section 3.2.6 we illustrate
this speciﬁc property of the model.
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3.2.4. Migration Gravity Equation
We now derive a gravity equation for bilateral migration ﬂows following Anderson (2011).
First, we deﬁne ωi ≡ wipi . Then Equation (3.13) boils down to the aggregate migration
ﬂow expression in Anderson (2011) given by
Mji =
ωi
δji∑
k(
ωk
δjk
)
Nj. (3.14)
We note that
∑
iMji = Nj and Li =
∑
jMji. With the world labor supply N
w ≡∑
j Nj =
∑
i Li, labor market clearance is given by
Li = ωi
∑
j
(
1/δji
Wj
)
Nj, (3.15)
where Wj ≡
∑
k ωk/δjk. Solving for ωi, it follows that
ωi =
Li
ΩiNw
, (3.16)
where Ωi ≡
∑
j
1/δji
Wj
Nj
Nw
. Using Equation (3.16), we can write Wj as Wj =
∑
k
Lk
ΩkδjkNw
.
Again using Equation (3.16), we can write bilateral migration ﬂows as given in Equation
(3.14) as
Mji =
LiNj
Nw
1/δji
ΩiWj
, (3.17)
with
Ωi =
∑
j
1/δji
Wj
Nj
Nw
, (3.18)
and
Wj =
∑
i
1/δji
Ωi
Li
Nw
. (3.19)
Analogously to the derivation of the trade gravity model where we substituted equi-
librium scaled prices into the price index, we substituted equilibrium real wages into
Equation (3.13) to obtain multilateral resistance to migration. As a result we keep in
mind that we can derive from our model a gravity equation for international migration to
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infer migration costs. As for the trade gravity equation, the migration gravity equation
incorporates speciﬁc multilateral resistance to migration terms which we have to capture
in the estimation of migration costs.
3.2.5. Welfare
Probably the most important goal of new quantitative trade models is to quantify welfare
eﬀects of trade liberalizations. A speciﬁc diﬀerence of our framework to existing models is
that the number and the composition of workers with respect to their origin country might
change due to changes in trade and migration costs. As it is suﬃcient with immobile
workers to measure welfare as the real income of a country which is usually done in
the literature, obviously it is not for our model. To take the number of workers in a
country into account we therefore measure welfare via the per capita equivalent of the
real income, namely the real wage or the production per labor force. Although this
welfare measure does not take into account the mentioned composition of the labor force,
so far we abstain from calculating welfare eﬀects for migrants and natives separately due
to a missing appropriate alternative.3 So, if we are willing to assume for the moment
that every worker  migrant or native  is the same, we can compare our welfare results
directly to other new quantitative trade models.
Arkolakis et al. (2012) provide a suﬃcient statistic to calculate welfare eﬀects for a class of
trade models including the basic Armington set up we use for the trade side. Speciﬁcally,
they show that the domestic expenditure or the import penetration ratio respectively,
and the trade elasticity are suﬃcient to calculate welfare changes from trade shocks in
these models. We show in Appendix B.2 that welfare changes in our model with mobile
workers and welfare measured as real GDP per labor force can also be calculated using
the statistic of Arkolakis et al. (2012). However, we show for a numerical example of
our model in Section 3.2.6 and also for the counterfactual analysis in Section 3.6.1 that
domestic sales and therefore welfare implications change if we allow workers to be mobile
in a new quantitative trade model.
3.2.6. Numerical Example
With the aggregate equation for trade ﬂows, Xij = (βiwi/Pj)(1−σ)tijYj, and the aggregate
equation for migration ﬂows, Mji =
(wi/Pi)/δji∑
k((wk/Pk)/δjk)
Nj, the nominal wage, wi = Yi/Li, the
3Also note that our welfare measure does not take into account the idiosyncratic part of the migration
utility, yet.
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price index, P 1−σi =
∑
k(βkwktki)
(1−σ), the income level, Yi =
∑
j Xij, and the labor force,
Li =
∑
jMji, the equilibrium is determined. In Section 3.6.1 we use this model to provide
empirical comparative statics results of counterfactual scenarios where we change trade
and migration costs. These changes involve non-trivial changes of the system. In the
following we present some basic properties of the model with a numerical three country
example. As we will do for the counterfactual scenarios, for the baseline calculation we
insert in this system Yi, Ni, t
(1−σ)
ij , δ
−1
ji , and σ.
The ﬁrst numerical example (Table 3.1) is characterized by completely symmetric coun-
tries in terms of size and income levels (Ni = 100; Yi = 100), no trade frictions (t
(1−σ)
ij =
1), and no migration frictions (δ−1ji = 1). So we look at the trade, migration and welfare
pattern of a symmetric, frictionless world. For all examples we set σ = 5 and βi = 1.
Internal trade and migration costs are set to zero, i.e. t(1−σ)ii = 1 and δ
−1
ii = 1.
Table 3.1.: Numerical Illustration 1
Country Yi Ni t
(1−σ)
ij δ
(−1)
ij wi Li Xii Mii βi Pi wi/Pi
A 100 100 1 1 1 100 33.33 33.33 1 0.76 1.316
B 100 100 1 1 1 100 33.33 33.33 1 0.76 1.316
C 100 100 1 1 1 100 33.33 33.33 1 0.76 1.316
For this frictionless and symmetric set up we can see that the model predicts a symmetric
world where every country sells one-third of its goods nationally and trades one-third of
its goods with every other country respectively. This result nicely illustrates the love of
variety property of the micro-structure behind the aggregate trade ﬂow equation. The
same is true for migration. One-third of the natives of every country stay, while the other
two-thirds migrate in equal proportion to the rest of the world. This result stems from the
unobserved part of the utility from migration. The functional form of the multinational
logit probability captures this part of the utility and drives the general two-way migration
structure of the model. Importantly note here, that we observe migration even if the world
is symmetric and thus there are no real wage diﬀerences.
For the next example (Table 3.2) we introduce some level of trade costs with country
B being less remote to trade compared to countries A and C, and we make migration
inﬁnitely costly. Note also that we assume trade and migration costs to be symmetric,
i.e. t(1−σ)ij = t
(1−σ)
ji and δ
−1
ji = δ
−1
ij . Speciﬁcally we set t
(1−σ)
AB = t
(1−σ)
BA = 0, 5, t
(1−σ)
BC =
t
(1−σ)
CB = 0, 5, t
(1−σ)
AC = t
(1−σ)
CA = 0, 4, and δ
(1−σ)
ij = 0 for all countries.
The less trade remote country B sells less goods domestically and trades more vice versa
37
Table 3.2.: Numerical Illustration 2
Country Yi Ni t
(1−σ)
ij δ
(−1)
ij wi Li Xii Mii βi Pi wi/Pi
A 100 100 0.5 0 1 100 53.106 100 1 0.854 1.171
B 100.867 100 0.4 0 1.009 100 49.563 100 1 0.845 1.194
C 100 100 0.5 0 1 100 53.106 100 1 0.854 1.171
compared to A and C in equilibrium. Note also that country B realizes higher gains
from trade which translate into a higher welfare or real wage respectively. The increased
real wage gives rise to migration in the next setting where we allow for free migration
in the world (see Table 3.3). We keep the trade cost setting as before, i.e. we set
t
(1−σ)
AB = t
(1−σ)
BA = 0, 5, t
(1−σ)
BC = t
(1−σ)
CB = 0, 5, t
(1−σ)
AC = t
(1−σ)
CA = 0, 4, and set δ
(1−σ)
ij = 1 for
all country-pairs.
Table 3.3.: Numerical Illustration 3
Country Yi Ni t
(1−σ)
ij δ
(−1)
ij wi Li Xii Mii βi Pi wi/Pi
A 100 100 0.5 1 1.006 99.425 52.948 33.142 1 0.858 1.172
B 102.32 100 0.4 1 1.012 101.15 50.573 33.717 1 0.848 1.193
C 100 100 0.5 1 1.006 99.425 52.948 33.142 1 0.858 1.172
The higher real wage in country B now drives migration into country B. But even costless
migration does not equalize real wages or leads to a full agglomeration here. As for Table
3.1, workers migrate to every destination and only a part of the workers react to the real
wage diﬀerences and therefore increase the labor force in country B. Compared to the
setting before with inﬁnite migration costs, this translates into less trade and a lower
real wage for country B, but a higher real wage for the other two countries. For the
counterfactual analysis in Section 3.6.1 we will see that the general equilibrium nature
of the model with asymmetric countries in terms of size and income and with estimated
trade and migration costs involves non-trivial changes in trade ﬂows, migration ﬂows,
and hence in welfare due to counterfactual changes in trade and migration costs. The
most important lesson from the last numerical example where workers can migrate is that
we observe a change in domestic sales of the countries. Due to a change in the number
of people working in a country, a welfare prediction from trade liberalization changes
compared to a model where workers are assumed to be immobile.
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3.3. Structural Estimation of Trade and Migration
Frictions
The parameters we want to estimate from the data are namely the trade costs, tij, and the
migration costs, δij. We describe in this section how we infer these from the structurally
estimating the two gravity equations.
3.3.1. Trade Gravity Estimation
The gravity equation for international trade is given by the system of Equations (3.5) to
(3.7). With a stochastic error term, νij, we rewrite Equation (3.5) as
Xij = exp
(
lnYi + lnYj − lnY W + (1− σ) ln tij − ln Π1−σi − lnP 1−σj
)
+ νij, (3.20)
Hence, a structural estimation of the aggregate, bilateral trade ﬂow expression implies
that one accounts in the estimation for the total production levels of countries i and j, the
world income, trade costs and the respective multilateral resistance to trade terms. Since
we are able to derive the same gravity equation here as for models without migration (see
for example (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003)), we can base the estimation of Equation
(3.20) on the recent developments which the literature proposes.4 Most importantly
we have to care about the unobservable multilateral resistance to trade terms in the
estimation to prevent a bias from omitting these. From Equations (3.6) and (3.7) we see
that these terms depend on all bilateral trade costs and income shares. Therefore missing
these terms for estimation would lead to an omitted variable bias as is shown in Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003). We follow the standard approach and include importer and
exporter ﬁxed eﬀects to capture ln Π1−σi and lnP
1−σ
j respectively. At the same time,
these ﬁxed eﬀects capture lnYi and lnYj, while lnY W is captured by a constant in the
regression. The actual goal of the estimation stage here is to consistently recover trade
costs. Therefore we have to specify bilateral trade costs empirically. We again follow the
literature here and specify t1−σij as
t1−σij = exp(β1 lnDISTij + β2RTAij + β3CONTIGij + β4LANGij + β5COLONYij),
(3.21)
4See Head and Mayer (2014) for a very useful summary of recent insights on the estimation of gravity
equations.
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where DISTij measures the distance between countries i and j, RTAij indicates whether
the two countries are jointly part of at least one regional trade agreement, and CONTIGij,
LANGij, and COLONYij indicate whether the countries are contiguous, share a common
language or an historic colonial relationship.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that the standard approach of estimating the
above multiplicative model of Equations 3.20 by simply taking logarithms and estimate
the resulting linear model with OLS yields inconsistent parameter estimates due to het-
eroskedasticity in bilateral trade data. In addition, log-linearization would drop all zero
observations from the trade and migration matrices, which is clearly not theoretically
justiﬁed and will in general lead to biased estimates. Thus, we do not rely on OLS
estimates for the bilateral trade and migration costs respectively but chose the Pois-
son pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator.5 By now this approach is standard for trade
gravity estimation and below we estimate the migration gravity as well via PPML for the
same reason.
As the regional trade agreement indicator is a policy variable which potentially violates
the exogeneity condition caused by self selection of speciﬁc countries into such an agree-
ment, we have to account for that in the estimation, too. To do so we follow Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) and estimate Equation 3.20 in two steps. In the ﬁrst step we add the
time dimension to our bilateral trade data set and include in our speciﬁcation directional
country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects to capture potential self selection eﬀects which are constant
over time at the country-pair-level. We then restrict the RTA coeﬃcient in the main
regression to the estimated RTA coeﬃcient from this auxiliary ﬁrst step regression.
3.3.2. Migration Gravity Estimation
To infer migration costs, we similarly estimate the migration gravity equation from Sec-
tion 3.2.4. We add a stochastic error term, µji, to Equation (3.17) and rewrite it to
Mji = exp (lnLi + lnNj −Nw + ln(1/δji)− ln Ωi − lnWj) + µji. (3.22)
As for the trade gravity estimation, we capture the multilateral resistance to migration
terms, ln Ωi and lnWj, and the labor supply and the number of natives, lnLi and lnNj by
5As argued by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), PPML is also likely to be a more sensible choice than
other consistent non-linear estimators (such as non-linear least squares or Gamma PML), because
it gives equal weight to all observations. They additionally demonstrate that the PPML estimator
is generally well behaved in the context of constant elasticity models by conducting Monte Carlo
simulations (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011)).
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i and j speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. World population, Nw, is captured by a constant. Since all
unilaterally varying drivers of migration in this structural estimation are already captured
by the ﬁxed eﬀects, we come up with a parsimonious speciﬁcation of migration costs. The
gravity variables we include are given by
δ−1ji = exp(γ1 lnDISTji + γ2EUji + γ3CONTIGji + γ4LANGji + γ5COLONYji), (3.23)
where DISTji, CONTIGji, LANGji, and COLONYji correspond to the regressors of
the trade gravity estimation. EUji indicates whether the two countries belong to the
European Union. We include the common European Union membership indicator as a
measure for free movement of workers. Within the European Union, workers are generally
allowed to move freely and to work in any member country. Hence, we expect migration
costs within the European Union to be signiﬁcantly lower and vice versa. However, as
for the RTA indicator in the trade regression, the membership of the European Union is
not randomly assigned and therefore potentially involves a selection process which might
not be captured by the other regressors. We circumvent this problem in the same way
as we do for the RTA indicator and follow again the two step procedure of Baier and
Bergstrand (2007). As mentioned, we also follow for the estimation of the migration
gravity the recommendation of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) for the same arguments
and estimate our preferred speciﬁcation via PPML.
3.4. Data
We compile the data we use for the estimation of the gravity equations and for the baseline
calculation in the comparative static analysis from diﬀerent freely available sources. The
bilateral trade ﬂows as a measure for, Xij, are originally compiled by Head et al. (2010)
and provided by the CEPII.6 The data set includes bilateral trade ﬂows for all world
pairs of countries from the year 1948 to 2006. Bilateral migration ﬂows, Mji stem from
the International Migration Database available from the OECD.7 For the measure of
bilateral migration ﬂows we use here, namely the yearly inﬂows of foreign population
by nationality, the OECD provides these information for a broad coverage of origin and
destination countries from 2000 to 2012. For the information on RTAs we use Mario
Larch's Regional Trade Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008).8 This ready-
6See http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8.
7See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG.
8See http://www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/index.html.
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to-use data set includes all multilateral and bilateral trade agreements as notiﬁed to the
World Trade Organization from 1950 to 2014. There is a total of 453 such agreements in
the data set. At last, we source the population information for Nj and NW from World
Development Indicators.9 From all the data we merge, we keep a sample of 36 EU-OECD
for the estimation on which we also provide the comparative static results.10
3.5. Estimation Results
We present the results of the estimation of the gravity equations in Tables 3.4 to 3.7.
Table 3.4 presents the results for the auxiliary trade gravity estimation where we include
directional country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects to control for potential self selection into RTAs. Our
preferred speciﬁcation using the PPML estimator in column (4) reports a coeﬃcient of
0.344 which translates to an average increase in bilateral trade ﬂows of a country-pair
signing a regional trade agreement of (exp(0.344) − 1) ∗ 100% = 41.05%. We use this
coeﬃcient in our preferred speciﬁcation in the main estimation of trade costs in Table
3.5 as the restriction. Besides this RTA coeﬃcient which we expected to have a positive
eﬀect on bilateral trade ﬂows, Table 3.5 reports expected qualitative and quantitative
coeﬃcients for the other gravity variables. Again, for our preferred speciﬁcation in column
(4) we ﬁnd the logarithm of distance between two countries to have a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on bilateral trade ﬂows, while two contiguous countries and countries
which share a common language trade more with each other. For our sample of countries
for the year 2005, the dummy which indicates a common colonial history of countries
turns out to have a negative but only slightly signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade ﬂows.
Turning to the auxiliary estimation of the migration gravity from which we estimate the
the coeﬃcient for the European Union indicator, we also ﬁnd an expected result. All else
equal, country-pairs joining the European Union observe on average (exp(0.760) − 1) ∗
100% = 113.83% more bilateral migration. This eﬀect is estimated on a reduced sample
of destination countries, since the variance-covariance matrix for the full set of countries
turns out to be highly non-singular.11 And again for the main estimation of the migration
9See
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators.
10The included countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile , Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Republic of, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
11The 15 destination countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
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Table 3.4.: Auxiliary Trade Gravity Estimation for Years 1948 to 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS PPML
log(Distance) 0.0279** -1.088***
(0.0112) (0.00964)
RTA 2.258*** 0.337*** 0.215*** 0.344***
(0.0217) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0135)
Contiguity 2.132*** 0.215***
(0.0440) (0.0222)
Common Language 0.680*** 0.201***
(0.0434) (0.0191)
Colony 0.896*** 0.562***
(0.0620) (0.0248)
Observations 63,395 63,395 63,395 66,110
Exporter-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Importer-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE No No Yes Yes
Zeros included No No No Yes
Sample OECD-EU OECD-EU OECD-EU OECD-EU
Notes: Dependent variable for OLS columns is the log of trade ﬂows from country i
to country j, lnXij . Dependent variable for PPML columns is trade ﬂows in levels,
Mij . Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For
information on the diﬀerent samples see text.
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Table 3.5.: Trade Gravity Estimation for the Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS PPML PPML
log(Distance) -1.318*** -1.341*** -0.833*** -0.882***
(0.0519) (0.0608) (0.0605) (0.0424)
RTA 0.459*** 0.344 0.489*** 0.344
(0.129) (0) (0.128) (0)
Contiguity 0.381*** 0.364** 0.390*** 0.374***
(0.115) (0.141) (0.0744) (0.0742)
Common Language 0.0567 0.0698 0.142 0.167*
(0.110) (0.139) (0.0963) (0.0949)
Colony 0.308** 0.292 -0.149 -0.203*
(0.132) (0.183) (0.109) (0.106)
Observations 1,558 1,558 1,560 1,560
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zeros included No No Yes Yes
Sample OECD-EU OECD-EU OECD-EU OECD-EU
Notes: Dependent variable for OLS columns is the log of trade ﬂows from country i
to country j, lnXij . Dependent variable for PPML columns is trade ﬂows in levels,
Mij . Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For
information on the diﬀerent samples see text.
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gravity in Table 3.7, we do ﬁnd expected eﬀects. The negative eﬀect of bilateral distance
on bilateral migration ﬂows is repeated for the migration gravity as is the positive eﬀect
of contiguity and common language. The colonial history indicator has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect in the migration gravity.
Table 3.6.: Auxiliary Migration Gravity Estimation for Years 2000 to 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS PPML
log(Distance) -0.812***
(0.0231)
European Union 0.156*** 0.457*** 0.723*** 0.760***
(0.0431) (0.0411) (0.0503) (0.0670)
Contiguity 0.146***
(0.0520)
Common Language 0.757***
(0.0428)
Colony 0.773***
(0.0597)
Observations 12,472 12,472 7,054 7,089
Year FE No No No No
Origin-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE No Yes Yes Yes
Zeros included No No No Yes
Sample OECD-EU OECD-EU Reduced Reduced
Notes: Dependent variable for OLS columns is the log of migration ﬂows from
country i to country j, lnXij . Dependent variable for PPML columns is migra-
tion ﬂows in levels, Mij . Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. For information on the diﬀerent samples see text.
3.6. Comparative Static Quantiﬁcation
With observed measures for model parameters from the data (Section 3.4) and theory
consistent estimated trade and migration costs (Section 3.5), we are now able to use
the model for comparative static calculations. As for the numerical example in Section
The same set of destination countries is used in Ortega and Peri (2013).
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Table 3.7.: Migration Gravity Estimation for the Year 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS PPML PPML
log(Distance) -0.784*** -0.651*** -0.574*** -0.589***
(0.0840) (0.0743) (0.107) (0.0919)
European Union 0.0842 0.760 0.858*** 0.760
(0.156) (0) (0.302) (0)
Contiguity 0.165 0.242 0.500** 0.500***
(0.188) (0.193) (0.217) (0.217)
Common Language 0.694*** 0.699*** 0.586*** 0.578***
(0.151) (0.149) (0.220) (0.223)
Colony 0.718*** 0.821*** 0.532*** 0.518***
(0.192) (0.193) (0.205) (0.208)
Observations 1,095 1,095 1,145 1,205
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zeros included No No No No
Sample OECD-EU OECD-EU OECD-EU OECD-EU
Notes: Dependent variable for OLS columns is the log of migration ﬂows from
country i to country j, lnXij . Dependent variable for PPML columns is migration
ﬂows in levels, Mij . Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. For information on the diﬀerent samples see text.
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3.2.6, we can solve the model for given information on Yi, Ni, t
(1−σ)
ij , δ
−1
ji , and σ. We
use GDPs of 2005 as a measure for Yi, total population of a country in 2005 measures
Ni, while trade and migration costs, t
(1−σ)
ij and δ
−1
ji , are estimated as described in Section
3.5. We set σ = 5 as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We provide results for two
diﬀerent counterfactual scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario we evaluate the welfare eﬀects of
TTIP if migration is inﬁnitely costly and therefore workers are immobile and compare
them to welfare eﬀects if migration costs are as estimated. In a second scenario we
highlight diﬀerences between the standard TTIP scenario and a TTIP scenario where we
additionally reduce migration frictions.
3.6.1. Results
For the ﬁrst counterfactual exercise, we hypothetically change the true RTA vector to
one where an agreement would be signed between the European Union and United States
in addition to existing RTAs in 2005. We focus on how workers mobility would change
the results. Therefore we compare the welfare results once if migration involves inﬁnite
migration costs to the situation where we plug in estimated migration costs according
to Table 3.7. Table 3.8 reports the results for the selection of 36 EU-OECD countries
where the upper panel provides the results for non-signing countries and the lower panel
for signing countries. The ﬁrst column reports the change in welfare measured as real
income per labor force if migration costs are inﬁnite. We allow for migration in the
second column and compare the welfare changes in the third column. The last two
columns report the changes in total trade respectively. First of all, we observe the usual
qualitative picture from new quantitative trade models that countries that do not take
part directly in the trade liberalization suﬀer in terms of welfare and signing countries
increase their welfare. The same is true for the eﬀects if workers are potentially mobile
but with diﬀerent quantitative results. For all non-signing countries the negative third
country eﬀects of TTIP are lower if migration is possible. The reduction of the negative
welfare eﬀects vary across these countries from around 4 up to 40 percent. For the signing
countries, allowing workers to be mobile is a mixed blessing. Still, all signing countries
win from signing TTIP but some are better oﬀ and some loose if migration is introduced
in the model. The percent changes in the welfare changes vary here from around -8 to
9 percent. Note that at the same time all signing countries' total trade increases with
migration. So the potential for welfare increasing trade eﬀects are even higher if we
allow for migration. But this potential cannot be exploited by all countries due to either
immigration which reduces welfare measured as real income per capita directly and/or
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non-trivial changes in prices induced by migration.
Table 3.9 presents the results for the comparison of the above TTIP scenario with esti-
mated migration costs to a TTIP scenario where we additionally reduce migration costs
by the estimated eﬀect of the EU indicator. So, we simulate the welfare eﬀects from TTIP
if it would have been signed with the free movement of workers as within the European
Union. We call this scenario TTIPplus. The additional reduction of migration costs is a
mixed blessing for non-signers. While some of these countries' negative welfare eﬀects are
lower, for some other the negative eﬀects are even increased. This picture is repeated for
the signing countries. The qualitative result of the trade liberalization holds, that means
all signers still win in terms of welfare from signing TTIP but some winners win less
and some more if migration frictions are reduced additionally. The exact quantitative
change depends on non-trivial changes in prices, the multilateral migration and trade
costs pattern, the resulting change in Li.
3.7. Conclusion
We present in this paper a new quantitative trade frameworks where labor is immo-
bile. We provide a structurally estimable trade model where we include an explicit and
endogenous migration decision at the individual level. From the model we derive two
structural gravity equations which we use to infer trade and migration costs empirically.
We rigorously estimate the model and account for multilateral resistance to trade and
to migration. Trade and migration interact via price eﬀects which lead to quantitatively
diﬀerent comparative static eﬀects if we use the model to ex ante evaluate the negotiated
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the
United States. The general equilibrium welfare changes if migration is allowed in such
a model are subtle. A further investigation on the exact relationship between trade and
migration has yet to be provided. So far, we conclude that considering the mobility of
workers in new quantitative trade models change welfare implications quantitatively.
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Table 3.8.: Comparison of Welfare Eﬀects from Signing TTIP for 36 EU and OECD
Countries
Welfare Trade
%∆(wi/Pi) %∆(wi/Pi) %∆%∆(wi/Pi) %∆Xi %∆Xi
with with with with
δij =∞ δij = δˆij δij =∞ δij = δˆij
Non-Signers
Australia -0.40 -0.36 -9.18 -0.59 -0.54
Canada -0.95 -0.74 -21.82 -0.34 -0.79
Chile -0.66 -0.56 -13.95 -0.35 -0.47
Iceland -0.75 -0.53 -29.43 -0.21 -0.82
Israel -0.53 -0.42 -20.63 -0.47 -0.73
Japan -0.12 -0.12 -3.92 -0.98 -0.82
Korea, Republic of -0.15 -0.14 -8.31 -0.28 -0.19
Mexico -0.87 -0.75 -13.98 -0.40 -0.54
New Zealand -0.33 -0.28 -15.82 -0.16 -0.25
Norway -0.78 -0.57 -27.70 -0.34 -0.85
Switzerland -0.75 -0.53 -29.77 -0.28 -0.92
Turkey -0.67 -0.53 -21.40 -0.38 -0.66
Signers
Austria 0.87 0.89 2.54 0.70 0.91
Belgium 0.56 0.61 9.04 0.54 0.58
Czech Republic 0.99 1.00 0.59 0.69 0.97
Denmark 1.24 1.20 -3.08 1.00 1.45
Estonia 2.21 2.02 -8.50 1.22 2.35
Finland 2.27 2.09 -7.81 1.74 2.78
France 0.77 0.80 3.35 0.97 1.15
Germany 1.01 1.01 -0.32 1.58 1.83
Greece 1.87 1.73 -7.42 1.84 2.69
Hungary 1.40 1.34 -3.99 0.97 1.50
Ireland 1.91 1.79 -6.53 1.41 2.25
Italy 1.37 1.33 -2.86 1.82 2.22
Netherlands 0.75 0.78 3.31 0.83 0.98
Poland 1.46 1.41 -3.14 1.10 1.60
Portugal 2.25 2.11 -6.21 1.60 2.54
Slovakia 1.30 1.26 -3.09 0.81 1.29
Slovenia 1.04 1.03 -0.31 0.68 1.02
Spain 1.49 1.44 -2.81 1.73 2.21
Sweden 1.88 1.76 -6.50 1.46 2.23
United Kingdom 1.27 1.25 -1.06 2.48 2.85
United States 1.39 1.36 -2.13 11.44 11.59
Notes: Welfare and trade eﬀects for 36 EU and OECD countries from signing TTIP comparing
inﬁnite migration costs and estimated migration costs.
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Table 3.9.: Comparison of Welfare Eﬀects from Signing TTIP to Signing TTIPplus for
36 EU and OECD Countries
Welfare Trade
%∆(wi/Pi) %∆(wi/Pi) %∆%∆(wi/Pi) %∆Xi %∆Xi
of of of of
TTIP TTIPplus TTIP TTIPplus
Non-Signers
Australia -0.36 -0.62 72.36 -0.54 -0.93
Canada -0.74 -1.34 80.68 -0.79 -2.47
Chile -0.56 -0.94 66.25 -0.47 -0.54
Iceland -0.53 -0.28 -46.53 -0.82 -1.07
Israel -0.42 -0.37 -11.96 -0.73 -0.69
Japan -0.12 -0.17 45.02 -0.82 -0.96
Korea, Republic of -0.14 -0.20 40.66 -0.19 -0.01
Mexico -0.75 -1.55 108.08 -0.54 -0.93
New Zealand -0.28 -0.43 51.52 -0.25 -0.59
Norway -0.57 -0.16 -71.74 -0.85 -0.47
Switzerland -0.53 -0.10 -80.63 -0.92 -0.42
Turkey -0.53 -0.37 -30.71 -0.66 -0.03
Signers
Austria 0.89 0.65 -26.88 0.91 3.53
Belgium 0.61 0.53 -12.93 0.58 3.33
Czech Republic 1.00 0.75 -25.43 0.97 3.68
Denmark 1.20 0.74 -38.55 1.45 5.09
Estonia 2.02 1.22 -39.49 2.35 7.00
Finland 2.09 1.44 -31.14 2.78 6.66
France 0.80 0.60 -24.66 1.15 3.95
Germany 1.01 1.07 5.93 1.83 3.69
Greece 1.73 1.43 -17.09 2.69 4.95
Hungary 1.34 1.03 -22.98 1.50 4.34
Ireland 1.79 0.97 -45.76 2.25 8.11
Italy 1.33 1.29 -3.57 2.22 3.99
Netherlands 0.78 0.57 -27.17 0.98 4.07
Poland 1.41 1.38 -2.32 1.60 3.27
Portugal 2.11 1.63 -22.72 2.54 5.83
Slovakia 1.26 0.94 -25.28 1.29 4.24
Slovenia 1.03 0.57 -44.45 1.02 4.61
Spain 1.44 1.23 -14.72 2.21 4.83
Sweden 1.76 1.22 -30.87 2.23 5.84
United Kingdom 1.25 0.68 -45.49 2.85 7.19
United States 1.36 1.73 27.25 11.59 9.87
Notes: Welfare and trade eﬀects for 36 EU and OECD countries from signing TTIP comparing
signing of TTIP to signing of TTIP with an additional reduction in migration costs.
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4. Heterogeneous Firms,
Globalization and the Distance
Puzzle1
4.1. Introduction
From the telegraph to the Internet, every new communications
technology has promised to shrink the distance between people,
to increase access to information, and to bring us ever closer
to the dream of a perfectly eﬃcient, frictionless global market.
((Friedman, 2005), p. 204)
The many facets of globalization like the increased trade in ﬁnal goods, intermediate
inputs and services, or the increased international mobility of capital and labor, are per-
ceived to bring countries closer together, shrinking the impediments of distance. However,
gravity estimations regressing bilateral trade on distance, inter alia, tell us the opposite.
Disdier and Head (2008) undertake a meta analysis of the magnitude of the distance
coeﬃcient based on 103 empirical studies and ﬁnd that (i) the mean eﬀect of the distance
coeﬃcient is about |−0.9| across studies, and (ii) the negative impact of distance on trade
rose around the middle of the century and has remained persistently high ever since.2
A stable or rising distance coeﬃcient over time is puzzling because the distance coeﬃcient
has the structural interpretation of the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance
(e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)). Transport technology is known to be biased
in favor of long distances (see Hummels (2007)), which should lead to a decrease of the
1This chapter bases on joint work with Mario Larch, Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Dieter Urban. A version
of this chapter is published as Larch et al. (2015). All remaining errors in this volume are mine.
2This paper also provides a good collection of references for the distance puzzle. Hence, we here
dispense with a discussion of all relevant papers and with providing all references.
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distance eﬀect. Hence, the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance should fall
with increasing globalization.
In this paper, we use the recently developed framework from Helpman et al. (2008),
henceforth HMR, which accounts for zero trade ﬂows and ﬁrm heterogeneity. To explain
the increasing OLS bias, we formally derive how the bias of the OLS distance coeﬃcient
evolves over time if the true data generating process is the HMR model and the elasticity
of trade with respect to distance decreases during globalization through, for instance,
improved transport and communication technologies.3
OLS estimates suﬀer from two biases. First, there is a sample selection bias because
bilateral trade is measured as a logarithm and zero values of bilateral trade turn into
missing values. As small or distant countries are more likely to have small trade ﬂows,
measurement errors in export ﬂows will more likely lead to zero trade ﬂows for those
countries. This leads to a positive correlation of the error term with distance, causing a
downward bias in the distance coeﬃcient, i.e. the value of the distance coeﬃcient is too
small in absolute terms. Hence, accounting for zero trade ﬂows does not explain the large
distance coeﬃcients of OLS.
Second, there is an omitted variable bias from ignoring that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in
productivity. If an index of the number of exporting ﬁrms in an industry is not included
as a control in the gravity estimation, then it appears in the regression error causing a
negative correlation between error and distance because there are fewer exporters to more
distant destinations. Hence, the distance coeﬃcient is upward biased through omitting
a control on ﬁrm productivity, i.e. the value of the distance coeﬃcient is too large in
absolute terms. As the sample selection bias and the omitted variable bias work in
opposite directions, the overall bias from OLS estimates is ambiguous theoretically.
Assuming that globalization can be associated with a fall in the elasticity of trade with
respect to distance, we show how the two biases evolve over time. We ﬁrst show that
ceteris paribus, the downward bias through sample selection, must decrease over time.
Intuitively, as trade costs decrease, ever fewer country-pairs have zero trade ﬂows and
eventually all countries trade with each other. However, then the sample selection bias
3We follow this interpretation of the distance coeﬃcient throughout the paper. Assuming decreasing
distance costs would lead to a ﬂatter world without relative diﬀerences of trade volumes across trading
partners w.r.t to distance. However, Buch et al. (2004) argue that the distance puzzle is not that
puzzling when the eﬀect of distance is interpreted in absolute terms. Under the assumption of linear
dependency of trade costs with respect to distance, they show that a potential decline in the impact
of distance would be caught by the constant term in the gravity equation. But still we shouldbut do
notobserve a decline in the relative impact of distance on bilateral trade, which is exactly measured
by the elasticity we look at.
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disappears, i.e. the distance coeﬃcient rises. We then show that, ceteris paribus, the
upward bias from omitting the number of exporting ﬁrms also becomes smaller over time
when the elasticity of trade with respect to distance falls. Intuitively, at a lower trade
elasticity, most ﬁrms will export, reducing the upward bias, i.e. the distance coeﬃcient
decreases. Thus, globalization  as captured by a smaller impact of distance  has an
ambiguous eﬀect on the bias of OLS in general as both biases decrease with a fall in the
elasticity of trade with respect to distance.
To investigate the empirical success of the HMR estimator in solving the distance puzzle,
we use three diﬀerent trade data sets, two aggregate and one at industry-level, over
diﬀerent time periods.4 We ﬁnd that the HMR estimates of the distance coeﬃcient (in
absolute value) are decreasing on average over time as expected.
Having empirically shown that the HMR estimator does produce decreasing distance
coeﬃcients over time, we compare the outcome with OLS estimates. We ﬁrst conﬁrm
the ﬁnding of HMR that OLS produces larger distance coeﬃcients (in absolute value).
More importantly, we show that these distance coeﬃcients increase over time. Hence, the
distance puzzle arises due to the fact that the bias of OLS increases over time. Employing
the HMR estimator instead of OLS solves the distance puzzle.
We then disentangle the estimated OLS bias in its two components, the omitted variable
bias and the sample selection bias. From theory, if globalization only reduces the elastic-
ity of distance on trade, this is consistent with the downward bias from sample selection
decreasing faster than the upward bias from not controlling for the number of exporting
ﬁrms. Thus, the HMR model suggests that the distance puzzle arises from ﬁrm hetero-
geneity having become relatively more important over time. When decomposing the bias
terms empirically, we ﬁnd evidence on the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Contrary to
the predictions of changes of the distance elasticity over time, the omitted variable bias
increases over time. We show that this empirical ﬁnding is in line with the theoretical
model if globalization not only decreases the elasticity of trade with respect to distance,
but also increases the elasticity of trade with respect to ﬁrm heterogeneity over time. This
is also nicely in line with empirical evidence provided by Poschke (2014) suggesting that
as countries develop the distribution of ﬁrm sizes becomes more dispersed. We ﬁnally
show that the estimated coeﬃcients from HMR are also strongly correlated with the time
patterns in freight costs reported by Hummels (2007) and Brun et al. (2005), which in
turn depend on ﬂuctuations of oil prices.
4Berthelon and Freund (2008) document the distance puzzle on bilateral industry data rather than on
bilateral country data.
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For future work, we also suggest a linearization of the HMR estimator, which is compa-
rable to the non-parametric approach of Helpman et al. (2008). This approach is easy
to implement with standard econometric programs because it is estimable via OLS. We
show that such a simpliﬁed estimator performs just as well as the original non-linear least
squares version.
We also show that a Heckman estimator deviates from the HMR estimates and produces
bigger distance coeﬃcients and increasing diﬀerences to the OLS estimates over time.
The Heckman correction results lead to the conclusion that taking into account zero
trade ﬂows cannot solve the distance puzzle, as expected from our theoretical results.
Alternative attempts to solve the distance puzzle stem from Felbermayr and Kohler (2006)
using Tobit estimates to take zero trade ﬂows into account.5 Other studies explain why
the substitution elasticity may have been rising over time (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004;
Krautheim, 2012; Lawless and Whelan, 2007; Berthelon and Freund, 2008), possibly
overcompensating for the fall in trade costs, which both determine the distance coeﬃcient
in theory. Duranton and Storper (2008) provide an alternative model to rationalize
rising overall trade costs besides falling transport costs. They assume vertically linked
industries in which the quality of inputs is not contractible and where providing a given
level of quality to suppliers becomes more costly with distance. Their main ﬁnding is
that lower transport costs imply that higher quality inputs are traded in equilibrium,
and the eﬀect of this higher quality is that there is an increase in trade costs. Yotov
(2012) proposes to measure the eﬀects of distance on international trade relative to the
eﬀects of distance within national borders as a simple and useful solution to the distance
puzzle. He ﬁnds a drop in the impact of distance on trade of roughly 50% from the mid-
sixties to 2005. Finally, using bilateral country data for the year 1986, HMR ﬁnd that
their estimated distance coeﬃcient represents a drop of roughly one third as compared to
5There is ample evidence from micro-data for particular countries that the extensive margin matters.
Bernard et al. (2006) use ﬁrm-level data to distinguish the entry and exit of ﬁrms into and out of ex-
porting (extensive margin) from the export volumes of exporting ﬁrms (intensive margin). They ﬁnd
that a reduction in trade costs may increase industry productivity through changes on the extensive
margin. Hummels and Klenow (2005) use disaggregated product-level data to distinguish between
the variety dimension (extensive margin) and the quality as well as the quantity dimension (inten-
sive margin). One of their main results is that adverse terms-of-trade eﬀects occur more frequently
if growth takes place mainly at the extensive margin. Similarly, Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) use
product-level data on bilateral U.S. exports demonstrating that a large part of potential export ﬂows
are zero, and showing that the incidence of these zero export ﬂows is strongly correlated with dis-
tance and importing country size. Hillberry and Hummels (2008) analyze trade at the ﬁve-digit zip
codes and decompose the extensive and intensive margins of shipments. Their main ﬁnding is that
distance reduces aggregate trade values primarily by reducing the number of commodities shipped
and the number of shipping establishments. However, the extensive margin is important over very
short distances.
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OLS. However, HMR do not examine the evolution of the distance coeﬃcient over time.
Hence, none of the mentioned papers discuss the role of the omitted variable problem
of ﬁrm heterogeneity in creating an increasing bias over time which, in contrast, is the
contribution of our paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 is divided into 2 subsec-
tions where we in Subsection 4.2.1 derive the gravity equation controlling for zero trade
ﬂows and ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. This is done following HMR, and then in Subsection
4.2.2 we calculate the biases of OLS estimates. Section 4.3 presents our estimation equa-
tion in Subsection 4.3.1, describes the data in Subsection 4.3.2, and gives the results in
Subsection 4.3.3. The last section concludes.
4.2. HMR and the Distance Puzzle
In this section, we use the HMR model to examine the distance puzzle. We will assume
the HMR model to be the data generating process and examine to what extent the OLS
estimates are biased and in what direction this bias goes. Then, we will examine how the
bias of OLS is aﬀected by globalization.
4.2.1. The Gravity Equation from HMR
The HMR model is a multi-country monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous
ﬁrms and identical consumers with CES love-of-varietyutility functions à la Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). HMR assume that ﬁrm productivity, 1/a, follows a truncated Pareto
distribution, G(a) = (ak − akL)/(akH − akL), where k > (ε− 1) is the shape parameter and
aL and aH are the lower (highest productivity) and upper support (lowest productivity).
HMR obtain the following gravity equation (their Equation (9)):
mij = β0 + λj + χi − γdij + ωij + uij, (4.1)
where mij is logged aggregate imports of country i from country j. β0 = (ε− 1) ln(α) +
ln(ψ), where ε is the substitution elasticity between any two varieties, 1/α = ε/(ε−1), and
ψ = kak−ε+1L /[(k−ε+1)(akH−akL)]. Exporter country-ﬁxed eﬀects, λj = (1−ε) ln cj +nj,
contain the country-speciﬁc minimum cost of a bundle of inputs in country j, cj, and
the log of the number of ﬁrms from country j is denoted by nj. Importer country-ﬁxed
eﬀects, χi = (ε − 1)pi + lnµi + yi, pi denote the logged consumer price index in i, µi
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denote the (constant) share of income spent by consumers of country i, and yi is the
income in country i. dij is the log of the distance between i and j and γ the elasticity
of bilateral trade with respect to distance. ωij captures the number of exporters from j
exporting to i given by ωij = ln[(aij/aL)k−ε+1 − 1], where aij denotes the inverse of the
cutoﬀ productivity level of exporting ﬁrms. Note that ωij is the only new in the gravity
equation as compared to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). uij is an iid remainder error
term with variance σ2u.
The estimation of (4.1) is hampered by two problems. First, it is only estimated on data
with positive trade ﬂows since the dependent variable, the log of trade volume (mij), is
not deﬁned for zero import values. Second, there is an omitted variable problem through
ωij which captures the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity in country j, information which is
typically not available for gravity estimations on world trade data sets.6
HMR note that both problems are related to the extensive margin of trade. They use
the zero-proﬁt condition for exporting from country j to country i and deﬁne a latent
variable for the cutoﬀ productivity for positive exports, zij:
zij = E [zij |dij,ξj, ζi, φij ] + ηij = γ0 + ξj + ζi − γdij − κφij + ηij, (4.2)
where γ0 collects constant terms, ξj = −ε ln cj−φEX,j is an exporter ﬁxed eﬀect capturing,
in addition to cj, a measure of ﬁxed export costs common across all export destinations
(φEX,j). ζi = (ε− 1) pi+yi+lnµi−φIM,i is an importer ﬁxed eﬀect that captures, besides
the consumer price index, income and income shares, a ﬁxed trade barrier imposed by the
importing country on all exporters (φIM,i). φij is an observed measure of any additional
country-pair speciﬁc ﬁxed trade costs and κ the corresponding parameter. ηij = uij +νij,
where νij ∼ N(0, σ2ν) is an error term in the ﬁxed trade costs speciﬁcation. σ2η is the
variance of ηij. Using this latent variable, the omitted variable of the number of exporting
ﬁrms, ωij, can be expressed as
ωij = ln [exp [δzij]− 1] , (4.3)
where δ = (k − ε+ 1) / (ε− 1).
While the latent variable, zij, cannot be observed, one can observe if trade takes place.
Thus, an indicator variable, Tij = I[zij>0], can be deﬁned from which the selection equa-
6Flam and Nordström (2011) have recently included a proxy variable for ωij , which is available for
Swedish exports. However, they did not estimate the distance coeﬃcient over time, which is the
focus of this paper.
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tion for the probability of strictly positive exports is obtained:
Pr
(
Tij = 1
∣∣dij,ξ∗j , ζ∗i , φij ) = Pr (z∗ij > 0 ∣∣dij,ξ∗j , ζ∗i , φij ) (4.4)
= Pr
(
γ∗0 + ξ
∗
j + ζ
∗
i − γ∗dij − κ∗φij > −η∗ij
∣∣dij,ξ∗j , ζ∗i , φij )
= Φ
(
γ∗0 + ξ
∗
j + ζ
∗
i − γ∗dij − κ∗φij
)
= E
[
z∗ij
∣∣dij,ξ∗j , ζ∗i , φij ] ,
where Φ (.) is the cumulative distribution function of the unit normal distribution and
every starred coeﬃcient represents the original coeﬃcient divided by ση.7
One can now in a ﬁrst stage estimate (4.4) by a probit estimation. Inverting the predicted
probability from (4.4) yields an estimate of the underlying latent variable, zˆ∗ij.
Deﬁning δ = ση(k − ε + 1)/(ε − 1) > 0, HMR use ˆ¯ω∗ij ≡ ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)]− 1} as
an estimate for E[ωij|., z∗ij > 0],8 where ˆ¯η∗ij = φ(zˆ∗ij)/Φ(zˆ∗ij) is the inverse Mills ratio from
the ﬁrst-stage probit estimation, which itself is well-known to be a consistent estimate
of E[uij|., z∗ij > 0].9 Inserting these terms into (4.1), HMR show that estimation of the
gravity model requires estimation of the following speciﬁcation:
mij = β0 + λj + χi − γdij + ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)]− 1}+ βuη ˆ¯η∗ij + eij, (4.5)
where βuη ≡ corr(uij, ηij)(σu/ση) = corr(uij, uij+νij)(σu/ση) > 0. The term ln{exp[δ(zˆ∗ij+
ˆ¯η∗ij)] − 1} corrects for the omitted variable ωij in the presence of sample selection10 and
βuη ˆ¯η
∗
ij is the well-known correction of the error term uij in the presence of sample selec-
tion. As a result, eij is an i.i.d. error term satisfying E[eij|., Tij = 1] = 0. Therefore, one
can estimate (4.5) using NLS and obtain an estimate of the distance coeﬃcient, γ, having
the structural interpretation of the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance
for all country-pairs in the population, i.e. for positive and zero trade ﬂows.
7As in every discrete choice model, the scale can be arbitrarily chosen, i.e. the model must be properly
normalized. We normalize by dividing through ση, following HMR. This leads the error term η
∗
ij =
ηij/ση to be distributed unit normal.
8Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2015) note that this is not a consistent
estimate because of Jensen's inequality. However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2015) also note that
it is a reasonably accurate approximation in many practical situations. The similarity of our results
from the linear approximation of HMR below supports this claim (see Section 4.3.3).
9This term is also known as Heckman's lambda (Heckman, 1979).
10In the absence of a sample selection bias but in the presence of the omitted variable bias, the correction
term would simplify to ln
{
exp
(
δzˆ∗ij
)− 1}, since plimˆ¯η∗ij = E[uij |., z∗ij > 0] = 0 in this case.
57
4.2.2. The Bias of OLS
Let us now start to examine the properties of an OLS estimate of the distance coeﬃcient,
γˆOLS, from estimating gravity Equation (4.1) without a sample selection correction and
when not controlling for the omitted variable bias due to ﬁrm heterogeneity by ωij.
To gain some intuition on these two biases and their direction, we ﬁrst look at them
individually before considering them simultaneously. We begin by discussing the sample
selection bias and then continue with the omitted variable bias.
Selection Bias By taking logs of imports, all zero trade ﬂows are omitted from the
sample. This is the selection bias. The eﬀect on the estimates of the distance elasticity
are summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. The selection bias resulting from ignoring zero values of bilateral trade leads
to an underestimation of the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance.
Proof see Appendix C.
Intuitively, this result is due to the fact that distant countries are more likely to have
small trade ﬂows. Hence, measurement errors will more likely lead to zero trade ﬂows for
those distant countries. Countries that are distant but remain in the sample will have
positive measurement errors, leading to a positive correlation between distance and the
error term. This explains the downward bias in the distance coeﬃcient of the selection
bias, i.e. a too small value of the distance coeﬃcient in absolute terms.
We illustrate this result by using Figure 4.1 which contains distance, dij, on the horizontal
axis and imports, mij, on the vertical axis. We depict by circles imports to country i
from countries j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, holding the control variables constant over countries j
for the purpose of graphical illustration. From the selection equation for the probability
of strictly positive exports (4.4), we know that distance has a negative eﬀect on the
probability of exporting.11 Thus, missing observations are more likely the larger is the
distance. In addition, the smaller the error term, uij, the more likely trade is to be
predicted to be zero. For this reason, we draw potential imports between countries i
and j = 4 and j = 5 such that the distance is large and the error terms ui4 and ui5 are
negative, causing these two observations to drop out of the sample, which we indicate
by hollow circles. Since the negative ui4 and ui5 are not only contained in the selection
Equation (4.4), but also in the gravity Equation (4.1), the imports that drop out do
11∂ Pr (Tij = 1 |· ) /∂dij = −γ∗φ (·) < 0, where φ (·) is the normal density function.
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not only occur at a large distance but also at unusually low values of imports.12 The
non-missing imports at large distances, indicated by ﬁlled circles, are those with positive
values of uij, i.e. E[uij|dij, Tij = 1] > 0 if the distance, dij, is large.
Figure 4.1.: Illustrating the Bias of OLS
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unobserved
×mij − ωij
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bias OLS
downward bias
ωi1
Notes: dij denotes distance between i and j and mij imports from j to i. HMR is given
by E [mij − ωij |dij ] with distance coeﬃcient γ. Heckman is given by E [mij |dij ] and OLS by
E [mij |dij , Tij = 1]. The bias OLS corresponds to Bias(γˆOLS) = γδ − Ξ [δ + βuη] η¯∗ij , where (γδ) is
denoted by upward bias and (−Ξ [δ + βuη] η¯∗ij) by downward bias in the ﬁgure. ωij controls for the
omitted variable due to ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Since the unconditional expected value of uij is zero by construction of the OLS es-
timator,13 i.e. E[uij|Tij = 1] = 0, the conditional expected value of uij is negative,
12Note that we have drawn negative values of mij . Naturally, negative values of mij can never exist, but
are generated by the gravity Equation (4.1), since shocks are, by assumption, normally distributed
on a range from −∞ to +∞. However, whenever mij is negative, it is not observed.
13The estimated regression constant will always ensure that the unconditional expected value of the
error term is zero in an OLS regression, whereas the conditional expected value of the error term is
only zero for a correctly speciﬁed model, i.e. a model without endogeneity problems.
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E[uij|dij, Tij = 1] < 0, if the dij is small. But then the error term in the outcome
equation uij and dij are positively correlated.
Lemma 2. Accounting for zero trade ﬂows will lead to distance coeﬃcient estimates that
are larger in absolute value.
Proof see Appendix C.
As we have shown in Lemma 1, omitting zero trade ﬂows leads to an underestimation
of the distance elasticity. When now accounting for zero trade ﬂows by employing a
Heckman estimator, the resulting distance elasticities will be larger in absolute values.
This can be seen by decomposing the expected value of positive trade ﬂows as follows:14
E[mij|dij, Tij = 1] = E[mij|dij] + E[uij|dij, Tij = 1], (4.6)
where E[mij|dij, Tij = 1] is ﬁtted by an OLS regression on the remaining three strictly
positive import data points from j = 1, 2, 3 and E[mij|dij] is ﬁtted by an OLS regression
on the entire population including j = 4 and j = 5. This in turn, is asymptotically
equivalent to an OLS regression with a sample selection correction denoted by Heckman
in Figure 4.1. Hence, the positive slope of E[uij|dij, Tij = 1] in dij results in a ﬂatter
declining slope of an OLS regression without sample selection, E[mij|dij, Tij = 1], than
one with sample selection, E[mij|dij].
Omitted Variable Bias Recent literature starting with Melitz (2003) highlights the
importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity for explaining trade patterns. Ignoring empirically ﬁrm
heterogeneity leads to an omitted variable bias. The eﬀect on the estimates for the
distance elasticity are summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3. The omitted variable bias resulting from ignoring ﬁrm heterogeneity leads to
an overestimation of the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance.
Proof see Appendix C.
The intuition is that if an explicit control for the number of exporting ﬁrms is missing
in the regression, it will end up in the error term. As there are fewer ﬁrms that export
to more distant countries, there is a negative correlation between the error term and
the distance. This results in an upward bias, i.e. the value of the distance coeﬃcient
14See, e.g., Equation (16.34) in Cameron and Trivedi (2005), p. 549.
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is too large in absolute terms. Note that this implies that accounting for the omitted
variable bias will lead to lower distance coeﬃcients in absolute values. A detailed formal
derivation of this result is given in Appendix C.
We again illustrate the bias with help of Figure 4.1. Assume that ωij is known (and
other controls are kept constant). Then a linear OLS regression of import values, mij,
on distance, dij, controlling for ωij is like a regression of (mij − ωij) on dij.15 An OLS
estimator ﬁtting the regression line E [mij − ωij|dij] then has the same slope in dij as one
ﬁtting E [mij|dij, ωij] or, indeed, one using a consistent correction factor that controls for
ωij, i.e. the HMR estimator (while at the same time controlling for the sample selection
eﬀect). To obtain (mij − ωij) in Figure 4.1, indicated by crosses, we read oﬀ the diﬀerence
between mij and ωij, an example of which is given for ωi1. As can be seen, the crosses
indicating (mij − ωij) are systematically located below the circles indicating mij at small
distances and above at large distances.16 Hence, a ﬁt of the crosses by the solid HMR
line, E [mij − ωij|dij], rather than the circles by the Heckman line, E [mij|dij], is ﬂatter
implying an upward bias of the distance coeﬃcient. Hence, the OLS estimator omitting
ωij overestimates the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance.
Interacting the Two Biases Let us now consider both biases simultaneously, formally
taking into account the interaction of the two. For this purpose, we need to draw on an
approximation of (4.3),
ωij ≈ δzij, (4.7)
where δ = ∂ωij/∂zij evaluated at the mean of zij.
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. When assuming that the HMR model is the data generating process, the
OLS estimate of γ in (4.1) may then be (asymptotically) upward or downward biased,
depending on whether the omitted variable bias from the share of exporting ﬁrms or the
sample selection bias due to the omission of zero trade ﬂows dominates, respectively.
Proof see Appendix C.
15This follows from the fact that the regression coeﬃcient of dij explains the remaining variation of the
corresponding variable that is not at the same time common variation with another control variable
(Frisch-Waugh theorem) and ωij enters the regression Equation (4.1) with coeﬃcient one.
16Note that the HMR regression line ﬁts all crosses for j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, because it does not only correct for
the omitted variable bias, but also for sample selection simultaneously. If only the omitted variable
bias was controlled for but not the sample selection bias, such a regression line would only ﬁt the
crosses corresponding to j = 1, 2, 3.
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We derive the simultaneous bias term in Appendix C, which is given by the following
simple expression:
Bias(γˆOLS) = γδ − Ξ [δ + βuη] η¯∗ij T 0, (4.8)
where Ξ =
∑
i
∑
j dij/
∑
i
∑
j (dij)
2.
Thus, as shown in Figure 4.1, the term γδ > 0 in (4.8) represents an upward bias in
OLS (and Heckman) from not controlling for the number of exporting ﬁrms, and the last
two terms measure a downward bias from sample selection in OLS, when omitting zero
trade ﬂows, as βuη, η¯∗ij and Ξ are positive. Overall, it is then indeterminate whether the
OLS line E [mij|dij, Tij = 1] is ﬂatter or steeper than the HMR line E [mij − ωij|dij]. In
anticipation of our empirical results, we have drawn it such that the OLS line is steeper
than the HMR line, which implies that the omitted variable bias dominates the sample
selection bias in levels. We depict this as Bias OLS in Figure 4.1.
4.2.3. Globalization
How would the bias of OLS evolve over time when globalization reduces the responsiveness
of bilateral trade ﬂows with respect to distance, due to new and better communication
and transport technologies? Make the following assumption:
Assumption Increased globalization implies that ∂γ
∂t
< 0.
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When assuming that the HMR model is the data generating process, both
the downward bias from sample selection due to zero trade ﬂows and the upward bias from
omitting the number of exporting ﬁrms decrease in the pace of globalization, i.e. when the
elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance (γ) falls over time.
Proof see Appendix C.
The change in the bias of the distance coeﬃcient ∂Bias(γˆOLS)/∂t can once more be
understood intuitively looking at the two biases separately. Beginning with the change
of the sample selection bias over time, we ﬁrst notice that the bias depends on how the
slope of E[uij|dij] changes when γ changes over time. To understand this, we need to
ﬁrst look at how the selection process is inﬂuenced by a reduction in γ. An observation
is missing whenever z∗ij < 0 according to (4.4). Obviously, a reduction in γ decreases
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z∗ij
(
∂z∗ij/∂γ = −dij < 0
)
, where some missing trade links turn positive. Eventually, all
missing trade links turn into positive ones at suﬃciently low γ. Hence, the true line
ﬁtting the data after globalization becomes ﬂatter.
Turning to the change of the omitted variable bias over time, we once more need to
understand how the slope of the conditional expectation function, E[ωij|dij], changes
with a reduction of γ. For this purpose, it is suﬃcient to look at how ωij changes for each
observation when γ falls. From (4.2) and (4.3) we immediately obtain
∂ωij
∂γ
= −dijδ e
δzij
eδzij − 1 < 0, (4.9)
for all ωij that are non-missing. Hence, the share of exporting ﬁrms of a country j
exporting to country i is increasing for each country-pair when γ falls. More importantly,
this share increases less for increasingly distant trading partners:
∂2ωij
∂γ∂dij
= −δ e
δzij
eδzij − 1 − dijγδ
2 e
δzij
(eδzij − 1)2 < 0, (4.10)
for all ωij that are non-missing.
Since E[ωij|dij] is ﬂatter after globalization than before globalization, the upward bias in
the distance coeﬃcient from omitting the variable ωij also becomes smaller.
Considering changes in both biases simultaneously, we cannot tell whether the diﬀerence
in slopes between the HMR-line and the OLS line will increase or decrease over time,
because the downward bias from sample selection decreases and the upward bias from
the omitted variable ωij also decreases. Since we cannot tell how the bias of OLS will
behave under globalization, the OLS estimate of the distance coeﬃcient may also increase
or decrease over time.
The HMR Estimator and the Distance Puzzle Let us now show how the HMR
estimator can be used to explain the distance puzzle. Suppose that the omitted variable
bias dominates in levels at the beginning of the data period such that there is an overall
upward bias in the distance coeﬃcient (see the estimates of Helpman et al. (2008)), i.e.
the OLS estimated schedule is steeper than the true line (HMR) just as in Figure 4.1.
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 3. If the downward bias from sample selection due to the omission of zero
trade ﬂows decreases faster than the upward bias from omitting the share of exporting
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ﬁrms, then, overall, the estimated OLS schedule will become steeper, explaining the dis-
tance puzzle. Controlling for both biases solves the distance puzzle.
Proof see Appendix C.
Hence, to capture the change of the bias in the distance coeﬃcient, we need a larger
decrease in the zero trade ﬂows bias as compared to the omitted variable bias due to ﬁrm
heterogeneity. A ﬁrst glance at the data and anecdotal evidence cope with these facts.
Whereas there has been a dramatic decrease in zero trade ﬂows over the last two decades,
ﬁrm sizes and productivities are still heavily dispersed (Poschke, 2014) and the share of
exporting ﬁrms remains small.
Note also that the sample selection bias alone cannot solve the distance puzzle if the HMR
model is the data generating process, as was suggested by Felbermayr and Kohler (2006)
without being speciﬁc about the underlying data generating process. As the sample se-
lection bias leads to a downward bias, the importance of distance will be underestimated.
Hence, the level cannot be correctly captured accounting for sample selection alone.
4.3. Econometric Analysis
4.3.1. Base-line Estimation Equation and Alternative Estimators
Our baseline estimation equation is the HMR gravity Equation (4.5). Since our main
interest rests on the coeﬃcient of the distance variable, γ, and how it evolves over time,
we will estimate this equation separately by year and industry. We use the following
augmented speciﬁcation:
mij = β0 − γdij + αXij + λj + χi + ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)− 1]}+ βuη ˆ¯η∗ij + eij, (4.11)
where we explain the additional variables below. Once more, note that ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij +
ˆ¯η∗ij
)−1]} captures the omitted variable bias due to ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in the presence
of sample selection, whereas ˆ¯η∗ij captures the sample selection bias of the error term from
estimating (4.11) for non-zero trade. To estimate these correction terms, we add a ﬁrst-
stage equation in order to estimate (4.4), where:
z∗ij = ϕ
∗
0 − γ∗dij + ϑ∗Xij + ϕ∗1COMM_RELij + ϕ∗2COMM_LANGij + ξ∗j + ζ∗i + ηij.
(4.12)
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Other Estimators
We have shown that the distance puzzle can be studied by systematically comparing the
estimates from HMR with corresponding estimates obtained with OLS. The OLS estima-
tor estimates Equation (4.11), omitting the correction terms for ﬁrm-level heterogeneity
and sample selection, i.e. excluding ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)− 1]} and ˆ¯η∗ij. By comparing
the HMR and OLS estimators, we can evaluate how the bias of OLS evolves over time as
predicted by Propositions 1 and 2 . We will also compare our estimates with HMR with
a number of other estimators.
Heckman The usual Heckman estimator estimates Equation (4.11) omitting the cor-
rection terms for ﬁrm-level heterogeneity but including that for sample selection, i.e.
excluding ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)− 1]} but including ˆ¯η∗ij.
Linear Approximation of HMR As δ enters the estimation equation non-linearly, we
ﬁrst estimate Equation (4.11) via non-linear least squares, as proposed by HMR. However,
as discussed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2015), this correction term is biased if their
theoretical model is the data generating process. However, for a wide range of zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij,
the term ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)− 1]} may be well approximated by _δ (zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η∗ij) for some
appropriate parameter
_
δ, which can be estimated by OLS (see our discussion in Section
4.2.1). Hence, we also estimate the model via OLS and include $ij =
_
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)
instead
of ln
{
exp
[
δ
(
zˆ∗ij + ˆ¯η
∗
ij
)− 1]}.17
4.3.2. Data
The ﬁrst of three data sets which we employ is borrowed from the original HMR paper
(Helpman et al., 2008). Despite that HMR provide their main results for the year 1986,
they also oﬀer results for 1980s, adding year ﬁxed eﬀects to a panel. A comprehensive
description of this data can be found in Appendix I in the HMR paper; the data are
available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/helpman. The second data set is the standard
CEPII gravity data set.18 A full description can be found in the appendix of Head et al.
(2010). The CEPII data enables us to explore the distance coeﬃcients for a longer period
than with the original HMR data set. Although the CEPII data set already starts in the
17HMR use a polynomial of degree 3 in the score variable in one of their robustness checks. We will
point out that even a linear approximation works well in practice.
18See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp.
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1940s, due to the number of observations, we use data from 1980 to 2006 which is the
latest available year. Thirdly, we use an industry-level data set where imports are taken
from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), who have compiled an industry data set corresponding
to the 3-digit ISIC, revision 2, level that contains 28 manufacturing industries for up to
100 countries during 1976-2004. Because there is a large number of missing values in the
early years and we are lacking a control variable in the last year, we have restricted the
sample to 1978-2003. This data set is available for downloading from the World Bank
(www.worldbank.org\trade). In turn, this data set draws its bilateral industry import
data from COMTRADE of the UN which is based on the Standard International Trade
Classiﬁcation (SITC) and then transformed into ISIC. Production data are taken from
UNIDO (International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics).
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, mij, in Equation (4.11) is the natural logarithm of bilateral im-
ports of country i from country j at a given year t; for the industry-level data additionally
in a given industry l, measured in million US$ converted by the Penn World Tables 6.0
purchasing power parity exchange rate (PPP) and deﬂated by the U.S. consumer price
index.
Explanatory Variables
The original HMR data set and the CEPII data set contain geographical information.
The industry-level trade data set is merged into a balanced geography data set covering
170 countries. Thus, all three data sets contain geographical variables common to gravity
estimations. These geography variables appear in Equations (4.11) and (4.12) and the
diﬀerent data sets as follows. Common to all data sets, dij is the log of the distance
between countries i and j. λj and χi are full sets of exporter and importer dummy
variables, respectively, controlling for, among others, the multilateral resistance terms
pointed out by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Xij contains a dummy variable
indicating a common border between i and j in all data sets as well as an indicator for
whether there is a common trade agreement between exporter i and importer j. Dummy
variables for a common legal system, a common colonial history, a currency union and
bilateral membership within GATT/WTO are only available and included for the HMR
and the CEPII data sets. Common island and landlock status indicators are included
in the HMR and the industry-level data sets. All these variables are captured by Xij in
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Equations (4.11) and (4.12).
Exclusion Restriction Variables
To overcome the weak identiﬁcation simply through functional form, HMR propose at
least three exclusion restriction variables for their procedure.
HMR prefer a speciﬁcation where, in the ﬁrst stage probit, a proxy variable of bilat-
eral ﬁxed export costs is employed. This variablemeasuring the bilateral number of
procedures needed to start exportingmight not inﬂuence the intensive margin but the
probability of a positive trade ﬂow. Since this variable does not cover a rich country
sample they oﬀer alternative exclusion restrictions. Beside the coverage issues of this
variable, we suspect that the ﬁxed exporting costs might signiﬁcantly change over time.
Therefore, using this variable which is, at best, available for periods after year 2000 would
not ﬁt our multi-period trade data sets that start in the seventies.
Alternatively HMR use the bilateral measures common religion and common language
and do not ﬁnd a qualitative diﬀerences in their results across any employed exclusion
restrictions. The common religion variable measures to what extent the population of
the importing country and the exporting share a common religion according to data
from the Christian Research Association for the year 2003. In particular, the measure is
calculated by ﬁrst summing the number of people that belong to each existing religion
in an importing country and then calculating each group's share of that country's total
population. This share is then multiplied by the corresponding share of the exporting
country. The measure is bounded between 0 and 1, with large numbers indicating a large
degree of overlap in the religious structures of the country. The second excluded variable
indicates whether the importer and the exporter share a common language. Below we
stick to this choice of exclusion restrictions and use the same control variables as in (4.11)
(including the importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects) in addition to both excluded variables
to estimate the probability of exporting in the ﬁrst stage. We do so for all three data
sets.
4.3.3. Results
To explore the distance puzzle, we thus estimate (4.11) for all three data sets by year and
additionally by industry for the industry-level data set. With ten years from the original
HMR data set, 27 years from the CEPII data set and data for 28 industries over 26 years
67
from the industry-level data set and with four speciﬁcations respectively, this amounts to
estimating 765 ﬁrst-stage regressions and 3060 second-stage regressions. For expositional
reasons, we show our results graphically.
HMR versus OLS
Figure 4.2 depicts distance coeﬃcients estimated with OLS and the non-linear method
from HMR for the original HMR data set. For each year, the distance coeﬃcient is
calculated and is then plotted over the available time period from 1980-1989. To indicate
the time pattern for each estimator, we have added a quadratic trend. Several interesting
features are present in Figure 4.2.
Note that the trend of the distance coeﬃcient, when estimated by OLS, γˆOLS, is slightly
increasing over time. This conﬁrms the puzzling result in previous studies that the
negative impact of distance on trade seems to increase rather then decrease over time,
which would be expected from the globalization process. Turning to the HMR distance
coeﬃcient, γˆHMR, we note that γˆHMR is indeed decreasing over time. Examining the bias
of OLS, γˆOLS− γˆHMR, we note that this is positive. From Proposition 1, this is consistent
with the upward bias from omitting the number of exporters dominating the selection
bias from omitting zero trade ﬂows. In addition, the bias grows over time. From theory,
this suggests that globalization and reduced trade costs seem to decrease the downward
bias from selection more than they reduce the upward bias from the number of exporters,
see Proposition 2. Hence, the omitted variable bias seems to dominate the selection bias,
and becomes relatively more important than the selection bias over time.
In Figure 4.3, we compare OLS with the linear approximation of HMR. We note that
the results are qualitatively the same as in Figure 4.2. The HMR distance coeﬃcient is
decreasing over time, whereas the OLS coeﬃcient increases with the associated bias of
OLS increasing. Comparing Figures 4.2 and 4.3 we note that the linear approximation of
HMR gives very similar results to the non-linear version of HMR. That the linear approx-
imation of the HMR works satisfactorily is useful information for a future application of
the linear approximation of the HMR methodology, given the cumbersome estimation of
the non-linear version of HMR.
This main empirical ﬁnding holds for all three data sets as can be seen from Figures
4.4-4.7. Figures 4.5 show for the CEPII data qualitatively the same results as Figures 4.2
and 4.3 do for the original HMR data set. Again, we ﬁnd this for the non-linear method
of HMR and the linear approximation we propose. When we estimate (4.11) by year and
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industry and then average the estimated distance by year, we ﬁnd a very similar pattern
shown in Figures 4.6-4.7.19
Figure 4.2.: Comparing Estimates of HMR with OLS for Original HMR Data.
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Figure 4.3.: Comparing Estimates of Linear Approximation of HMR with OLS for Orig-
inal HMR Data.
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19Note here that, although the linear approximation works best for values of δ around 1 (see Footnote
2), it still performs well for diﬀerent values of correction factors.
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Figure 4.4.: Comparing Estimates of HMR with OLS for CEPII Data.
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Figure 4.5.: Comparing Estimates of Linear Approximation of HMR with OLS for CEPII
data.
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Heckman versus OLS
Next, we make a comparison by results obtained with the usual Heckman procedure.
Since Heckman does not correct for the omitted variable bias, but the sample selection,
we expect it's estimated distance coeﬃcients to be larger in absolute values than those
from OLS. This is exactly what our results in Figure 4.8 for the original HMR data
depict. The estimated distance coeﬃcients are bigger than those estimated from OLS
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Figure 4.6.: Comparing Estimates of HMR with OLS for Industry-Level Data (Averaged).
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Figure 4.7.: Comparing Estimates of Linear Approximation of HMR with OLS for
Industry-Level Data (Averaged).
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in every single year in our data. This empirical ﬁnding is very much in line with our
theoretical result that accounting for zero trade ﬂows cannot solve the distance puzzle
when HMR is the data generating process. The results for the CEPII data (Figure 4.9)
and the averaged distance coeﬃcients from the industry-level estimates (Figure 4.10)
again support this theoretical result. We ﬁnd no evidence for a reduction of estimated
distance coeﬃcients when accounting for sample selection from ignoring zero trade ﬂows
compared to OLS estimates. Figure 4.10 also shows bigger distance coeﬃcients in every
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single year and an increasing trend for the Heckman estimates. The importance of zero
trade ﬂows seems to be less for the CEPII data set given that the Heckman estimates are
very similar to the OLS results. This is reasonable since Head et al. (2010) ﬁll up many
zero trade ﬂows which actually have not been zero while generating the CEPII data set
(see appendix of Head et al. (2010)).
To sum up our results up until here, we do not ﬁnd a qualitative diﬀerence between the
three data sets. Some quantitative diﬀerences are quite reasonable since for example the
results for the industry data are averaged over industries with equal weights.
Figure 4.8.: Comparing Estimates of Heckman with OLS for Original HMR Data.
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Industries
Figure 4.11 show changes over time in the level of the distance coeﬃcient for each of the
28 industries from HMR and OLS. Most industries show a similar pattern, where the
distance coeﬃcient with OLS is increasing over time and the HMR distance coeﬃcient is
decreasing over time, producing an increasing bias of the OLS estimates.20 In particular,
these patterns are present in industries that are characterized by intra-industry trade
(e.g. Footwear or Manufacture of machinery), whereas the patterns seem weaker in
20Actually, the bias can be identiﬁed visually from Figure 4.11. Therefore we added again quadratic ﬁts
over time to our estimates. We mostly observe an increase in the diﬀerence between the quadratic ﬁt
of the OLS estimates and the quadratic ﬁt of the HMR estimates over time, at least for the second
half of our data period. Note that this diﬀerence is always signiﬁcant and never converges to the end
of our data period, except for petrolium reﬁneries.
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Figure 4.9.: Comparing Estimates of Heckman with OLS for CEPII Data.
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Figure 4.10.: Comparing Estimates of Heckman with OLS for Industry-Level Data (Av-
eraged).
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industries where the pattern of trade is to a larger extent explained by comparative
advantage (e.g. Tobacco manufactures or Petrolium reﬁneries). This is also what
should be expected since trade in the HMR model generates intra-industry trade.
Descriptive evidence of these results is shown in Table 4.1 where the ISIC classiﬁcation
is linked to the industry classiﬁcation with respect to product diﬀerentiation according
to Rauch (1999) and the information of whether OLS bias increases or not. Rauch
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classiﬁes industries at the SITC 4-digit level as diﬀerentiated or not. However, we ﬁrst
subsume these SITC 4-digit classiﬁcations into our ISIC classiﬁcation which actually
aggregates the SITC 4-digit industries at a higher level, i.e. the ISIC codes consist of
more than one SITC 4-digit code. We then calculate the share of diﬀerentiated SITC
4-digit industries according to Rauch (1999) within our 28 ISIC industries (Share of
diﬀerentiated industries).
In Table 4.1 we do ﬁnd a correlation of 0,34 between the dummy Increase in bias and
Share of diﬀerentiated industries.21 The mean Share of diﬀerentiated industries within
the 23 industries where we do ﬁnd an increasing bias is 0.75 which is much higher than
the 0.40 within the 5 industries where we do not ﬁnd an increase in the bias. If we
draw an arbitrary cutoﬀ for diﬀerentiated versus homogeneous industries at a Share of
diﬀerentiated industries of 0.5 we would see that 17 out of 19 cases are diﬀerentiated
according to the Rauch classiﬁcation. Since the sizes of the SITC 4-digit industries are
not accounted for when subsuming them into the ISIC classiﬁcation, we now concentrate
on ISIC codes where we calculated a clear-cut Share of diﬀerentiated industries of either
0 or 1. Within these 15 observations we ﬁnd 12 matches, either between no increase in
the bias and a clear-cut Share of diﬀerentiated industries of 0 or between an increase in
the bias and a clear-cut Share of diﬀerentiated industries of 1.
We also link our industry-level results in Table 4.1 to the estimated industry speciﬁc elas-
ticities of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006). We then take the average of the
estimated elasticity of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006) over all SITC rev.
2 3-digit industries which sum up to the ISIC-level. Generally, we expect that industries
with high elasticities of substitution are less diﬀerentiated (more homogeneous) and that
an increase in the bias for these industries is less likely with respect to the HMR model.
Dropping the suspicious average elasticity of paper products which is far more than 2
standard deviations diﬀerent from the average of the industry elasticities, we ﬁnd the
following result. There is a small negative correlation (-0.08) between the dummy which
indicates an increase in the bias from our results and the elasticity calculated from the
results of Broda and Weinstein (2006). In 13 out of 22 cases where industry elasticity is
smaller than the average industry elasticity, we also ﬁnd an increase in the bias of OLS.
Examining the clear-cut cases, where we either observe 100 percent diﬀerentiated goods
or 0 percent diﬀerentiated goods according to Rauch (1999), we ﬁnd 10 out of 15 of these
21However, left with 28 industries/observations, the regression results lack in their precision, but can
serve as additional descriptives. Point estimates of regressions (probit, logit or linear probability) of
the dummy which indicates a bias increase on Share of diﬀerentiated industries give results in our
favor (positive) and are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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observations to match with our expectation; the three zero percent diﬀerentiated goods
industries all have an above average elasticity and 7 out of 10 100 percent diﬀerentiated
goods industries have a below average elasticity. All in all the picture for the industry
elasticities is consistent with our expectation. A more comprehensive look at the industry
dimension of the HMR model is not the focus of this paper. However, it is also not nec-
essary to support our result that the distance puzzle cannot be solved only by accounting
for zeros.
Globalization and Transport Costs
Additionally, we provide evidence that the HMR data generating process ﬁts the data
well and that Equation (4.11) might consistently estimate the distance coeﬃcient. Figures
4.12 to 4.17 show the results of relating the estimated distance coeﬃcient γˆHMR to actual
trade costs. Firstly, Figures 4.14 and 4.16 show that the estimated distance coeﬃcients are
strongly positively correlated with shipping costs in data recently published by Hummels
(2007). Figure 4.12 does not support this ﬁnding, which we suspect to happen because
of the low number of observations here. Secondly, Figures 4.13, 4.15 and 4.17 shows
that the γˆHMR is also positively correlated with oil prices, which should be an important
determinant of transport costs. Additionally, we note that the OLS estimate of the
distance coeﬃcient is negatively correlated with these data on transport costs. Once
more, this non-intuitive correlation can be explained because OLS neither controls for
the omitted variable of the number of exporters nor for the omission of zero trade ﬂows.
Auxiliary Estimates
Finally, we underpin our results by plotting the bias terms in more detail and provide
more evidence on the mechanisms in play and how they evolve over time. Actually, our
estimates show that the bias of OLS increases over time. Hence, it must either be the
case that the downward bias from sample selection decreases faster than the upward bias
from not controlling for the number and size of exporting ﬁrms or that the downward bias
stays stable over time and the upward bias increases or that the downward bias decreases
and the upward bias stays stable, or anything in between these cases. Figures 4.18 to 4.20
depict the actual bias terms for the three data sets respectively. In these ﬁgures we plot
the combined bias term of the OLS estimator (Equation (4.8)) and the two separated bias
terms from sample selection (Ξ [δ + βuη] η¯∗ij) and omitting the measure of heterogeneity
of the HMR estimator (γδ), respectively. All bias terms are averaged over all bilateral
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Table 4.1.: Indusry Composition and the Bias of OLS
ISIC Industry Increase in bias Share of dif-
ferentiated
industries
Elasticity
311 Food yes 0.28 3.94
313 Beverage yes 0.2 4.18
314 Tobacco no 0 9.77
321 Textiles yes 0.68 5.93
322 Wearing apparel yes 0.96 5.83
323 Leather yes 0.88 1.94
324 Footwear yes 1 1.74
331 Wood and cork no 0.7 2.13
332 Furniture no 1 1.64
341 Paper yes 0.18 45.81
342 Printing yes 1 5.6
351 Industrial chemicals no 0.19 4.33
352 Chemical products yes 0.92 1.92
353 Petroleum reﬁneries no 0.13 9.63
354 Products of petroleum and coal yes 0 15.64
355 Rubber products yes 1 2.47
356 Plastic products yes 1 2.7
361 Pottery, china and earthenware yes 1 1.92
362 Glass yes 1 1.92
369 Non-metallic mineral yes 0.8 1.89
371 Iron and steel yes 0.33 4.16
372 Non-ferrous metal yes 0 5.09
381 Fabricated metal yes 1 7.06
382 Machinery yes 1 8.97
383 Electrical machinery yes 1 6.63
384 Transport equipment yes 1 10.31
385 Scientiﬁc equipment yes 1 2.05
390 Other manufacturing yes 0.92 2.69
Notes: 28 ISIC Rev. 2 manufacturing industries, where yes corresponds to a dummy which is equal
to 1 if we do ﬁnd an increase in the bias γˆOLS − γˆHMR from Figure 4.11. Share of diﬀerentiated
industries is the share of diﬀerentiated SITC 4-digit industries according to Rauch (1999) within
the ISIC industry. Elasticity corresponds to the average elasticity of substitution from Broda and
Weinstein (2006) over all SITC rev. 2 3-digit industries which sum up to the ISIC-level.
observations by year.
For all data sets the bias from zero trade ﬂows is almost stable over time and only
decreases slightly. γδ actually increases over time. Solely important for our results is
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that the relative change over time ﬁts in with Proposition 3. The bias from omitting
heterogeneity dominates the bias from sample selection due to zero trade ﬂows. These
ﬁgures also highlight that the bias from omitting heterogeneity (γδ) drives the changes
over time since the sample selection bias (Ξ [δ + βuη] η¯∗ij) changes only slightly. This is in
line with the fact that zero trade ﬂows alone cannot explain the distance puzzle.
Contrary to Proposition 2, ﬁgures 4.18 and 4.19 depict an increase in the heterogeneity.
This diﬀerence between our theory and the estimates can be explained by the ceteris
paribus assumption of the theory which is not met for the estimates. Speciﬁcally, rec-
ognize that we estimate the coeﬃcients for each year so that the heterogeneity of ﬁrms
can increase over time due to reasons other than trade. To demonstrate this point, we
allow both the distance coeﬃcient, γ, and the impact of ﬁrm heterogeneity on trade, δ,
to change over time. Speciﬁcally, we again take the derivative with respect to time of
Equation (4.8) but now take into account changes in γ and δ simultaneously:
∂Bias(γˆOLS)
∂t
= δ
∂γ
∂t
(−)
+ γ
∂δ
∂t
(+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
Omitted variable bias
Ξ
(δ + βuη) ∂η¯∗ij
∂t
(−)
+ η¯∗ij

︸ ︷︷ ︸
T 0.
Selection bias
(4.13)
We again can decompose the bias of OLS into the omitted variable bias and the selection
bias. Sticking to the assumption that increased globalization implies a decreasing γ over
time and assuming the selection bias to be small (as ﬁgures 4.18 to 4.20 suggest) and ∂δ
∂t
to be positive and bigger in absolute value than ∂γ
∂t
, we end up with an increase of the bias
of the OLS estimates of the distance coeﬃcient which is in line with the ﬁgures 4.18 to
4.20. This implies that an increase of the heterogeneity in the data due to other reasons
can actually explain why the omitted variable bias can increase over time simultaneously
as a decreasing elasticity of distance, while the selection bias only changes marginally.
4.4. Conclusions
Globalization has advanced rapidly during the last two decades. In contrast, the inﬂuence
of distance in empirical estimates of bilateral trade ﬂows has remained high and has not
declined. In this paper, we use the model by Helpman et al. (2008), emphasizing zero
trade ﬂows and ﬁrm heterogeneity, to resolve this distance puzzle.
Using diﬀerent trade data sets, the non-linear estimation of HMR leads to declining
distance coeﬃcients over time. These coeﬃcients also reﬂect the variation in true trade
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costs as the estimated HMR distance coeﬃcients are also strongly correlated with the
variation in freight costs and oil prices. When estimating the eﬀect of distance on trade
with OLS, we do not only ﬁnd a larger distance coeﬃcient but also that it increases over
time. Thus, the distance puzzle arises from a growing bias of OLS estimates.
We show how the growing bias of OLS estimates can be explained from the two sources
of bias generated from applying OLS to a gravity estimation when the HMR model is the
data generating process. The upward bias of the OLS estimates implies that the omitted
variable bias (from the number of heterogeneous exporting ﬁrms) must dominate the sam-
ple selection bias (due to the omission of zero trade ﬂows). When relating globalization
to a fall of the true distance coeﬃcient, both the downward bias from sample selection
from omitting zero trade ﬂows and the upward bias from omitting the number and size
of exporting ﬁrms will decrease with increasing globalization (in absolute value). We ﬁnd
that the bias of OLS increases over time. Decomposing the bias of OLS into its two
componenets, the omitted variable bias and the sample selection bias, we empirically ﬁnd
an increase over time of the omitted variable bias while the sample selection bias hardly
changes over time. This result implies an increasing importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity
over time.
On a ﬁnal note, the gravity equation is perhaps the most widely used tool in empirical
work using aggregate international trade data. While ﬁrm-level data is becoming more
frequent, applying gravity equations on aggregate trade data will also remain common
in the future when various policy issues are investigated. In this paper, we have shown
how taking sample selection and exporter ﬁrm heterogeneity into account is crucial for
understanding the eﬀect of distance on international trade when aggregate trade data is
used. Then, we showed the usefulness of a linear approximation of the HMR estimator.
As this estimator is much simpler to apply than the non-linear estimator of HMR, we
suggest that the linear approximation could be fruitfully used for many other research
questions.
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Figure 4.12.: HMR, OLS and Freight Costs for Original HMR Data.
80
81
82
83 84
85
86
8788
89
.6
.8
1
1.2
1.4
(−1
)xD
ist
an
ce
 co
eff
ice
nt
175 200 225
Freight cost
Trend: HMR Trend: OLS
HMR−estimate OLS−estimate
Trade costs proxied by a ship liner index (price to ship general cargoes and various
manufacturing goods) from Hummels (2007). Year of estimate indicated at HMR estimate.
Distance coefficients by year and freight costs for HMR data
HMR, OLS, and trade costs:
Figure 4.13.: HMR, OLS and Oil Prices for Original HMR Data.
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Figure 4.14.: HMR, OLS and Freight Costs for CEPII Data.
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Figure 4.15.: HMR, OLS and Oil Prices for CEPII Data.
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Figure 4.16.: HMR, OLS and Freight Costs for Industry-Level Data (Averaged).
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Figure 4.17.: HMR, OLS and Oil Prices for Industry-Level Data (Averaged).
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Figure 4.18.: Bias Terms Over Time HMR Data.
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Figure 4.19.: Bias Terms Over Time CEPII Data.
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Figure 4.20.: Bias Terms Over Time Industry Data.
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5. Employment Eﬀects of Oﬀshoring
and FDI  Disentangling Modes
and Measures1
5.1. Introduction
The recent two decades of globalization have been vividly debated in the media and
in politics (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006), fearing the exodus of production jobs in highly
developed countries. But was the economic impact really as large as the intensity of the
debate on it? At the very heart of the recent wave of globalization was the unbundling of
the production process, a shift of production steps to locations with lower costs (Baldwin,
2006).
Contrary to the strong media perception, academic research on employment eﬀects of
oﬀshoring or correlated measures of FDI are ambiguous.2 A signiﬁcant number of stud-
ies ﬁnd positive employment eﬀects contrary to the perception of the public and partly
contrary to economic theory. A potential explanation is that oﬀshoring has not been sys-
tematically measured by statistical oﬃces and researchers have to refer to proxy variables,
which may erroneously include many events other than oﬀshoring.
Using two diﬀerent micro-data sets, this study investigates whether ambiguous employ-
ment eﬀects of international sourcing arise from using diﬀerent proxy variables of oﬀ-
shoring and FDI, or whether diﬀerent estimation methods, diﬀerent samples, or diﬀerent
control/selection variables are responsible for the ambiguity.
Considering only studies which use micro-data and ﬁrm-level measures of oﬀshoring or
FDI, studies still diﬀer by their choice of the employed measures of FDI and oﬀshoring:
new investments abroad (Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2004; Barba Navaretti et al.,
1This chapter bases on joint work with Dieter Urban. All remaining errors in this volume are mine.
2See Crinó (2009) for a survey.
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2010), expansion of employment in foreign aﬃliates (Becker and Muendler, 2008), increase
in intermediate input purchases from abroad (Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007; Moser et al.,
2015), increase in usage of intermediate inputs interacted with contemporaneous domestic
establishment restructuring (Moser et al., 2015) or relocation (Wagner, 2011).
These studies diﬀer also by countries on which data were drawn: Italy (Barba Navaretti
et al., 2010), France (Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007), and Germany (all other above men-
tioned studies). They diﬀer further by the estimation technique: OLS, dynamic panel
data, or, in most studies, matching estimators, where control or selection variables again
diﬀer across studies.
As large as the range of choices in study design are, as large is the range of results
with strong positive employment eﬀects from foreign employment expansion (Becker and
Muendler, 2008) on one end, and (slightly) negative employment eﬀects in some sample
subgroup (Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007), or when not excluding outliers (Wagner, 2011),
or when interacting oﬀshoring treatment with contemporaneous establishment closure
events (Moser et al., 2015) on the other end.3
We investigate a unique and discrete oﬀshoring measure of German establishments that
experienced oﬀshoring during the time period 2004-2006 and compare several interna-
tionalization measures. On the one hand, we apply FDI, market seeking FDI and cost
saving FDI measures using diﬀerent control variables and diﬀerent estimation methods.
On the other hand, we apply a measure of oﬀshoring, which is similar to a measure used
by Wagner (2011), albeit the data period is diﬀerent and the data diﬀer by their cov-
erage and their quality (response rates and missing values). To compare methods, we
apply both OLS estimators and matching techniques. To keep results comparable, we use
three diﬀerent sets of selection variables to determine the probability of FDI or relocation
abroad of an establishment for the matching methods. Note that for the latter, Smith
and Todd (2005a) ﬁnd that an analysis of the prominent LaLonde data (LaLonde, 1986)
is quite sensitive to diﬀerent samples and selection variables.
Our analysis is closest to Moser et al. (2015) and Wagner (2011) with respect to the
study design and empirical results. When focusing on diﬀerent channels through which
international sourcing might aﬀect domestic employment, Moser et al. (2015) also ﬁnd
negative employment eﬀects of one oﬀshoring measure. Overall they do ﬁnd positive
employment eﬀects of internationalization on establishment employment including oﬀ-
shoring measured via an increase in intermediate input purchases from abroad. They do
ﬁnd a negative employment eﬀect, whenever they restrict their sample to establishments
3See Table D.1 for an even broader picture of measures, methods, data, and results of other studies.
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which undergo a general domestic restructuring of a part of the establishment in the same
period. This result for a reﬁned measure of oﬀshoring already indicates that potential
negative employment eﬀects occur if domestic layoﬀs are temporarily linked; Moser et al.
(2015) conclude that the downsizing channel dominates potential productivity eﬀects of
oﬀshoring in these cases. Wagner (2011) coins the term relocation for a ﬁrm-level mea-
sure of internationalization where a domestic part of the ﬁrm is replaced by a foreign
one. Note that for this measure a domestic restructuring is causally, not just temporar-
ily, aligned compared to the measure for which Moser et al. (2015) ﬁnd negative eﬀects.
Wagner (2011) ﬁnds comparably small negative employment eﬀects and concludes that
the economic impact is not as large as feared.
Even within a uniﬁed data framework, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive employment eﬀects
from diﬀerent FDI measures and strongly negative and signiﬁcant employment eﬀects
from relocation abroad. The latter result is robust evidence for signiﬁcant employment
losses from relocation abroad as one mode of foreign activity measured at the micro-
level. Moreover, the disparity of results on the two types of measures of oﬀshoring or FDI
does neither hinge on diﬀerences in estimation methods (OLS vs. matching), nor on the
choices of selection or control variables. We explain this disparity of results by the variety
of activities that are captured by these diﬀerent measures. None of the measures captures
only one single type of FDI. For example, the FDI measure may comprise horizontal FDI,
vertical FDI, export platform FDI, etc.; relocation abroad may also consist of horizontal
or vertical FDI. Some of these activities may occur in the vein of a general expansion of
a ﬁrm both abroad, but also at home. This may explain why most FDI measures, even
those of cost-saving FDI may go hand in hand with domestic employment expansion.
Only in some cases, an expansion abroad substitutes for domestic production, and sheds
oﬀ domestic labor. Most FDI activities abroad either stimulate domestic activities, or
are concomitant to a general expansion of a multinational ﬁrm. This result is also in
line with the study of Moser et al. (2015) which also ﬁnds positive employment eﬀects
from oﬀshoring on the one hand, and negative ones from oﬀshoring if accompanied by
partial establishment closures on the other hand. To sum up, even when we have a close
look at diﬀerent micro-level measures of foreign activity within one data set, we ﬁnd
tremendously diﬀerent employment eﬀects.
Since strongly negative employment eﬀects from relocation abroad are, to best of our
knowledge, documented the ﬁrst time in this study,4 we conﬁrm this new result by a
quasi natural experiment which is unique to our data. As a second robustness check we
4Only Wagner (2011) provides for some sample evidence of a negative employment eﬀect from relocation.
These eﬀects are much smaller and seem to be more sensitive to an outlier correction.
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employ a second administrative data set which oﬀers a very similar micro-level measure
of relocation. We can conﬁrm negative employment eﬀects of a foreign activity when a
restructuring at home is causally coherent.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a framework for a establishment-
level analysis of oﬀshoring, including a comparison of diﬀerent empirical measures linked
to theoretical concepts. Section 5.3 outlines the empirical method and section 5.4 dis-
cusses brieﬂy the data we use. In section 5.5 we provide the estimation of the propensity
score of oﬀshoring and FDI measures and various auxiliary tests. Section 5.6 presents
the results of the main estimations of the average treatment eﬀects of oﬀshoring or FDI
on employment for both micro-data sets and additional results of the quasi natural ex-
periment. The last section concludes.
5.2. Employment Eﬀects of Oﬀshoring and FDI
To explore why employment eﬀects diﬀer across various studies on FDI/oﬀshoring, we
need to understand ﬁrst how these studies diﬀer in data, measurement, and methodology.
We focus in this section on a comparison of measures of FDI/oﬀshoring and ask what types
of FDI or outsourcing are captured by each of those measures and which employment
eﬀects are expected from each type of FDI.
For example, Becker and Muendler (2008) use expansion of employment in foreign aﬃli-
ates, which may capture both an incremental increase in horizontal and vertical FDI. If
foreign markets grow fast and FDI is of the horizontal type, then foreign aﬃliates increase
and employment at home will not be aﬀected if horizontal FDI is literally replicating the
domestic production process abroad. If it is instead of the horizontal type according to
Venables (1999), the ﬁrst stage of the production process may take place at home, and a
second one abroad, while the product is always sold abroad in equilibrium. An expansion
abroad will then go along with a positive employment eﬀect at home. If the investment is
of the vertical type according to Venables (1999), the foreign aﬃliate produces interme-
diate inputs for assembly and sales at home. Expansion abroad will occur, because there
is increased demand at home, increasing the demand for intermediate inputs from the
foreign aﬃliates. Again, a positive employment eﬀect at home is expected. A negative
employment eﬀect may arise, instead, if some production steps, undertaken previously at
home, are shifted abroad. But even then, a ﬁrm's relocation of domestic production steps
abroad may help to save costs, increase its competitiveness, and subsequently augment
its world market share, which in turn may stimulate the activities related to production
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steps that remain at home.
A similar argumentation may result if the measure is a dummy variable for a domestic
establishment having a new foreign aﬃliate (for example Barba Navaretti and Castellani
(2004), Buch and Lipponer (2010)). Again this may be horizontal or vertical in nature,
yielding ambiguous eﬀects on employment in dependence on which of the above mentioned
cases is taking place. On top of the previous cases, some of the new investments may
even be mergers & acquisitions which may be completely detached from the domestic
production process and domestic employment eﬀects are absent.5
FDI measures may be further speciﬁed by the motivation for the investment. Mattes
(2010) for example distinguishes FDI that is undertaken for the purpose to seek new
markets and FDI that is seeking to reduce costs according to self-assessments of ﬁrms.
While the market seeking motive is rather associated with horizontal FDI, cost reduction
is typically associated with vertical FDI. Still, also horizontal FDI can be driven by cost
savings (Markusen, 2002). Also Hering et al. (2010) distinguish diﬀerent motives for FDI
according to the location of the sales of the foreign aﬃliate. Again, both positive or
negative employment eﬀects may arise for these speciﬁcations for reasons outlined above.
A fourth measure of FDI or oﬀshoring is imported intermediate input demand (Biscourp
and Kramarz, 2007; Moser et al., 2015). While this measure is excluding horizontal
FDI, but focuses on vertical FDI and international outsourcing instead, a domestic plant
may substitute domestic suppliers for foreign suppliers, leaving employment in its own
domestic plant possibly unaﬀected. Alternatively, cost savings through oﬀshoring render
the ﬁrm more competitive on world markets and stimulate domestic employment. Should
the increase in intermediate inputs, instead, go along with a substitution of domestic in-
house production, then there may be an employment decline in the domestic plant.
A ﬁfth measure is relocation of domestic production to a plant abroad, for example in
(Wagner, 2011). This measure may again capture both, FDI (either horizontal or verti-
cal) and international outsourcing. However, it excludes foreign expansions of operations,
which are detached from domestic operations and excludes substitution of domestic for
foreign suppliers, too. Still, the closure of a part of a plant may go along with a change
in the specialization pattern, giving up some tasks, but expanding others instead. For
example, certain low-skilled production activities may be shifted outside of the home
country (and probably causing domestic dismissals), while high-skilled intensive head-
quarter services are extended at home.
5See Stiebale and Trax (2011) focusing on mergers & acquisitions.
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In summary, all types of FDI or oﬀshoring have ambiguous employment eﬀects in theory,
and all measures available in existing data capture several types of FDI. If one wants to pin
down employment eﬀects unambiguously, then positive employment eﬀects at home will
arise if a ﬁrm is expanding both at home and abroad. Instead, a negative employment
eﬀect at home is to be expected if domestic production is substituted for production
abroad, keeping the overall level of activity constant. As the literature, so far, has used
mostly one of these measures at a time, and research designs have been diﬀerent with
respect to the data, the estimation method, and the control or selection variables, the
previous results are hard to compare.6 We investigate the above mentioned measures in a
uniﬁed estimation design on the same data set to investigate systematically why studies
diﬀer in their empirical results so strongly.
5.3. Empirical Method
We closely follow Moser et al. (2015), Wagner (2011), and combine a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator with a propensity score matching technique to investigate the rela-
tionship between FDI or oﬀshoring and establishment-level employment. The econometric
problem is one of the missing counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened if plants
had not undergone treatment (i.e. oﬀshoring/FDI). Matching techniques address this
problem by statistically designing a counterfactual, while controlling for self selection on
observables. To do this in the simplest possible way, a non-treated observation is assigned
to each treated one that had ex ante the same probability of obtaining treatment than its
treated twin. Treatment is then purely random conditional on the selection variables x,
which determine the probability of treatment, P (D = 1 | x), where D is a binary variable
with value 1 if an observation obtained treatment.
The coeﬃcient of interest is the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) on
establishment-level employment. The ATT measures the average diﬀerence between the
outcome of the treated observations and the hypothetical outcome without treatment.
To apply matching methods, three core-assumptions of matching must be fulﬁlled:
1. Conditional-Mean-Independence assumption (CMIA):
E[y1 | D = 0, x] = E[y1 | D = 1, x] = E[y1 | x],
E[y0 | D = 0, x] = E[y0 | D = 1, x] = E[y0 | x],
6See Table D.1.
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where y1 is the employment outcome of an average establishment under treatment
and y0 is the outcome if the same establishment does not experience treatment.
This assumption ensures that the assignment to the treatment group is random
conditional on observable characteristics, i.e. self-selection into treatment is allowed,
conditional on observable characteristics of the establishment. This implies that the
mean of observations' outcomes with the same observable characteristics without
treatment would be the same.
2. Overlap Assumption:
0 < P (D = 1 | x) < 1.
This assumption ensures that observations with probability zero or one are excluded
from the matching process because their assignment is not random by deﬁnition.
3. Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption (SUTVA):
SUTVA means there exist no inter-dependencies between the two matching groups.
Under this assumption the treatment only aﬀects the treated observation itself.
Thus, the eﬀects on the treated have no impacts on the non-treated observations
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
The combination of the matching estimator with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach
somewhat relaxes a part of the CMIA. The measurement of the outcome variables in
diﬀerences eliminates constant time trends based on unobservables like a ﬁrst diﬀerence
estimator or a ﬁxed eﬀect model. Indeed, a varying diﬀerent time trend between treated
and non-treated observations might remain and is excluded by assumption.
Observations that are oﬀ the overlapping support region are not a problem in our analysis.
Non-overlapping observations would pose a problem if many observations would be lost by
controlling for this assumption. However, in our speciﬁcations we exclude the observations
of the treatment group that have a lower propensity score than the lowest of the non-
treatment group and non-treated observations that have a higher propensity score as the
highest of the treatment observations vice versa. The estimations are constrained to this
sample.
Program evaluation methods are typically used to investigate the eﬀects of small treat-
ments that have no general equilibrium eﬀects.7 Consider a job-training program only
7An introduction to matching methods is given in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). For a useful textbook
section see Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Angrist and Pischke (2009) follow a new approach to teach
these methods and compare them to standard econometrics expediently. A general implementation
guide is Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and speciﬁc problems are discussed for instance in Abadie
(2005), Abadie and Imbens (2006), Angrist and Hahn (2004), Dehejia and Wahba (2002), Dehejia
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for a small number of unemployed people that does not change the overall skill of all
unemployed people and thus does not change the labor demand at all. Since the amount
of oﬀshoring units is quite small we follow the literature (for example Wagner (2011)) and
exclude general equilibrium or spillover eﬀects which potentially would hurt the SUTVA
by assumption.8
Consider the following two data generating processes:
yTit = g(xi0)t+ f
T (xi0)t+ δ
T
itt+ γi + Uitt+ εit, (5.1)
yNTit = g(xi0)t+ f
NT (xi0)t+ δ
NT
it t+ γi + Uitt+ εit. (5.2)
yit is the total employment of an establishment i at time t = {0, 1}, where 0 denotes the
period before and 1 denotes the period after FDI/oﬀshoring. Equation (5.1) describes the
data generating process for the oﬀshoring establishments and Equation (5.2) describes it
for the non-treated establishments. g(xi0)t is the function of the growth trend depending
on observables xi0 before treatment which is independent of the treatment. fNT (xi0)
captures the causal impact of oﬀshoring also depending on the observable characteristics
xi0; this is allowed to be heterogeneous across establishments. The unobservable hetero-
geneous causal impact of the treatment is δNTit which the establishments also include in
their decision. γi are time invariant attributes that aﬀect the outcome, both observable
and/or unobservable. Uitt varies over time and is not observable but aﬀects the outcome,
too.
Assuming, we could observe the same establishment's outcome ﬁrst in the oﬀshoring
situation and then in the non-oﬀshoring situation, g(xi0)t, γi and Uitt cancel out, and we
would end up with
fT (xi0) + δ
T
i1 − fNT (xi0)− δNTi1 .
(2005), Heckman et al. (1998a), Heckman et al. (1998b) or Smith and Todd (2005b). Holland (1986)
discusses general causal inference based on the potential outcome model and Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) concentrate on the propensity score.
8See Ferracci et al. (2014) for a solution of this problem if segmentation of markets is reasonable. Moser
et al. (2015) cope with the same problem by modifying their econometric model and do not exclude
these eﬀects by assumption. By conditioning on time eﬀects, they can allow for a special case of a
spillover eﬀects. Supposing that the observations belong to the same competitive price-market, only
the aggregate share of ﬁrms that decide in the period before treatment to oﬀshore is relevant for
the equilibrium employment. So they include time dummies in their selection regression to capture
the amount of oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Importantly, the ATT cannot be interpreted as usual. The resulting
ATTs of this approach must then be interpreted as relative eﬀects instead of absolute causal eﬀects.
This is suﬃcient for their purpose, because their main interest is to identify diﬀerent channels through
which activities abroad inﬂuence performance at home. As we do not want to segment markets by
industries to capture integrated production strategies, and because we are interested in the causal
eﬀect, both alternatives do not seem to be appropriate here.
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This diﬀerence is hypothetical. We cannot observe the counterfactual of a establishment's
outcome. Therefore we have to design a counterfactual outcome conditional on the ob-
servables for every establishment and estimate the average diﬀerence in these outcomes
over all observations. As mentioned above we concentrate on the ATT which can be
formalized as
E[yTi1 − yNTi1 | Di1 = 1] = E[fT (xi0) + δTi1 − fNT (xi0)− δNTi1 | Di1 = 1],
where Dit is an indicator variable with value of one for the treatment group in period
one and zero if there is no oﬀshoring event. E[fNT (xi0) + δNTi1 | Di1 = 1] is the part we
have to construct where the matching algorithms select a most similar control group on
observables.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator is given by
∆yi1 = β0 + β1xi0 + β2Di1 + εi,
with Dit as treatment indicator. This estimator needs four assumptions to estimate the
ATT consistently: (i) no heterogeneous treatment eﬀects based on observables, (ii)xi0 are
exogenous time trend determinants, (iii) a linear functional form for the time trend and
(iv) the time trend on observables xi0 has a common average for treated and non-treated.
The last assumption implies that for a consistent estimator there are no self-selection
eﬀects into oﬀshoring for the establishments on unobservables (i.e. E[Ui1 | Di1 = 1, xi0] =
0) and no heterogeneous causal eﬀects on unobservables (i.e. E[δTi1−δNTit | Di1 = 1, xi0] =
0).9
In combination with the matching estimator the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-matching ap-
proach relaxes the ﬁrst three assumptions as described above (see for this approach
Heckman et al. (1997)). The ATT under the remaining assumption of conditional mean
independence is given as
E[∆yi1 | xi0, Di1 = 0] = E[∆yi1 | xi0, Di1 = 1] = E[∆yi1 | xi0],
and the ATT in the population is
ATT = E[δx | Di1 = 1],
9We use this estimator as a robustness check for our results by estimating a twofold diﬀerentiated
equation via OLS, see Angrist and Pischke (2009).
97
with
δx ≡ E[∆yi1 | xi0, Di1 = 1]− E[∆yi1 | xi0, Di1 = 0].
Obviously, if we try to match the observations by xi0 or if we try to condition on xi0
respectively, there is a problem of dimensionality. Consider the case of some continuous
variables or a large set of categorical variables or any combination of these two as deter-
minants of the treatment. Hence, exact matching is not useful or practicable. We prefer
to match on the propensity score. The propensity score is the conditional probability of
getting treated of an establishment i, P (Di1 = 1) = P (xi0) ≡ pi. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) show that conditioning on the propensity score pi instead of conditioning on xi0 is
a consistent. The central idea is that if the outcome is independent of the selection into
treatment Di1 conditional on xi0, the same is valid conditional on P (xi0):
yTit , y
NT
it ⊥ Dit | xi0 ⇒ yTit , yNTit ⊥ Dit | P (xi0).
The propensity score has to be estimated. Typically, a binary outcome model is used for
that purpose. We choose a multinomial-logit model to estimate the propensity score of
establishments to oﬀshore (McFadden, 1974).
The idea of the propensity score matching estimator is to ﬁnd for any treated observation
another non-treated observation with the same estimated probability of treatment, pˆi,
as for the treated one and compare their outcomes. But the propensity score is also a
continuous variable and to ﬁnd a matching partner with the same estimated pˆi has zero
probability in a random sample. We have to include similar observations instead of (non-
existent) identical one to compare the outcomes. Various matching algorithms exist to
tackle this problem. They vary in their idea of deﬁning the right set of matching partners
or control observations, their measurement of the distance or in weighting issues. Note
that every deviation from the identical propensity score matching makes the estimated
coeﬃcient potentially biased.
In this study we employ two diﬀerent, but intuitive matching strategies. We use a kernel
and a k-nearest neighbor approach.10 They diﬀer in the number of observations included
and in their underlying non-parametric weighting function g(.) of the included control
observations. To formalize this we follow the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence matching ATT for-
10Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) present other matching algorithms.
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mulation of Heckman et al. (1997),
δˆ =
∑
i
Di1
[
∆yi1 −
∑
j
((
(1−Dj1)g(pi, pj)∆yj1
))]
,
where for this estimated ÂTT the expected value is replaced by the sample mean. The
weighting function for the kernel-estimator can then be formalized as
g(pi, pj) =
K((pj − pi)/h)∑
j∈A(i) K((pj − pi)/h)
.
A(i) = (j || pi−pj |< h) is the set of control group observations and K(.) is the Epanech-
nikov Kernel function which deﬁnes the weights in particular.11 h is a parameter that
deﬁnes the bandwidth around the treated observation where the potential control obser-
vations are located. The bandwidth allows one to vary the number of control observations
that are included for calculating the ÂTT and the Epanechnikov kernel function allows
one to weigh the more distant observation less in the calculation. Heckman et al. (1998b)
have shown that this approach generates consistent estimates of the ATT under common
assumptions.
The second estimator in this analysis is the k-nearest neighbor estimator. We use it for
some variation and robustness checks and to employ the necessary balancing tests. It
substitutes the function g(.) of δˆ with:
g(pi, pj) =
1, if j = arg min | pi − pj |0, else .
This function uses the k-nearest non-treated neighbor observations of the treatment ob-
servation by the propensity score and weighs them with factor one. If there is only one
neighbor the outcome of this one non-treated observation is compared to one treatment
observation.
The choice of the bandwidth h for the Kernel approach or the number of neighbors for
the k-nearest neighbors approach is a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand a bigger set of neighbors
or a bigger parameter h for the bandwidth go along with a bias in the estimator; every
match which is not a perfect match biases the estimator and if the bandwidth of this
potential matching partners increases  i.e. h increases  also the bias increases poten-
11There are several other kernel functions available aside from the Epanechnikov function. For example
we also use a Gaussian kernel, but it does not matter for any qualitative result.
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tially.12 The same is intuitive for the k-nearest neighbor approach. The more neighbors
are included the lower is the quality of the matches by propensity score. Put diﬀerently,
a distant neighbor is distant because its observable characteristics, xi0, are diﬀerent from
the treatment observation at hand. On the other hand, every single observation added in-
creases the eﬃciency of the estimator as usual. This trade-oﬀ applies to both approaches.
Therefore we use the variation of the parameter h or k to check the sensitivity of our
results subsequently.
One remaining problem of matching is to size the standard errors to enable inference.
A general approach to get such missing standard errors is bootstrapping. This seems
to be useful for matching estimators, too (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). But Abadie
and Imbens (2008) proof formally that bootstrapping is not valid for the nearest neigh-
bor approach with replacement that we employ. On the other hand they suggest that
bootstrapping is valid for the kernel matching estimator. Hence, for the kernel estimator
we provide the bootstrapped standard errors and for the the nearest neighbor results
we provide the analytical but only asymptotically valid standard errors of Abadie and
Imbens (2006).13
As mentioned above one robustness check we perform is to vary the two diﬀerent matching
estimators by their parameters for the bandwidth h and diﬀerent numbers of neighbors.
As a second robustness check we use diﬀerent logit speciﬁcations, stemming from Wagner
(2011) and Moser et al. (2015).
The crucial assumption of the matching approach is the CMIA. The selection into treat-
ment has to be exhaustively determined by observables to get consistent ATTs (Becker
and Muendler, 2008). Regrettably and logically, there is no formal test of this assump-
tion. One way to indicate validity of the CMIA is a pre-test, following Heckman and
Hotz (1989), Imbens (2004), and Smith and Todd (2005a). The idea is to perform the
matching estimator for the same observations but before the treatment period. If there
would be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of the ATTs without treatment, conditional on the same
xi0, the CMIA does not seem to hold. If there is no diﬀerence a self-selection eﬀect into
treatment is less plausible.
12Except for the case where there are no other observations within the bandwidth.
13The practical implementation is done in STATA version 10.1. The point estimates and standard errors
for the kernel matching stem from the PSMATCH2 package by Leuven and Sinaesi (2003) with
500 bootstrap iterations, where the propensity score estimation is repeated in every iteration. The
standard errors for the nearest neighbor approach stem from the NNMATCH package (Abadie et al.,
2004) which uses the calculation of Abadie and Imbens (2006) for valid standard errors. A practical
guide to implement these matching estimators is given by Abadie et al. (2004) and by the help-ﬁle
of the PSMATCH2 package.
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After running the matching algorithms, testing whether covariates or selection variables
are balanced between the matching partners is at the core of the matching estimator
and indicates the quality of the matching procedure itself. Balancing in the population
is not a problem (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). There are three possible reasons why
the balancing is not fulﬁlled in the sample. First, the estimated propensity score is
diﬀerent from the real propensity due to a misspeciﬁcation of the binary model. Second,
as mentioned, the matching is not an exact procedure, and third, even if the propensity
score estimation is correct and the matching is exact  i.e. identical propensity scores for
treated and matched-control can be found  the balancing property could be invalid due
to an unlucky sample draw (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Hence, we have to test the
balancing of the covariates between the two matching groups after the matching on the
propensity score. The literature oﬀers a set of balancing tests. We decide to perform three
typical balancing tests in our analysis namely the standardized-diﬀerence test between
the treatment group and the matched-control group according to Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985), a t-test of mean-diﬀerence between these groups and a t-squared Hotelling test
by propensity score quantiles. The ﬁrst two tests check the balancing of the covariates
separately. The big advantage of the Hotelling test is that the selection variables of every
matching group are tested jointly. All balancing tests are provided for the simplest case
of nearest neighbor matching with one neighbor, because there are no statistical problems
stemming from the weighting function in this case.
5.4. Data
As our main data source, we compile a data set of recent waves of the so-called IAB
Establishment Panel. This is a stratiﬁed, annual survey on behalf of the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB) from 1993 onwards on West German establishments and
from 1996 onwards additionally on East German establishments. The sample is drawn
from a nationwide population consisting of about two million establishments. There is
no size cut-oﬀ in the panel, thus, every establishment with at least one employee who is
liable to the German social security system is included. Such are all sectors, subdivided
into 17 industries. The stratiﬁcation occurs along the dimensions of 16 federal states
(Bundesländer), establishment size class in terms of employees, and industry. Thereby,
establishments of large size located in small regions, and belonging to industries with
few establishments are oversampled. Within the 170 cells of the stratiﬁcation matrix,
the sampling is random. Establishments that refuse to answer are replaced by randomly
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drawn establishments of the same strata.14
The high quality of the data and high response rates are ensured by attributes of the
survey like professional face-to-face interviews (response rates up to 84%), elaborated
questionnaire designs with pre-tests and a complex editing process after the ﬁeld phase
with comprehensive plausibility and consistency checks.15
The questionnaire consists of several topic blocks like employment, business policy, invest-
ments, wages and salaries, and so on. The main interest of the survey is to collect labor
market related information. Furthermore, it consists of regular and irregular questions.
The former are asked every year. The latter are dependent on actual developments or pol-
icy interests and on experiences of previous questionnaires and therefore asked only once
or a few times. Unfortunately, our treatment variables of oﬀshoring and FDI belong to
the irregular questions, constraining our analysis to various treatment periods in between
the years 2004 and 2006 (see details below). Subsequently, we describe the variables
we use in detail according to their function within the matching approach: treatment
variables, outcome variable, and selection variables.
5.4.1. Treatment Variables
We are interested in the establishment-level employment eﬀects of diﬀerent modes of
internationalization. We analyze ﬁve diﬀerent treatments: FDI, market-seeking FDI,
cost-saving FDI, low-wage-region FDI and Relocation. In the following, we outline the
details of measurement for these treatment variables.
FDI
According to the 2006 IAB Establishment Panel questionnaire, we call an international
sourcing mode FDI if an establishment has invested abroad in the two previous business
years, i.e. usually in legal years 2004 and/or 2005. If an establishment answered to
this question with yes, it belongs to the treatment group. If it answered with no
it potentially belongs to the control group. Altogether, 170 out of 5759 establishments
14See for example Fischer et al. (2008) for details on the data set. See also http://www.iab.de/en/
erhebungen/iab-betriebspanel.aspx.
15For instance, implausibilities in the data are cleared up with individual telephone calls with the inter-
viewee. Highly erroneous or implausible questionnaires are excluded from the data.
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engaged in new FDI during the years 2004 or 2005 within our estimation sample.16 For
Germany this measure has also been used by Mattes (2010), albeit applying a diﬀerent
estimation technique. A very similar treatment is used by Barba Navaretti and Castellani
(2004) (and others, see Table D.1) on Italian ﬁrm data using diﬀerent selection variables.
Market-Seeking FDI
FDI can be reﬁned further by the main objective or motive according to which an estab-
lishment made its decision on its most important foreign investment. The questionnaire
of 2006 oﬀers seven motives: penetrate new markets/protect market share, procurement
options for intermediate inputs, lower costs, taxes and contributions, lower labor costs,
fewer administrative regulations, option of public funding, and other motive. Multiple
answers are possible.
If one motive for the most important new foreign investment was to penetrate new markets
or to protect foreign market shares, but not labor cost savings at the same time, we call
this mode market-seeking FDI which may capture horizontal or export platform FDI.
There are 84 such modes of FDI in our estimation sample during the years 2004 or 2005.
Cost-Saving FDI
Likewise, we call a mode cost-saving FDI if one motive for the most important new
foreign investment was to save labor cost, but not to penetrate new markets or to protect
foreign market shares at the same time as before. While labor cost savings are associated
foremost with vertical FDI, they may also be relevant for horizontal FDI (Markusen,
2002; Braconier et al., 2005). Within the estimation sample there are 25 such cases of
FDI during the years 2004 or 2005.
Low-Wage-Region FDI
A diﬀerent reﬁnement of the FDI variable tracks its geographic destination. The 2006's
survey oﬀers 5 destination regions for the most important foreign investment of the es-
tablishments. First, the Euro-area, second, the new European Union members since May
2004, a third region which includes south-east Europe with Russia and Turkey, fourth,
16The numbers of establishments counted as treated in the estimation sample may diﬀer from the overall
number of treated observation in the whole sample due to missing values of some covariates/selection
variables.
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Asia and at last the rest of the world. From the point of view of German establishments,
we deﬁne an investment to the second, third and/or fourth region as low-wage-region FDI.
We ﬁnd 99 establishments in the estimation sample of this mode of FDI. For example
Debaere et al. (2010) ﬁnd FDI to less developed countries to have negative eﬀects on the
change in employment at home for middle income country's multinationals. Although,
at a glance, labor cost savings might dominate the decision to invest in such countries
for German establishments, we expect market-seeking interests to be important as well,
especially since the regions include big emerging markets as China and India.
Relocation
In the wave of 2007 the establishments were asked whether they closed down a domestic
in-house activity in the period from July 1st, 2006 to June 30th, 2007, and whether they
re-opened this particular division abroad. We count these cases as Relocation treatment.
Note that we do not further distinguish between a cross-border spin-oﬀ or a cross-border
spun-oﬀ, although possible.17 Much more important for our purpose is that we know that
for these events a domestic restructuring or downsizing is causally aligned to the interna-
tionalization of the establishment. Relocation is the only empirical measure where we can
be sure that going abroad involves domestic organizational changes at the establishment-
level which plausibly lead to a domestic downsizing. Establishments that did not close
down any division or closed down a division but displaced it only domestically belong
potentially to the control group for this treatment. Altogether there are 43 relocation
cases among 6496 establishments. Note also that this measure is most likely to exclude
an expansion of the ﬁrm and diﬀers in that vein to all other employed measures.
5.4.2. Outcome Variables
Our aim is to estimate the oﬀshoring eﬀect on a German establishment's total employ-
ment. To capture the impact of treatment, diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation compares
employment before and after treatment of treated establishments with appropriately cho-
sen establishments which are not treated during the same time period. To allow for some
adjustment period, we take the diﬀerence in log employment before treatment with log
17The 2008th survey of the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008) supports
spin-oﬀ and spun-oﬀs to be typical oﬀshoring events. The biggest part of German cross-national
displacements are represented by foundations of new establishments within the business-network of
the ﬁrm (spun-oﬀ: 50,6%), or by displacing the domestic activity to an organizationally aligned ﬁrm
that already exists (spin-oﬀ: 38%).
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employment up to one year after the treatment period. The treatment period of the
FDI variables covers the years 2004 and 2005. Total establishment-level employment is
counted at June 30th in every year. Hence, we take the diﬀerence in log employment from
June 30th, 2003 to June 30th, 2006, if treatment is one of the FDI variables. Likewise,
relocation abroad occurs during July 1st, 2006 and June 30th, 2007. Hence, we take the
diﬀerence in log employment during the period June 30th, 2006, and June 30th, 2008.
Total employment is the most reliable variable of the IAB Establishment Panel. First, it
stems from the social security register, the reporting of which is obligatory by law for the
establishments. Second, it is checked before the current interview in the establishment
starts. Before the interview of the following year starts, the last year's employment is
checked again. In a last step it is additionally checked during the editing process (Fischer
et al., 2008).
5.4.3. Selection Variables
The last group of variables are the covariates that are necessary to estimate the propensity
score for every establishment. Selection variables serve as the decision criteria according
to which management may have decided upon FDI or relocation. Hence, we include the
lags of the time varying variables in the propensity score estimation and only the time
invariant or persistent selection variables are included with their value contemporaneous
to treatment, in order to loose as few observations as possible. Concerning the FDI
treatments, selection variables date back to the period of the year 2003, still before
treatment starts potentially on January 1st, 2004. Concerning the relocation treatment,
selection variables date from the period of the year 2005 or June 30th, 2006  still before
treatment starts potentially on July 1st, 2006.
To take into account sample stratiﬁcation, we always include the stratiﬁcation variables
among the selection variables, i.e. 16 regional dummies and 17 industry dummies, and
ﬁrm size in terms of employment. In this way we take into account that relocation activity
varies by industries, federal state, and ﬁrm size (see for instance the descriptive statistics
in Statistisches Bundesamt (2008)).
Further, we investigate whether diﬀerent choices of selection variables matter for the re-
sults. In particular, we choose the selection variables previously used in the studies of
Moser et al. (2015), selection variables MUW henceforth, and of Wagner (2011), selec-
tion variables Wagner, henceforth. We use an additional speciﬁcation that explains the
probability of the relocation treatment better than the previous two speciﬁcations. This
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speciﬁcation we call SU henceforth.
Selection Variables MUW
For the FDI variables we use the same selection variables as Moser et al. (2015) do. Their
logit estimates show that oﬀshoring is signiﬁcantly more likely the larger an establishment
in terms of full-time employees is, the more advanced its technology, the higher average
wage costs, and the larger the share of high-skilled workers. If we assume these variables
to proxy productivity of a ﬁrm, their choice is perfectly in line with heterogeneous ﬁrms
literature following the seminal theoretical contribution of Melitz (2003). Also foreign-
owned establishments seem to have a higher probability of oﬀshoring or FDI.18 These
selection variables are measured as follows:
 log total employment : logarithm of total employment at establishment i at time
t-1, i.e. before treatment;
 log wage per employee: logarithm of total wage cost per employee at establishment
i at time t-1;
 high technology : dummy variable taking value of one if an establishment self reports
to employ a technology which is above average or state-of-the-art at time t-1;
 high-skilled : percentage share of high-skilled employees at establishment i at time
t-1;
 foreign ownership: dummy variable taking value of one if majority of the establish-
ment is held by a foreign investor.
Selection Variables Wagner
Additionally we provide the same variables as Wagner (2011) for all oﬀshoring measures
as a robustness check for our results. These selection variables are measured as follows:
 employment : total employment at establishment i at time t-1;
18Similar sets of selection variables are applied for instance by Becker and Muendler (2008) or Barba
Navaretti and Castellani (2004). According to the former study the ﬁrms that displace their activities
internationally, stem from the high technology (manufacturing) sectors and are larger in terms of
employment. Additionally, Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2004) ﬁnd the size of a ﬁrm and its
productivity and proﬁtability to be relevant covariates for the treatment of international investments.
Becker and Muendler (2008) also identify the domestic employment and the establishment's average
wage costs per employee to be signiﬁcant selection variables for their measure of foreign employment
expansion. Furthermore, they employ variables that describe the skill composition of the workforce
at the establishment.
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 employment squared : total employment squared;
 employment cubic: cubic term of total employment;
 sales per employee: sales per employee at establishment i at time t-1;
 wage per employee: wage per employee at establishment i at time t-1;
 export share: percentage share of total exports of total sales at establishment i at
time t-1;
 employment change: change of total employment at establishment i from time t-2
to t-1.19
Selection Variables SU
This speciﬁcation adjusts the estimation of the propensity score to ﬁt it better to the
relocation case. Apart from the industry and region dummies and the ﬁrm size variable
in terms of number of employees, we additionally include the export share as in the
speciﬁcation ofWagner (2011) and the technology variable as in the MUW speciﬁcation.
As a new variable we include an indicator for an establishment that belongs to a corporate
group, and an indicator whether an establishment has a works council.
Aﬃliates of a corporate group may be more likely to be relocated, because these often are
purely production units which are intensive in production workers and therefore may be
relatively cheap elsewhere. Instead, headquarters are intensive in high-skilled labor which
is relatively cheap in Germany. Moreover, single establishment corporations are often too
small to ﬁnance foreign investments, or lack the managerial experience of supervising
aﬃliates.
establishments with more than ﬁve employees are eligible in Germany to have a works
council if there are employees who desire to have one. In fact, many, even large ﬁrms
do not have a works council. The decision to close an in-house activity and to dismiss
employees is a prototypical situation where a works council takes part in the decision.
Because it is in the interest of the works council to secure domestic employment and
works councils can increase the cost of relocation (if not block it at all), its presence is
likely to reduce the probability of relocation.
19Note that this selection variable partly accounts for diﬀerent growth paths of the treated and non-
treated observations.
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Quasi Natural Control Group
In addition to the designed control groups through the matching method we oﬀer a unique
quasi natural control group for the relocation variable. Within the 2006's survey (one
period before treatment) the establishments were asked if an agreement for employment
and location assurance with their workforce or its representation exists and of what con-
tent it is. The establishments were asked what promises they make within this agreement
and which promise the bargaining workforce makes in turn. One promise of the establish-
ments is disclaiming to outsource/relocate any activity of the establishment and possible
counterparts of the agreement are typically lower wages or increased hours of work. We
assume establishments that disclaim to relocate most likely to be potential oﬀshoring
units, because their workforce would not bargain about this probably expensive promise
if it is unlikely to happen. We present results for the relocation variable as described
above, but with a restricted control group consisting only of such disclaimers.
DESTATIS Data
The second data set we employ is a special purpose survey on relocation in 2006 on
behalf of the German federal statistical oﬃce (DESTATIS). The DESTATIS data provide
a comparable relocation measure on employment for German ﬁrms. These data have also
been used in Wagner (2011).20 Here a representative sample of about 20000 German
establishments is interviewed about their relocation activities before 2001, between 2001
and 2003 and between 2004 and 2006. Especially they are asked for relocation which
implicitly includes a restructuring at home. We merge this information to characteristics
of regular reports on manufacturing establishment activities of DESTATIS via a unique
establishment identiﬁer. We end up with a second data set for a micro-level relocation
measure. Again we need three types of variables: treatment, outcome, and selection
variables. The outcome variable is equal to the outcome variable before, the diﬀerence
in log employment from the period before relocation to the period after relocation. The
relocation treatment variable is diﬀerentiated for three time periods: relocation to a
foreign country in years (i) 2001-2006, (ii) 2001-2003 and (ii) 2004-2006. Unfortunately,
the set of available selection characteristics is limited for this data set. Thus, we include
log employment, log sales per employee, and log wage per employee beside 2-digit industry-
and 16 regional dummies.
20See Wagner (2011) for a comprehensive description of the data.
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5.5. Propensity Score Estimation and Matching
The ﬁrst estimates we depict stem from the binary model which predicts the conditional
probability for every establishment to be an oﬀshoring establishment. We split up the
auxiliary estimates into two tables. Table 5.1 presents the results from our logit speciﬁ-
cation for the diﬀerent FDI measures. Column (1) presents the MUW selection variable
speciﬁcation for the FDI variable. The same speciﬁcation is used in columns (3), (4)
and (5) for the market-seeking FDI treatment (column 3), for the cost-saving FDI vari-
able (column 4) and for the low wage region FDI (column 5). Column (2) provides the
estimations from the Wagner speciﬁcation as a robustness check.
As expected we ﬁnd in our baseline the logarithm of the number of employees at a ﬁrm
as measure for ﬁrm size to have a positive sign and to be highly signiﬁcant. The same
holds for the logarithm of wage per employee, the high technology measure and the skill
composition of the establishment. All these coeﬃcients have the expected signs and
are highly signiﬁcant. The foreign ownership dummy is signiﬁcant as well, but shows a
counter intuitive sign at ﬁrst glance. We have expected a positive sign for foreign owned
ﬁrms. To explain the negative sign, we have to keep in mind that we observe single
establishments instead of whole ﬁrms or headquarters. If we observe an establishment
that is foreign owned it is likely that this establishment is part of a multinational. Hence,
it might be just a subsidiary. If we look at a foreign direct investment decision, as we
do here, it is fair to say that this decision is undertaken more likely by the (foreign)
headquarter. Hence, it might not be surprising that we ﬁnd a negative sign.
If we compare the coeﬃcients of the covariates of FDI in general to our market-seeking
FDI or low wage region FDI measure we ﬁnd no major diﬀerences. All point estimates
stay at similar values and stay signiﬁcant, too.
If we look at the covariates Wagner (2011) uses, we ﬁnd no counter intuitive results.
Moreover we ﬁnd the same signs for every covariate as Wagner (2011) does and mostly no
diﬀerences in the signiﬁcance level to his trimmed baseline speciﬁcation. Additionally, we
ﬁnd no important diﬀerences in the explanatory power across all speciﬁcations presented
in Table 5.1, except for the cost saving FDI treatment. Here just the size measure turns
out to be signiﬁcant. All other loose their signiﬁcance. We suspect the minimal number
of treatment cases of 25 as the reason for this.
Table 5.2 presents the eﬀects of covariates on the relocation decision. We provide four
speciﬁcations. First, column (1) shows the coeﬃcients of our baseline selection variable
speciﬁcation. Column (3) and (4) serve as robustness checks as before; therefore we use
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Table 5.1.: Propensity Score Estimation  FDI
MUW Wagner Market seeking Cost saving Low wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) region (5)
ln employment 0.724*** 0.713*** 0.692*** 0.715***
(t-1) (0.065) (0.086) (0.150) (0.081)
ln wage per employee 0.682*** 0.927** -0.132 0.613*
(t-1) (0.266) (0.368) (0.559) (0.350)
high technology 0.797*** 0.807** 0.632 1.073***
(t-1) (0.253) (0.355) (0.567) (0.351)
high-skilled 1.918*** 2.479*** 0.657 1.954***
(t-1) (0.406) (0.544) (0.958) (0.523)
foreign ownership
-1.268*** -1.216** -1.379 -1.028**
(0.40) (0.523) (1.070) (0.459)
employment 7.66e-04***
(t-1) (1.46e-04)
employment squared 7.42e-08**
(t-1) (2.99e-08)
employment cubic 1.73e-12
(t-1) 1.27e-12
sales per employee -2.61e-08
(t-1) (8.14e-08)
wage per employee 2.30e-04***
(t-1) (4.89e-05)
export share 0.015***
(t-1) (0.002)
employment change -0.811***
((t-2) - (t-1)) (0.299)
17 industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
16 regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.3322 0.3261 0.2791 0.1851 0.3136
Number of Obs. 5759 4972 4364 3018 5121
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance level. (1) MUW: dependent
variable investment abroad in business years 2004/2005; selection variables as in Moser et al. (2015).
(2) Wagner: dependent variable investment abroad in business yeas 2004/2005; selection variables
as in Wagner (2011). (3) Market seeking: dependent variable investment abroad in business years
2004/2005 if motivation is market seeking but not labor cost savings; selection variables as in Moser
et al. (2015). (4) Cost saving: dependent variable investment abroad in business years 2004/2005 if
motivation is labor cost saving but not market seeking; selection variables as in Moser et al. (2015).
(5) Low wage region: dependent variable investment abroad in business years 2004/2005 to Asia,
new EU members or Russia and south-east Europe; selection variables as in Moser et al. (2015).
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the MUW and the Wagner (2011) selection variables. Column (2) presents the results
for the quasi natural control group.
The baseline shows the expected positive and signiﬁcant signs for size, export share and
the aﬃliate dummy. Works councils are found to have a signiﬁcant negative impact on
the probability to oﬀshore, too. Contrary to the FDI cases, establishments that relocate
abroad self-assess to be further away from their technology frontier than establishments
that do not relocate. In speciﬁcations (3) and (4), only the size and the export share
variables remain signiﬁcant with the expected signs. For the quasi natural control group
speciﬁcation we ﬁnd the export share, the aﬃliate and the works council dummy to be
signiﬁcant determinants with the expected signs. Here the size and the high technology
status loose their explanatory power.
Table 5.3 reports the results of the propensity score estimation for the DESTATIS data.
Again, as expected we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the size measure with respect to log
employment. The two selection variables left, log sales per employee and log wage per
employee, remain insigniﬁcant for this data set.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 provide the balancing tests for the general FDI indicator between the
treatment and matched-control observations. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 do so for the relocation
variable. Unfortunately there is no analytical measure for the standardized diﬀerence test
but a percent bias below 20 is mentioned by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to be suﬃcient
to state balanced covariates. None of the remaining percent biases after the matching
process reaches this critical value. Also the mean diﬀerence t-test in column ﬁve does
not reject the null hypothesis. All p-values are far away from indicating an unbalanced
variable. The last balancing test of Hotelling is performed over three quantiles and
the hypothesis of an unbalanced composition in treatment and matched-control group is
clearly rejected.
Tables 5.6 and 5.9 provide the pre-test test for FDI variables and for relocation. The ﬁrst
column compares only the baseline estimates of the matching procedure with a standard
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach which employs the OLS estimator on a diﬀerentiated
estimation equation.21 According to the idea of the test, all outcomes stem from the
last and the second last period before treatment, respectively. None of the ATTs show
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence before treatment for the same matching partners as in the actual
matching period with treatment. Hence, we do not ﬁnd an indication of a violation of
the CMIA assumption.
21This standard approach is reported in all ATT output tables in the following.
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Table 5.2.: Propensity Score Logit Estimation  Relocation
SU Quasi natural MUW Wagner
control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln employment 0.396*** -0.084 0.228**
(t-1) (0.121) (0.210) (0.101)
high technology -0.570* 0.333 -0.419
(t-1) (0.330) (0.683) (0.309)
export share 0.023*** 0.028** 0.009***
(t-1) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003)
aﬃliate
0.782*** 1.522**
(0.365) (0.701)
works council
-1.049*** -5.299***
(0.460) (1.120)
log wage per employee -0.086
(t-1) (0.335)
high-skilled 0.147
(t-1) (0.592)
foreign ownership
0.783
(0.415)
employment 3.87e-04***
(t-1) (1.47e-04)
employment squared -3.19e-08*
(t-1) 1.81e-08
employment cubic 4.81e-13
(t-1) 3.98e-13
sales per employee -1.13e-07
(t-1) (3.79e-07)
wage per employee 2.69e-05
(t-1) (7.96e-05)
employment change -0.175
((t-2) - (t-1)) (0.373)
17 industry dummies yes yes yes yes
16 regional dummies yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.1259 0.4159 0.0819 0.1262
Number of Obs. 6496 214 7347 5271
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance level. (1) SU:
dependent variable displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country in period
01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007; selection variables as described in text. (2) Quasi natural control
group: dependent variable displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country in period
01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007; selection variables as described in text. (3) MUW: displacement
of an in-house activity to a foreign country in period 01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007; selection
variables as in Moser et al. (2015). (4) Cost saving: displacement of an in-house activity
to a foreign country in period 01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007; selection variables as in Wagner
(2011).
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Table 5.3.: Propensity Score Logit Estimation  Relocation DESTATIS
relocation 04-06 relocation 01-03 relocation 01-06
(1) (2) (3)
log employment 0.446*** 0.429*** 0.358***
(t-1) (0.059) (0.085) (0.075)
log sales per employee 0.0834 0.000 0.008
(t-1) (0.125) (0.197) (0.162)
log wage per employee 0.203 -0.083 0.135
(t-1) (0.286) (0.497) (0.411)
2-digit industry dummies yes yes yes
16 regional dummies yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.1056 0.0934 0.1008
Number of Obs. 2674 1259 1283
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance level. (1) relocation
04-06: dependent variable displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country in period
2004 to 2006; selection variables as described in text. (2) relocation 01-03: dependent variable
displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country in period 2001 to 2003; selection
variables as described in text. (3) relocation 01-06: displacement of an in-house activity to a
foreign country in period 2001 to 2006; selection variables as described in text.
5.6. Results
We present our results of the ATTs of FDI and relocation on employment again in sepa-
rated tables. Table 5.10 covers the speciﬁcations of FDI treatment variables. We present
the ATTs for diﬀerent bandwidths of kernel matching and diﬀerent number of neighbors
for k-nearest-neighbor matching. Table 5.11 covers the relocation treatment but reports
for the baseline speciﬁcation of covariates an additional column where the change in em-
ployment is measured one period later. Table 5.12 presents the results for the DESTATIS
data.
For our FDI measures we ﬁnd a robust positive treatment eﬀect on the employment.
Additionally, we cannot state a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the point estimates between the
diﬀerent measures of FDI. Hence, employment eﬀects of FDI in general, market-seeking
FDI, or low wage region FDI seem to have similar eﬀects on employment. The cost saving
FDI treatment does not yield signiﬁcant eﬀects at all, most possibly driven by the low
number of observations. This result is in line with most ﬁndings of previous studies. In
contrast to Debaere et al. (2010) we ﬁnd positive employment eﬀects, if the destination
is a low wage country, indicating that the market seeking motive might dominate for
German establishments in these countries.
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Table 5.6.: Heckman and Hotz Pre-Test  FDI
Time OLS for FDI ATT for FDI
t-1
0.029** 0.013
(0.012) (0.019)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthe-
sis; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance
level; OLS DiD: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence
estimator with robust standard errors
(White, 1980); matching method: ker-
nel matching; weighting: epanechnikov;
bandwidth: 0.01; standard errors are gen-
erated via bootstrapping with 500 repli-
cations; treatment variable: investment
abroad in the business years 2004 and/or
2005.
The picture looks quite diﬀerent if we look at the results for relocation (Table 5.11). Here,
all point estimates are negative and mostly signiﬁcant at the common levels. For the quasi
natural control group we ﬁnd very similar results to the estimated ATTs. Additionally, we
do not ﬁnd qualitatively diﬀerent results for the OLS diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates.
The point estimates somehow diﬀer in size  what is expected through a self selection of
establishments into internationalization  but not by their sign. Finally, in Table 5.12 we
provide the results from relocation for the DESTATIS data. Again we ﬁnd negative point
estimates for all three measures or time periods as described above. The quantitative
diﬀerence might be due to diﬀerent sizes of the observational units. For the IAB data we
do not have a size cutoﬀ, while the DESTATIS questionnaire only includes ﬁrms with at
least 100 employees. These eﬀects are qualitatively comparable to the relocation eﬀects
Wagner (2011) ﬁnds in some samples, but diﬀer quantitatively with much bigger negative
eﬀects on employment for our results.
FDI expansion  independently of the type of FDI  seems to create jobs at domestic
establishments or occurs in ﬁrms that expand both at home and abroad. Only in cases,
when domestic production is substituted for foreign production while the ﬁrm stagnates,
negative employment eﬀects show up. This result is in line with Moser et al. (2015)
who also use data on German establishments, but covering a diﬀerent time period. They
ﬁnd positive employment eﬀects from the increase in intermediate input purchases, but
negative employment eﬀects from the treatment where intermediate input purchases rise
simultaneous to partial establishment closure. This suggests that potential negative ef-
fects on employment at the establishment-level due to restructuring dominate potential
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Table 5.9.: Heckman and Hotz Pre-Test  Relocation
Time OLS relocation ATT Relocation
t-1
-0.042 -0.038
(0.027) (0.058)
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance level; OLS
DiD: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence estimator with ro-
bust standard errors (White, 1980); matching
method: kernel matching; weighting: epanech-
nikov; bandwidth: 0.01; standard errors are
generated via bootstrapping with 500 replica-
tions; treatment variable: displacement of an
in-house activity to a foreign country in period
01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007.
productivity eﬀects in cases where we observe a closure of an in-house activity. Our nega-
tive employment eﬀects at the establishment-level are even bigger which might be driven
by the fact that we can causally link a domestic restructuring to our relocation cases.
Our results seem to be sensitive to the mode of internationalization rather than to the
estimation method, the choice of control or selection variables, or the employed data
set. Qualitative diﬀerences in micro-level employment eﬀects in the literature may be
explained by diﬀerences in the actual proxy variables which are used to measure diﬀerent
theoretical concepts.
5.7. Conclusion
Empirical studies on employment eﬀects of oﬀshoring or FDI obtain opposing results. To
understand why results diﬀer so much, we have been investigating how diﬀerent measures
of oﬀshoring or FDI impact on domestic employment in German establishments using dif-
ferent estimation techniques, and control or selection variables. While neither estimation
techniques, nor the choice of variables is decisive for opposing employment eﬀects, posi-
tive employment eﬀects arise from FDI, market-seeking FDI, and even cost-saving FDI.
Instead, negative employment eﬀects derive from relocation abroad. We explain this
disparity of results by the diﬀerent types of FDI that are captured with the various mea-
sures. In most cases, FDI expansion may occur in the vein of a general expansion of
a multinational ﬁrm, creating jobs both at home or abroad. In other cases, expansion
abroad may even stimulate activities at home. Yet, in other cases, foreign activities may
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Table 5.10.: ATTs  FDI
MUW Wagner Market seeking Cost saving Low wage region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS DiD 0.047 0.033 0.067** 0.062 0.047*
(0.029) (0.022) (0.033) (0.042) (0.028)
kernel 0.01 0.087*** 0.064* 0.103** 0.054 0.071*
(0.028) (0.033) (0.045) (0.047) (0.036)
kernel 0.03 0.083*** 0.047 0.111*** 0.059 0.078**
(0.027) (0.031) (0.040) (0.043) (0.034)
kernel 0.05 0.083*** 0.047 0.112*** 0.062 0.079**
(0.026) (0.029) (0.039) (0.043) (0.032)
NN 1 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.092** 0.035 0.091**
(0.035) (0.042) (0.039) (0.061) (0.041)
NN 2 0.081*** 0.062* 0.109*** 0.047 0.077**
(0.028) (0.034) (0.038) (0.053) (0.034)
NN 3 0.074*** 0.065* 0.114*** 0.076 0.072**
(0.025) (0.034) (0.038) (0.049) (0.030)
treated Obs. 170 148 84 25 99
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance level; OLS DiD: Diﬀerence-
in-Diﬀerence estimator with robust standard errors (White, 1980); matching estimator PSMATCH2
(Leuven and Sinaesi, 2003); Kernel-matching: epanechnikov kernel; standard errors are generated
via bootstrapping with 500 replications; NN-matching: no caliper; standard errors stem from Abadie
and Imbens (2006) via NNMATCH (Abadie et al., 2004). (1) MUW: treatment investment abroad
in business years 2004/2005; propensity score estimation Table 5.1, speciﬁcation (1); control group
establishments without treatment. (2) Wagner: treatment investment abroad in business yeas
2004/2005; propensity score estimation 5.1, speciﬁcation (2); control group establishments without
treatment. (3) Market seeking: treatment investment abroad in business years 2004/2005 if moti-
vation is market seeking but not labor cost savings; propensity score estimation 5.1, speciﬁcation
(3); control group establishments without treatment. (4) Cost saving: treatment investment abroad
in business years 2004/2005 if motivation is labor cost saving but not market seeking; propensity
score estimation 5.1, speciﬁcation (4); control group establishments without treatment. (5) Low
wage region: treatment investment abroad in business years 2004/2005 to Asia, new EU members
or Russia and south-east Europe; propensity score estimation 5.1, speciﬁcation (5); control group
establishments without treatment.
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Table 5.11.: ATTs  Relocation
SU Quasi natural MUW Wagner
control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS DiD/ in (2) -0.148* -0.244*** -0.326* -0.043**
mean comparison (0.079) (0.089) (0.191) (0.020)
kernel 0.01 -0.325* -0.047 -0.310* -0.356
(0.170) (0.416) (0.180) (0.221)
kernel 0.03 -0.328* -0.263 -0.310* -0.346
(0.177) (0.410) (0.179) (0.225)
kernel 0.05 -0.330* -0.477 -0.310* -0.344
(0.178) (0.352) (0.179) (0.223)
NN1 -0.365** -0.459* -0.287 -0.068
(0.146) (0.264) (0.189) (0.168)
NN2 -0.362*** -0.432* -0.265* -0.339
(0.134) (0.259) (0.160) (0.236)
NN3 -0.348 -0.462** -0.307* -0.361
(0.188) (0.232) (0.163) (0.288)
treated Obs. 43 40 48 37
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance level;
OLS DiD: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence estimator with robust standard errors (White,
1980); matching estimator PSMATCH2 (Leuven and Sinaesi, 2003); Kernel-
matching: epanechnikov kernel; standard errors are generated via bootstrapping
with 500 replications; NN-matching: no caliper; standard errors stem from Abadie
and Imbens (2006) via NNMATCH (Abadie et al., 2004). (1) SU: treatment dis-
placement of an in-house activity to a foreign country in period 01.07.2006 to
30.06.2007; propensity score estimation Table 5.2, speciﬁcation (1); control group
establishments without treatment. (2) Quasi natural control group: treatment
displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country in period 01.07.2006 to
30.06.2007; propensity score estimation Table 5.2, speciﬁcation (2); control group
establishments without treatment if they had disclaimed to relocate in an agree-
ment with their workforce. (3) MUW: treatment displacement of an in-house
activity to a foreign country in period 01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007; propensity score
estimation Table 5.2, speciﬁcation (3); control group establishments without treat-
ment. (4) Wagner: treatment displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign
country in period 01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007; propensity score estimation Table 1,
speciﬁcation (4); control group establishments without treatment.
121
Table 5.12.: ATTs  Relocation DESTATIS
relocation 04-06 relocation 01-03 relocation 01-06
(1) (2) (3)
kernel 0.01 -0.026* -0.008 -0.039
(0.014) (0.019) (0.028)
kernel 0.03 -0.026* -0.009 -0.044
(0.014) (0.018) (0.027)
kernel 0.05 -0.027* -0.008 -0.042
(0.013) (0.017) (0.027)
NN1 -0.030* -0.004 -0.048
(0.016) (0.023) (0.032)
NN2 -0.026* -0.001 -0.045*
(0.014) (0.020) (0.026)
NN3 -0.020 -0.001 -0.057**
(0.014) (0.018) (0.026)
treated Obs. 535 210 348
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signiﬁcance level;
matching estimator PSMATCH2 (Leuven and Sinaesi, 2003); Kernel-matching:
epanechnikov kernel; standard errors are generated via bootstrapping with 500
replications; NN-matching: no caliper; standard errors stem from Abadie and
Imbens (2008) via NNMATCH (Abadie et al., 2004). (1) relocation 04-06:
dependent variable displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country
in period 2004 to 2006; propensity score estimation Table 5.3, speciﬁcation
(1); control group establishments without treatment. (2) relocation 01-03:
dependent variable displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country in
period 2001 to 2003; propensity score estimation Table 5.3, speciﬁcation (2);
(3) relocation 01-06: displacement of an in-house activity to a foreign country
in period 2001 to 2006; selection variables as described in text; propensity score
estimation Table 5.3, speciﬁcation (3); control group establishments without
treatment.
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substitute for domestic activities while the ﬁrm as a whole stagnates. Diﬀerent measures
of oﬀshoring or FDI capture those cases in diﬀerent proportions.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1. Derivation of Multinomial-Logit Probabilities
I follow a standard discrete choice setting à la McFadden (1974) to derive multinomial-
logit probabilities. The presentation closely follows Train (2003). The probability of the
decision of worker h to migrate from o to d, Podh, is given by
Podh = Prob(Vod + εodh > Vok + εokh ∀ k 6= d)
Podh = Prob(εokh < εodh + Vod − Vok ∀ k 6= d),
(A.1)
where Vod gives the observed part of the utility from immigration to country d for all
workers from o, Vok gives the observed part of the utility from immigrating to any other
country k from o for all workers from o and εodh and εokh are the worker and country-pair
speciﬁc utility components correspondingly. V 's are known to the researcher and ε's are
private information to the workers and assumed independently, identically distributed
extreme value with density
f(εodh) = e
−εodhe−e
−εodh , (A.2)
and cumulative distribution
F (εodh) = e
−e−εodh . (A.3)
Conditional on εodh Equation (3.9) is the cumulative distribution for each εokh evaluated
at εodh + Vod − Vok given by Equation (B.2). For independent εs we can write the cumu-
lative distribution over all other alternatives as the product of the individual cumulative
distributions. As usual we reach the unconditional Podh by integrating Podh | εodh over all
possible values of εodh for the given density (B.1):
Podh =
∫ (∏
k 6=d
e−e
−(εodh+Vod−Vok)
)
e−εodhe−e
−εodhdεodh. (A.4)
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Starting from this expression we can derive the standard multinomial-logit choice prob-
ability expression.
Podh =
∫ ∞
εodh=−∞
(∏
k
e−e
−(εodh+Vod−Vok)
)
e−εodhdεodh (A.5)
=
∫ ∞
εodh=−∞
exp
(
−
∑
k
−e−(εodh+Vod−Vok)
)
e−εodhdεodh (A.6)
=
∫ ∞
εodh=−∞
exp
(
−e−εodh
∑
k
−e−(Vod−Vok)
)
e−εodhdεodh. (A.7)
If we deﬁne t = e(−εodh) such that −e(−εodh)dεodh = dt and noting that t approaches 0 as
εodh goes to inﬁnity and t is inﬁnite if εodh approaches negative inﬁnity, we get
Podh =
∫ 0
∞
exp
(
−t
∑
k
e−(Vod−Vok)
)
(−dt) (A.8)
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−t
∑
k
e−(Vod−Vok)
)
dt (A.9)
=
exp
(−t∑k e−(Vod−Vok))
−∑k e−(Vod−Vok)
∣∣∣∣∣
∞
0
(A.10)
=
1∑
k e
−(Vod−Vok) =
eVod∑
k e
Vok
. (A.11)
A.2. From Aggregate Migration Flow Equation to a
Structural Migration Gravity System
Note that all natives from country o are split up over all n countries including the home
country which leads to the accounting identity,
∑
dMod = No.
∑
oMod = Ld is the
number of all migrants coming to d, including natives that stay in d,Mdd. This is then the
labor force available in country d. Following Anderson (2011), deﬁne Wo ≡
∑
k wk/δok
and note that the world labor supply is Nw ≡ ∑oNo = ∑d Ld. So, assuming full
employment in the world and using Equation (3.13) we can rewrite Ld as
Ld = wd
∑
o
((1/δod)/Wo)No. (A.12)
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From this we can infer wd as
wd =
Ld
ΩdNw
, with (A.13)
Ωd =
∑
o
1/δod
Wo
No
Nw
. (A.14)
Using Equation (3.16) we can write Wo as
Wo =
∑
k
wk
δok
=
∑
k
Lk
ΩkδokNw
. (A.15)
Substituting into Mod (Equation (2.3)) we can write
Mod =
wd/δod∑
k wk/δok
No =
LdNo1/δod
NwΩdWo
. (A.16)
Ld is exogenous in this model by Anderson (2011). In Chapter 3 of this thesis, where
wages of this model are determined in a linked trade system, we are able to endogenize
Ld. The modularity of the gravity model still allows me here to calculate equilibrium
changes of the multilateral resistance terms conditional on Ld.
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B. Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1. Derivation of Multinomial-Logit Probabilities
We closely followed the standard logit setting à la McFadden (1974) and Train (2003) to
derive these logit probabilities.
We start from Equation (3.9) with density
f(εjih) = e
−εjihe−e
−εjih
, (B.1)
and cumulative distribution
F (εjih) = e
−e−εjih . (B.2)
Conditional on εjih Equation (3.9) is the cumulative distribution for each εjkh evaluated
at εjih + Vji − Vjk given by equation (B.2)). For independent ε`s we can write the cumu-
lative distribution over all other alternatives as the product of the individual cumulative
distributions. As usual we reach the unconditional Pjih by integrating Pjih | εjih over all
possible values of εjih for the given density B.1:
Pjih =
∫ (∏
k 6=i
e−e
−(εjih+Vji−Vjk)
)
e−εjihe−e
−εjih
dεjih.
Starting from this expression we can derive the standard multinomial-logit choice prob-
ability expression.
Pjih =
∫ ∞
εjih=−∞
(∏
k
e−e
−(εjih+Vji−Vjk)
)
e−εjihdεjih
=
∫ ∞
εjih=−∞
exp
(
−
∑
k
−e−(εjih+Vji−Vjk)
)
e−εjihdεjih
=
∫ ∞
εjih=−∞
exp
(
−e−εjih
∑
k
−e−(Vji−Vjk)
)
e−εjihdεjih
(B.3)
139
If we deﬁne t = e(−εjih) such that −e(−εjih)dεjih = dt and noting that t approaches 0 as
εjih goes to inﬁnity and t is inﬁnite if εjih approaches negative inﬁnity, we get
Pjih =
∫ 0
∞
exp
(
−t
∑
k
e−(Vji−Vjk)
)
(−dt)
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−t
∑
k
e−(Vji−Vjk)
)
dt
=
exp
(−t∑k e−(Vji−Vjk))
−∑k e−(Vji−Vjk)
∣∣∣∣∣
∞
0
=
1∑
k e
−(Vji−Vjk) =
eVji∑
k e
Vjk
.
(B.4)
B.2. Suﬃcient Statistics for Welfare with Bilateral
Migration Based on GDP per Labor Force
We follow Arkolakis et al. (2012) in deriving a suﬃcient statistics for welfare when allowing
for bilateral migration. Considered is a foreign trade shock that leaves the ability to
serve the own market, tjj, unchanged as in Arkolakis et al. (2012). Using Yj = wjLj,
we can write d lnYj = d lnwj + d lnLj. Real consumer expenditure per labor force is
given by Wj ≡ Yj/ (PjLj) and taking logs, the total diﬀerential is given by d lnWj =
d lnYj − d lnPj − d lnLj.
We ﬁrst take the total diﬀerential of lnPj = ln
{[∑n
i=1 (βipitij)
1−σ] 11−σ}:
d lnPj =
n∑
i=1
((
βipitij
Pj
)1−σ
d ln pi +
(
βipitij
Pj
)1−σ
d ln tij
)
.
Using Xij = ((βipitij)/Pj)
1−σ Yj and deﬁning λij = Xij/Yj = ((βipitij)/Pj)
1−σ, yields
d lnPj =
n∑
i=1
λij (d ln pi + d ln tij) . (B.5)
Noting that d ln pi = d lnwi holds, we can also write d lnPj =
∑n
i=1 λij (d lnwi + d ln tij).
Combining terms leads to d lnWj = d lnYj − d lnPj = d lnwj + d lnLj
−∑ni=1 λij (d lnwi + d ln tij). Taking the ratio of λij and λjj we can write λij/λjj =
[(βipitij)/(βjpjtjj)]
1−σ. Noting that dtjj = 0 by assumption, the log-change of this ratio
is given by d lnλij − d lnλjj = (1− σ) (d ln pi + d ln tij − d ln pj). Combining this with
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Equation (B.5) leads to:
d lnPj =
1
1− σ
(
n∑
i=1
λijd lnλij − d lnλjj
n∑
i=1
λij
)
+ d ln pj
n∑
i=1
λij.
Noting that Yj =
∑n
i=1Xij, it follows that
∑n
i=1 λij = 1 and d
∑n
i=1 λij =
∑n
i=1 dλij = 0.
Hence,
∑n
i=1 λijd lnλij =
∑n
i=1 dλij = 0. Using these facts, the above expression simpliﬁes
to d lnPj = − 11−σd lnλjj + d ln pj = − 11−σd lnλjj + d lnwj, using again d ln pj = d lnwj.
Using these expression in d lnWj leads to d lnWj = d lnwj+d lnLj+ 11−σd lnλjj−d lnwj−
d lnLj =
1
1−σd lnλjj. Integrating between the initial and the counterfactual situation we
get ln Wˆj = 11−σ ln λˆjj. Taking exponents leads to
Wˆj = λˆ
1
1−σ
jj . (B.6)
This expression is identical to the suﬃcient statistics of Arkolakis et al. (2012). Hence,
allowing for bilateral migration does not change the suﬃcient statistic for welfare when
focusing on real expenditure per labor force.
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C. Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: We ﬁrst derive how the omitted variable ωij is correlated with distance dij. This
can easily be seen by inserting (4.2) into (4.3) and taking the expected value conditional
on distance dij and the other control variables z0 ≡ γ0 + ζi + ξj − κφij to obtain
E[ωij |dij, z0 ] =
∫
fωij (ωij) ln [exp [δ (z0 − γdij + ηij)]− 1] dωij ≡ Ω (z0, dij) , (C.1)
where fωij (ωij) is the marginal distribution function of ωij, and we take ωij to be con-
ditionally independent of dij and z0, i.e. we investigate the omitted variable bias after
having properly controlled for the selection bias (such as by the Heckman correction fac-
tor) or, equivalently, considering the case where no trade ﬂows are missing.1 This has the
purpose of comparing the Heckman estimator, which controls the selection bias but suﬀers
from the omitted variable bias with the HMR estimator which controls for both biases.
Controlling conceptually for the selection bias while analyzing the omitted variable bias
implies that eδ(zo−γdij+ηij) > 1 to ensure that there are no missing observations causing
selection bias. Moreover, Ω (zo, dij) is the non-linear conditional expectation function,
the shape of which is easy to analyze. Taking the derivative of (C.1) with respect to
distance dij, we obtain
∂E[ωij |dij, z0 ]
∂dij
= −γδ
∫
fωij (ωij)
eδ(z0−γdij+ωij)
eδ(z0−γdij+ηij) − 1dωij < 0. (C.2)
Hence, there is a negative correlation between ωij and dij, because the share of exporting
ﬁrms becomes smaller the larger is distance.
1To see how this equation is obtained, note that by deﬁnition of a conditional expected value
E[ωij |dij , z0 ] =
∫
f (ωij |dij , z0 )ωijdωij , where f (ωij |dij , z0 ) is the conditional distribution of ωij
(see for example Greene (2012), (B-51)). If we then assume that ωij is conditionally independent of dij
and z0, we obtain from (B-60) f (ωij |dij , z0 ) = fωij (ωij) , where fωij (ωij) is the marginal probabil-
ity density (see B-45). Inserting this relation above, we obtain: E[ωij |dij , z0 ] =
∫
fωij (ωij)ωijdωij .
Inserting (4.2) and (4.3) into this relation yields (C.1).
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C.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Rewrite (4.1) as mij = β′Xij +ωij +uij and z∗ij in (4.4) as z
∗
ij = ϕ
∗′Xij +η∗ij where
β≡ (β0, λj, χi,−γ)′, and ϕ∗=
(
γ∗0 , ξ
∗
j , ζ
∗
i ,−γ∗
)′
,−κ∗. Let, βˆOLS denote the OLS estimator
of β ignoring the sample selection and omitted variable corrections. We then obtain:
E
(
βˆOLS
)
= β +
[
XijX
′
ij
]−1
XijE
[
ωij + uij
∣∣z∗ij > 0] , (C.3)
where we have exploited that the Xij variables contain only geography information and
are therefore deterministic. To evaluate (C.3), examine the conditional expectations
E
[
ωij
∣∣z∗ij > 0] and E [uij ∣∣z∗ij > 0]. Using formula (16.36) on p. 549 in Cameron and
Trivedi (2005), we ﬁrst obtain:
E
[
uij
∣∣z∗ij > 0] = cov (uij, η∗ij)E [η∗ij|η∗ij > ϕ∗′Xij − κ∗φij] (C.4)
= corr (uij, uij + νij)
σu
ση
φ (ϕ∗′Xij − κ∗φij)
Φ (ϕ∗′Xij − κ∗φij)
≡ βuηη¯ij > 0,
where βuη = corr (uij, uij + νij)σu/ση and η¯ij =
φ(ϕ∗′Xij−κ∗φij)
Φ(ϕ∗′Xij−κ∗φij) . Further, we have as-
sumed that uij and η∗ij are bivariate normally distributed. Note that this implies that
uij = cov(uij, η
∗
ij) η
∗
ij/σ
2
η + %ij, where %ij is independent of η
∗
ij and has zero mean.
Hence, E
[
uij
∣∣η∗ij > ϕ∗′Xij − κ∗φij ] = cov(uij, η∗ij) 1/σ2ηE [η∗ij ∣∣η∗ij > ϕ∗′Xij − κ∗φij ] and
cov
(
uij, η
∗
ij
)
= corr (uij, uij + νij)σuση. To proceed, use a linear approximation of ωij =
ln
[(
Z∗ij
)δ − 1] for z∗ij > 0.We can then write ωij = ln [(Z∗ij)δ − 1] = ln [exp (δz∗ijl)− 1] ≈
δz∗ij > 0, where δ = ση
k−ε+1
ε−1 is deﬁned as above.
2 We then obtain:
E
[
ωij
∣∣z∗ij > 0] , (C.5)
= E
[
δz∗ij
∣∣z∗ij > 0] = δE [{E [z∗ij |Xij ]+ η∗ij} ∣∣z∗ij > 0]
= δE
[
z∗ij |Xij
]
+ δE
[
η∗ij
∣∣z∗ij > 0] ,
= δE
[
γ∗0 + ξ
∗
j + ζ
∗
i − γ∗dij − κ∗φij |Xij
]
+ δE
[
η∗ij
∣∣z∗ij > 0] ,
= δ
[
γ∗0 + ξ
∗
j + ζ
∗
i − γd∗ij − κ∗φij +
_
η
∗
ij
]
,
= δϕ∗′Xij + δη¯∗ij.
2It can be shown that this approximation works very well in the range of ωij from [0.5,∞] and estimated
values of δ around 1.
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Noting that [X′X]−1 X′Xϕ∗δ = ϕ∗δ, we obtain:
E
(
βˆOLS
)
= β + ϕ∗δ +
[
XijX
′
ij
]−1
Xijδη¯
∗
ij +
[
XijX
′
ij
]−1
Xijβuηη¯
∗
ij T 0. (C.6)
Since country dummies in Xij are not correlated by construction and distance is hardly
correlated with country dummies the matrix X′X can be viewed as diagonal. But then:
E
(−γˆOLS) = −γ − γδ + ∑i∑j dij∑
i
∑
j (dij)
2 [δ + βuη] η¯
∗
ij, (C.7)
and hence
Bias( γˆOLS) = γδ −
∑
i
∑
j dij∑
i
∑
j (dij)
2 [δ + βuη] η¯
∗
ij.

C.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: From (4.8), we have Bias(γˆOLS) = γδ − Ξ [δ + βuη] η¯∗ij. Thus, it follows that
∂Bias(γˆOLS)
∂t
= δ ∂γ
∂t
− Ξ [δ + βuη] ∂η¯
∗
ij
∂t
. The change of the omitted variable bias over time is
simply given by:
∂ (δγ)
∂t
= δ
∂γ
∂t
< 0.
The sign of the change of the sample selection bias depends on the sign of
∂η¯∗ij
∂t
=
∂
(
φ(z∗ij)
Φ(z∗ij)
)
∂t
(C.8)
=
1
Φ(z∗ij)2
[(
φ′
(
z∗ij
) · Φ (z∗ij)− φ (z∗ij)2)] ∂z∗ij∂t
=
−z∗ijφ (z∗ij)
Φ
(
z∗ij
) −(φ (z∗ij)
Φ
(
z∗ij
))2
 ∂z∗ij
∂t
=
[
−z∗ij η¯∗ij −
(
η¯∗ij
)2] ∂z∗ij
∂t
= −η¯∗ij
[
z∗ij + η¯
∗
ij
] ∂z∗ij
∂t
.
Note that
∂z∗ij
∂t
= −dij ∂γ (t)
∂t
> 0.
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The derivative of the mills ratio
∂η¯∗ij
∂z∗ij
= −η¯∗ij
[
z∗ij + η¯
∗
ij
]
is negative. This can be shown by
noting that
E
[
η∗ij
∣∣η∗ij > −ϕ′X] = φ (ϕ′X)Φ (ϕ′X) = φ (−ϕ′X)1− Φ (−ϕ′X) , (C.9)
and using the result derived in Sampford (1953) and also given in Theorem 19.2 on page
876 in Greene (2012), that for φ (x) / (1− Φ (x)) the derivative with respect to x is given
by
φ (x)
1− Φ (x)
[
φ (x)
1− Φ (x) − x
]
, (C.10)
and bounded between zero and one. Using the equality given in Equation ((C.9)), we
may write this as:
φ (ϕ′X)
Φ (ϕ′X)
[
φ (ϕ′X)
Φ (ϕ′X)
+ ϕ′X
]
= η¯ij [zij + η¯ij] . (C.11)
Hence, this expression diﬀers from our derivative of η¯∗ij only by the multiplication with
−1. Hence, the derivative of η¯∗ij with respect to z∗ij is bounded between −1 and 0. But
then
∂η¯∗ij
∂t
= ∂
[
φ
(
z∗ij
)
/Φ
(
z∗ij
)]
/∂t < 0. The change in the bias for OLS is therefore
ambiguous, depending on whether the change in the sample selection bias or the change
in the omitted variable bias is larger:
∂Bias(γˆOLS)
∂t
= δ
∂γ
∂t
− Ξ [δ + βuη]
∂η¯∗ij
∂t
T 0. (C.12)

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D. Appendix to Chapter 5
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